




# RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS

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Fiscal Year 1991



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


Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

92-10426



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## National Desert Storm Reservists Day, 1991

*By the President of the United States of America*

### A Proclamation

On this occasion we gratefully salute the members of the National Guard and Reserve forces of the United States—dedicated and highly trained men and women who played a major role in the success of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Whether they served directly in the Persian Gulf or on military bases in the United States and elsewhere around the world, as members of our Nation's Total Force, these National Guardsmen and reservists made a vital contribution toward the liberation of Kuwait.

During the course of the war in the Persian Gulf, more than 228,000 members of the Ready Reserve were ordered to active duty. Thousands more volunteered in advance of being called to support the coalition effort. Members of the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve—these men and women were trained and ready to do their jobs. As they have done for all conflicts since colonial times, guardsmen and reservists responded quickly to the call. They promptly assumed a variety of combat missions such as armor, artillery, tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and minesweeping. Their support missions included transportation, medical, airlift, service/supply, civil affairs, intelligence, military police, and communications.

When called to active duty, members of the Ready Reserve were suddenly required to leave behind their families and their careers. As we thank our Desert Storm reservists for the many sacrifices that they have made in behalf of our country, it is fitting that we also honor their loved ones. They too have shown the extraordinary degree of patriotism and courage that we have come to expect of the Nation's military families. National Guard and Reserve units worked in close cooperation with the Active Services to develop a broad-based family support network to assist these new military dependents.

The Nation's employers, educators, and other institutions throughout the private sector have provided strong support and assistance to their reservist employees and students who were called to duty on short notice. The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, a 4,000-member network of business and civic leader volunteers, has put forth special efforts to help guardsmen and reservists, as well as their employers, to understand their job rights and responsibilities.

In recognition of their vital role in the liberation of Kuwait, the Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 134, has designated May 22, 1991, as "National Desert Storm Reservists Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this day.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 22, 1991, as National Desert Storm Reservists Day. I call upon all Americans to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities in honor of the courageous men and women of the United States Ready Reserve.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-first day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fifteenth.

The signature of George H. W. Bush is written in cursive at the bottom right of the page.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

28 FEB 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Department of Defense Reserve  
Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1991

The Department of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board's  
Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1991 is hereby provided.

This comprehensive report reviews the progress that has been  
made by the Department in improving the readiness of the National  
Guard and Reserve components. In the Board's judgement, there  
are areas where further improvements are required to make the  
Reserve forces more effective members of the Total Force. Also,  
in this year's report, the Board recognizes the significant  
contributions of the Reserve components in Operations DESERT  
SHIELD/STORM.

The report represents the collective views of the members of  
the Board, and not the official policy positions of this  
Department or any other Department or agency of the United States  
government.

The Board continues to make excellent contributions to our  
efforts to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve are  
adequately manned, equipped, trained, and ready as part of the  
Total Force. The Board's assistance to me and the Department has  
been significant and most appreciated.

*Phil Cheney*

Attachment:  
As Stated



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

28 FEB 1992

Honorable Dan Quayle  
President of the Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

The Department of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board's Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1991 is hereby provided.

This comprehensive report reviews the progress that has been made by the Department in improving the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve components. In the Board's judgement, there are areas where further improvements are required to make the Reserve forces more effective members of the Total Force. Also, in this year's report, the Board recognizes the significant contributions of the Reserve components in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The report represents the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other Department or agency of the United States government.

The Board continues to make excellent contributions to our efforts to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve are adequately manned, equipped, trained, and ready as part of the Total Force. The Board's assistance to me and the Department has been significant and most appreciated.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:  
As Stated



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

28 FEB 1992

Honorable Thomas S. Foley  
Speaker of the House  
of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

The Department of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board's Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1991 is hereby provided.

This comprehensive report reviews the progress that has been made by the Department in improving the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve components. In the Board's judgement, there are areas where further improvements are required to make the Reserve forces more effective members of the Total Force. Also, in this year's report, the Board recognizes the significant contributions of the Reserve components in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The report represents the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other Department or agency of the United States government.

The Board continues to make excellent contributions to our efforts to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve are adequately manned, equipped, trained, and ready as part of the Total Force. The Board's assistance to me and the Department has been significant and most appreciated.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:  
As Stated

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**This report represents the Reserve Forces Policy Board's independent review of Reserve component issues, and provides a consensus evaluation of Reserve component programs. It includes the collective views of the Board members, and does not necessarily reflect the official policy positions of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States government.**

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
# **Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1991**

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**The Annual Report of the  
Reserve Forces Policy Board**

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-7300



The logo of the Reserve Forces Policy Board represents the total military force as the shield for the Nation. The United States is identified by its national symbol, the eagle. The blue field represents the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps is a part of the Navy Department. The Coast Guard becomes a part of that department in time of war. Integrated in that field are three stars depicting the Active Component, National Guard, and Reserve of the departments. The seven vertical stripes of the shield stand for the seven Reserve components—Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

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The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board is a reflection of the consensus of the 22-member Board. Although most recommendations and proposed policy changes have unanimous support, neither this report nor the signatures of the members purport that the signers, the Services, or the Department of Defense concur with every recommended action or position.



## Reserve Forces Policy Board Members

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### Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.

Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board Attorney-at-Law, Hazel & Thomas, P C , Falls Church, Virginia and Washington, DC Legislative Counsel to the Secretary of Defense, 1989-1990, Secretary of the Army, 1981-1989 Previously, Counselor, with Cabinet rank, to President Gerald Ford, Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs Representative in Congress from Virginia, 1963-1971 Appointed Chairman November 16, 1989

*John O. Marsh, Jr.*



### Major General William R. Berkman United States Army

Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board Chief, Army Reserve, 1979-1986 Attorney-at-Law, Morrison & Foerster San Francisco, California, 1957 to 1979 Assigned to Board August 1 1986

*William R. Berkman*



**HONORABLE G. KIM WINCUP**

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs),  
Washington, DC. Assigned to Board November 22, 1989

*G. Kim Wincup*



**LIEUTENANT GENERAL J.H. BINFORD PEAY, III  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the  
Army, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board September 3, 1991.

*J. H. Binford Peay III*



**MAJOR GENERAL WARREN G. LAWSON  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

The Adjutant General for the State of Iowa, Johnston, Iowa  
Assigned to Board August 1, 1990

*Warren G. Lawson*



**MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES J. WING  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

The Adjutant General for the State of Wyoming, Cheyenne,  
Wyoming. Assigned to Board December 1, 1990

*Charles J. Wing*



**MAJOR GENERAL THEODORE W. PAULSON  
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Commander, 63d Army Reserve Command, Los Alamitos, California Manager of Mapping Services, Southern California Edison Company, Long Beach, California Assigned to Board February 25, 1991

*Theodore W. Paulson*



**MAJOR GENERAL KENNETH A. BOULDIN  
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Commander, 125th Army Reserve Command, Nashville, Tennessee President, Computer Dealers & Lessors Association, Washington, DC Assigned to Board April 11, 1991

*Kenneth A. Bouldin*



**HONORABLE BARBARA SPYRIDON POPE**

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC Assigned to Board November 21, 1989

*Barbara Spyridon Pope*



**REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD B. BAKER, JR.  
UNITED STATES NAVY**

Director, Strategy Plans and Policy Division Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington DC Assigned to Board April 1 1991

*Edward B. Baker, Jr.*





**REAR ADMIRAL SAMUEL E. McWILLIAMS**  
**UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Deputy Commander, U S Maritime Defense Zone Pacific, Alameda, California Manager, International Operations, United Airlines, Denver, Colorado Assigned to Board May 1, 1989

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Samuel E. McWilliams".



**REAR ADMIRAL DAVID A. JANES**  
**UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Deputy Commander, Naval Surface Force, U S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California Chairman of the Board, California Manufacturing Enterprises, City of Industry, California Assigned to Board August 1, 1990

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "David A. Janes".



**MAJOR GENERAL JOHN F. CRONIN**  
**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

Deputy Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia Rancher, Bend, Oregon Assigned to Board October 1, 1990

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "John F. Cronin".



**BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL I. NEIL**  
**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California President, Neil, Dymott, Perkins, Brown & Frank Law Offices, San Diego, California Assigned to Board February 19 1990

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Michael I. Neil".



**HONORABLE J.G. COOPER**

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Environment), Washington, DC. Assigned to Board December 5, 1989

A handwritten signature of J.G. Cooper in cursive script.



**BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES T. ROBERTSON, JR.  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

Director of Personnel Plans Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board November 12, 1991

A handwritten signature of C.T. Robertson, Jr. in cursive script.



**MAJOR GENERAL DRENNAN A. CLARK  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

The Adjutant General for the State of Nevada, Carson City, Nevada  
Assigned to Board June 1, 1991

A handwritten signature of Drennan A. Clark in cursive script.



**MAJOR GENERAL DONALD L. OWENS  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

The Adjutant General for the State of Arizona, Phoenix, Arizona  
Assigned to Board April 1, 1990

A handwritten signature of Donald L. Owens in cursive script.



**MAJOR GENERAL HARVEY J. McCARTER**  
**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE**

Mobilization Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Pilot, KLM Airlines. Assigned to Board September 13, 1989.

*Harvey J. McCarter*

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**BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES E. SHERRARD, III**  
**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE**

Commander, Fourth Air Force, McClellan Air Force Base, California Assigned to Board June 1, 1991

*James E. Sherrard*

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**REAR ADMIRAL JOHN W. LOCKWOOD**  
**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**

Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC Assigned to Board September 18, 1991

*J. W. Lockwood*

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**REAR ADMIRAL G. ROBERT MERRILEES**  
**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESERVE**

Senior Reserve Officer, Pacific Area  
Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California  
Program Analyst, TQM and Employee Development,  
NASA, Kennedy Space Center, Florida  
Assigned to Board January 5, 1991

*GR Merrilees*



# Executive Summary

## General

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board), acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve components" (10 USC 175(c)).

Representatives of each of the seven Reserve components (Army and Air National Guard, and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard Reserve) serve as members of the Board, together with officers from the Active components of each Military Department and the Coast Guard and the Assistant Secretaries for Reserve Affairs from each Service, as prescribed by law (10 USC 175(a), (b)).

The Board is required by statute to prepare an annual report on Reserve programs of the Department of Defense (DoD) which the Secretary of Defense provides to the President and the Congress (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report details contributions of the Reserve components to the Total Force and addresses matters pertaining to National Guard and Reserve readiness.

The report reviews the progress that has been made by the Department of Defense and the Services in improving the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve components and areas where, in the Board's judgement, further improvements are required. In this year's report, the Board recognizes the significant contributions of the Reserve components in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Department of Defense implemented the Total Force Policy in 1973. It has been fundamental to U.S. national security policy ever since. Reserve component units have been integrated into virtually all theater operational plans. The Reserve components contribute significantly to the combat, combat support, and combat service support elements of each Service. The Total Force Policy has served our Nation well.

Today, more than ever, greater dependence is being placed on the Reserve components. Most warfighting contingency plans and peacetime operations include the Reserve components. The use of the Presidential call-up authority and the employment of Reserve component personnel in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL demonstrate the realities of a global threat and the continued requirement for a strong and ready Total Force. Reserve components were also involved in ongoing operational missions support, including drug interdiction activities and disaster relief.

The Reserve components provide a cost-effective means for augmenting the Active components and maintaining a strong national defense, while responding to changing requirements and budget mandates. Although the Reserve components are capable of additional missions, they must be adequately resourced and supportable within the parameters of Reserve component recruiting, retention, and training.

## **Force Structure**

The Reserve components are full partners with the Active components under the Total Force Policy. The efforts made over the last decade to strengthen the Reserve components have paid great dividends—deterrence of conflict and reduction of tensions between the major powers of the world. It has been understood since the early eighties that large-scale combat operations could not be successfully conducted without the Reserve components. Their increased involvement in contingency operations has demonstrated that their use in even low intensity scenarios is no less essential, especially in early mobilization support and reinforcement roles. Since the Total Force Policy was implemented, the Reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness, which this year has been validated by the Reserve components' successful response to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL.

Defense budget cuts and revised threat assessments will significantly impact the force structure of our Armed Forces. The Board believes that potential threats to United States' interests should be the primary factor in shaping Active/Reserve force mix decisions.

Although force structure decisions are dependent primarily on the senior military and political leadership perceptions of the future threat, the Board believes that all components, Active and Reserve, should participate in such decisions to ensure that their respective capabilities, contributions, and cost effectiveness are appropriately considered for the most viable future force structure. Sufficient Active component forces must be immediately available to respond to low intensity conflicts. However, for even the smallest operation, it is likely Reserve component support will be required for missions such as strategic airlift and civil affairs.

The Board recommends that careful analysis be conducted before approving Reserve component budget reductions, to ensure full

consideration of Reserve component cost effectiveness and force capability requirements resulting from the projected threats. If budget constraints cause the Services to make force structure reductions in the Active forces, a thorough analysis should be conducted on the feasibility of transferring that capability to the Reserve components. The Board continues to oppose the concept of "equal cuts" in Active and Reserve component budgets without appropriate analysis. Further, the Board believes it important to:

- resource the Reserve components with the necessary personnel and equipment.
- provide training support through adequate facilities, ranges, and schools.
- provide sufficient ground vehicle miles, flying hours, and steaming days to maintain individual and unit proficiency.
- properly equip combat support and combat service support units, and greatly enhance training support for these units.

The Board further recommends that additional or enhanced mission assignments be considered for the Reserve components, including continued involvement in drug interdiction and demand reduction programs.

## **Personnel**

The required Reserve component units and individuals were available on short notice to support the initial deployments for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. However, some categories of personnel were almost fully utilized, and there would not have been sufficient replacements in the event of casualties or troop rotation. Also, there are continuing shortages in some Selected Reserve health care specialties, of junior officers and warrant officers, and in a number of critical specialties. Some of these shortages have persisted for years and may require additional incentives. Continuing efforts are also needed to increase the percentage of personnel who are fully qualified in their current duty positions.

No significant differences in attrition have been noted between units which were mobilized for Operations DESERT

SHIELD/STORM and those not mobilized. In some instances, fiscal year 1991 losses are less than fiscal year 1990. Replacing Selected Reservists who depart prior to completion of their term of service is costly and time consuming. Retention of trained personnel should continue to receive a high priority.

The Board is closely monitoring medical personnel strength to permit early identification of recruiting or retention problems resulting from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM<sup>4</sup>. To date, there is cautious optimism that attrition levels will not be significantly greater than in prior years. Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT have reemphasized the importance of Reserve component health care professional personnel. Substantial numbers of physicians, nurses, and other Reserve component health care professionals volunteered or were called to active duty in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Fortunately, because of low numbers of casualties, the health care professionals did not have to be fully utilized for casualty care.

One of the key issues continuing to impact on the Reserve components is Full-Time Support (FTS) manning. There continues to be critical shortage of Full-Time Support personnel in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Currently, only 73 percent of Army National Guard and 64 percent of Army Reserve Full-Time Support requirements are funded. Adequate numbers of Full-Time Support personnel are essential to accomplish Reserve component administrative requirements, to ensure adequate maintenance of equipment, and to improve training and mobilization readiness.

The activation of Reserve component units and personnel for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was the first major mobilization of the Reserve forces in almost 40 years. The call-up resulted in the identification of a number of matters requiring attention in areas of mobilization and demobilization, and unforeseen impacts on family support activities.

Under the authority of 10 USC 673, the manpower requirements of the Services were

filled. Questions involving entitlements for Reservists called up under this authority required both policy changes and revised legislation, which was accomplished in a timely manner.

The treatment of current members of the Total Force will have a significant impact on the future of the all-volunteer force. Appropriate legislation and policies relating to employment, economic protection, benefits, and family support for the Reserve components are important.

Family support, together with employer support, are perhaps the two most important elements of concern to members of the Board and the Reserve mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Family support activities should be funded for all Services well after the cessation of hostilities, the return of the mobilized personnel, and demobilization. Family and employer support programs should continue to be enhanced, since they are essential to the success of an all-volunteer force.

Significant numbers of National Guard and Reserve members recalled in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were found to be in poor dental health, which had an adverse impact on their readiness capability. The present standards are appropriate, but enforcement of the standards is not adequate. The Board is concerned about the dental health of Reserve component members and has recommended changes in policy which would provide access to military dental care and reduce the burden of nondeployables due to dental problems.

Lessons learned during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM have reinforced the requirement for an effective interface between Active and Reserve component management information (automated data processing) systems. Ideally, the Active and Reserve components would utilize the same systems. Existing incompatibility between Active and Reserve component pay, personnel, logistics, and mobilization management systems made it necessary during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM to retrain mobilized Reserve component personnel to operate Active

component systems. Manual "work arounds" were developed to offset shortcomings in automated systems, resulting in pay and personnel record problems.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM demonstrated the importance of sealift for any major contingency. The Merchant Marine is a critical element of the Nation's sealift capability, for it provides the necessary seagoing personnel to man cargo ships, which are essential to provide sealift for the majority of war materiel. The Board is concerned that there is a declining number of Merchant Marine personnel and that there may not be sufficient qualified personnel to meet future contingencies.

The Board is required by 10 USC 113(c)(3) to review Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) policies pertaining to appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the Reserve components. In adopting the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 for Active component personnel, Congress directed that a similar statute be submitted for the Reserve components. Current statutes pertaining to the Reserve components are based upon the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 (ROPA). To update the provisions of ROPA, and to provide common statutes for the appointment, promotion, separation and retirement of all Reserve component officers, the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) was developed by the Department of Defense and initially introduced to the 99th Congress in February, 1986. It was subsequently introduced to the 100th and 101st Congresses, but again not passed. ROPMA is expected to be reintroduced in the 102d Congress.

The drawdown of Active component end strength provides opportunities to retain trained manpower through transition of former Active Component personnel into the Reserve component. There is a need to maintain sufficient Reserve component end strengths in order to provide adequate transitioning capacity to support the movement of former Active component members into the Reserve components. Not

only would this increase the active duty experience level of the Reserve components, but it would also preserve the training investment in former Active component members. The Board believes that an effective transitioning program can retain the Nation's investment in trained and experienced active duty personnel and concurrently improve Reserve component readiness. Adequate pay funding for Reserve component programs is required to support the transitioning of Active component personnel and for the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program.

The role of women soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines was highly publicized in Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT. Their significant contributions, as members of the Armed Forces continue to draw the attention of policymakers, who are reviewing current laws and policies, which may exclude women from certain assignments and career fields. In its interim report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, the Department of Defense reported that women were fully integrated into their assigned units, deployed successfully, and performed admirably in vital roles under stress, enduring all of the same hardships under the same harsh conditions. Recent changes in legislation have removed legal barriers to many combat-related assignments. DoD and Service policy changes should result in increased utilization of this important source of manpower. The Board supports the expansion and enhancement of appropriate career opportunities for women in the Reserve components.

## **Training**

Training and readiness were keys to the successes of the Reserve components during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Maintaining and building upon the level of mobilization and combat readiness demonstrated by the Reserve components during fiscal year 1991, will require continuing emphasis on innovative, realistic, and challenging unit and individual level training opportunities and experiences. As the Active and Reserve components are restructured over the coming

years, the maintenance of quality Reserve components, capable of meeting the demands of future contingencies, will continue to be the most critical mission of the Reserve components.

The purpose of training in the Reserve components is to prepare Reserve component units and members to fight and win in combat. The Reserve components implemented a number of new training programs during fiscal year 1991 to improve mobilization and combat readiness. A Reserve component unit's ability to mobilize, deploy, and perform its wartime missions is enhanced by frequent training with its wartime gaining command.

The Reserve component units must attain and maintain appropriate levels of mobilization and combat readiness in much less time than is available to Active component units. Major detractors to unit training continue to limit training for the Reserve components. The Board reaffirms its recommendation that the Reserve components increase efforts to reduce and control the administrative requirements on Reserve units that interfere with accomplishing the training mission during inactive duty training periods.

The continuing development of new training programs for Reserve component medical personnel greatly enhances the mobilization and combat readiness of the Total Force. Reserve component medical personnel were among the first called up in large numbers for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Participation in medical readiness exercises provides Reserve component medical, dental, and veterinary personnel valuable training in combat casualty care training, to include the experience of providing general medical, dental, and veterinary support to troops under field conditions. Unique opportunities also exist for medical, dental, and veterinary training in many parts of the world, benefiting not only the Reserve component personnel involved, but also providing assistance to other nations.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM marked the first time that the Presidential Selected

Reserve call-up authority under 10 USC 673b was utilized. The Reserve components commented on how well these authorities worked, what problems were encountered with their implementation, and recommendations for changes to these call-up authorities.

Some personnel cross-leveling was required for Army Reserve units activated under 10 USC 673b. Ideally, the Individual Ready Reserve would have been used to satisfy that requirement to cross-level between units. But 10 USC 673b did not authorize call-up of members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

Both 10 USC 673b and 10 USC 673 worked well as basic authorities. The challenge was in the implementation of guidance and policy that previously had not been worked to the level of detail required for execution. While politically more palatable to involuntarily call up Reservists incrementally in small numbers, this methodology diluted and delayed mobilization potential. As implemented, 10 USC 673b, exempted personnel who had not completed initial entry level training. These exempted personnel remained at the home training center and were not available to be placed in the training pipeline until 10 USC 673 authority was granted. Implementation of 10 USC 673 authority initially would have allowed these exempted personnel to be involuntarily called up to complete entry level training and then be available for deployment with or without their unit or as replacements.

The Board reaffirms its recommendation that units to be called up under 10 USC 673b be alerted as far in advance of the call-up as practical so that preparations can commence

To the maximum extent possible, the Board believes Reserve component units should be called up under 10 USC 673b as complete units to maintain unit integrity and readiness. There may be occasions when the entire unit may not be needed. However, the Board expressed concern that calling unit cells, rather than complete units, was a departure from a long-standing understanding, and the provisions of 10 USC 672(c), that Reserve component units would be called up to serve



only as units. Unit members have been recruited with that understanding.

The Department of Defense published guidance concerning the call-up of members of the Reserve components for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM under 10 USC 673b and 10 USC 673. The Services also had implementing policies and procedures. Service policies and procedures differed; some differences may have been soundly based in unique Service requirements and needs. Service differences were noted in the following areas: single parents, pregnant members, HIV-positive members, and reporting times, although problems were reported to be minimal.

At the time of mobilization, the Board felt that since testing HIV-positive resulted in ineligibility for deployment, Reserve component members testing HIV-positive should be separated from the Service. While Service commanders were authorized to permit a delay in reporting up to 30 days, reporting times varied from 3 days to 30 days following notification. Policies and procedures regarding the call-up of Reserve component members is an area where greater uniformity between Services may be desirable.

Even before the President used the Presidential Selected Reserve call-up authority under 10 USC 673b, Reserve volunteers made major contributions to Operation DESERT SHIELD. The use of members of the Selected Reserve, unit members and Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and Individual Ready Reservists as volunteers provided needed manpower support during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The extensive use of Selected Reserve unit member volunteers caused the review of policies on the appropriateness of the use of Selected Reserve volunteers, which could have adversely impacted the readiness of later-deploying Selected Reserve units from which the volunteers came.

The success of the initial deployment of troops and materiel in Operation DESERT SHIELD was due in no small part to the outstanding response of Reserve component

volunteers who augmented the Active forces from the start of the operation.

As Reserve component participation in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM highlighted areas for attention in mobilization, so, too, this first major demobilization in almost 40 years, identified matters for attention in that area. The Reserve components provided information on their demobilization plans, special programs to facilitate the transition to civilian life by returning Reservists, and problems encountered in the demobilization.

Gaining commands in some instances appeared reluctant to release recalled Reservists after their mission was completed. There was a tendency in some Services to keep Reservists on active duty to offset Active component personnel shortages or for other reasons. In some cases, there appeared to be a lack of concern about the impact on the Reservists' civilian employment. Clear policy guidance is needed at Department of Defense level to gaining commands regarding the release of Reservists from active duty.

Efforts should be made to demobilize the units and members of the Reserve components expeditiously, consistent with existing operational requirements. Like-units of the Active components and Reserve volunteers should be utilized to the maximum possible to perform remaining tasks. Reserve component units that continue to be required should be notified of projected release dates. The Board believes that, subject to operational requirements, members of the Reserve components should be demobilized as soon as possible following the cessation of hostilities. The Board also believes that demobilization should be planned to the same degree of detail as mobilization, from the notification of a planned release date to the completion of outprocessing.

The Board recommends that the Department of Defense promulgate policy guidance to the combatant commands and Services regarding the release of mobilized Reserve component members and retirees from active duty as

rapidly as possible following the cessation of hostilities, subject to operational considerations, and that plans for demobilization be developed.

## **Equipment**

The Department of Defense's policy in the allocation of resources to the Total Force is governed by the "First to Fight, First to be Equipped" principle. This principle, originally recommended by the Reserve Forces Policy Board, gives manning, training, and equipping priority to early-deploying units over later-deploying units, even if the early-deploying units are Reserve forces. As a result of this policy, some Reserve units have a higher priority for manning, equipment, and training, than do some Active units. The Board recommends that the "First to Fight, First to be Equipped" policy be continued and clarified to accommodate "first to be deployed, first to be equipped" units.

Modern and upgraded equipment is being provided to the Reserve components. Further modernization and delivery of materiel is currently programmed. Delays in modernization adversely impact on unit training and readiness of the Reserve components. Budget constraints continue to hamper the modernization program of the Reserve forces. Although many units are receiving some new equipment, sufficient equipment is not being procured to fill the wartime requirements. The Board recommends caution in removing aging, yet capable, equipment from units scheduled for equipment modernization until the new equipment is actually on-hand. In addition, serviceable excess equipment resulting from inactivations of Active component units should be made available to the Reserve components.

While the policy to prioritize equipment distribution for combat forces has worked reasonably well, priority for equipping support forces and mobilization forces has not received equal attention. This has led to equipment shortfalls in early-deploying Reserve component support forces.

Equipping of the Reserve components has been improved during the last several

years. However, there are still significant equipment shortages. Each Reserve component has major equipment shortages peculiar to its own mission. A lack of equipment seriously impairs the ability of the Reserve components to accomplish their wartime missions.

Major training equipment shortages in the Reserve components negatively affect opportunities for training and result in lower readiness levels and decreased mobilization capabilities. Training contributes directly to retention of mobilization skills, and in most cases ensures Reservists train on equipment to be used upon mobilization. Forces deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM used assigned equipment and gear from prepositioned war reserve mobilization stock, or used equipment allocated to mobilized Active component forces. Some equipment was reallocated from units not mobilized and distributed in support of deployed units. This redistribution caused a degradation in unit readiness for those units from which the equipment was pulled. Those Reserve component units which mobilized fully equipped were the units which were most capable of performing all assigned missions from the start.

The importance of maintaining the capability to rapidly project military power around the globe to protect the interests of the United States was apparent during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The lack of sufficient airlift and sealift capability continues to be a strategic vulnerability. While the strategic lift issue does not impact on Reserve component unit readiness, the ability of such units to arrive in-theater, at the times required by the gaining commanders, is significantly impacted by strategic lift shortages.

The Board continues to believe that strategic airlift and sealift are critical for the readiness, deployment, and resupply of the Total Force. There should be no distinction made between Active and Reserve component units when setting priorities for equipment and training.

A critical element of the Reserve components' command infrastructure is their

automated data processing computer systems. Automated logistics management systems are critical to the Reserve components' preparation and planning for mobilization and deployment. Development and fielding of supply, personnel, transportation, and logistics management systems must accurately reflect and support the Reserve components' requirements and missions. A comprehensive modernization program continued to be one of the top priorities in fiscal year 1991. The Board recommends continued support and funding be provided for development and fielding of common automated data systems and corresponding training requirements to ensure complete interoperability between Active and Reserve components.

### **Facilities**

Adequate facilities are essential to the administration, training, and mobilization readiness of the Reserve components. For reasons of economy and efficiency of operations, joint use of facilities by more than one Reserve component has been emphasized by the Department of Defense in recent years. All new construction is evaluated for potential joint use. Many new Armed Forces Reserve centers efficiently house several units of two, three, or even four different Reserve components.

However, joint use is not an immediate panacea, since most existing facilities are sized to accommodate only one component. Construction of new joint use facilities that would replace existing facilities with useful life remaining is often not a feasible economic option.

Fiscal constraints have an effect on military construction budgets for both new construction and overdue maintenance and repair work projects. Increased missions with commensurate equipment require increased funding to keep pace with facility needs. The Board recommends that the Department of Defense increase funding for Reserve component military construction to meet requirements for increased roles and equipment responsibilities, such as drug interdiction missions.

The Board is concerned about the potential impact of base closures on Reserve component training and readiness. Some base closure decisions may have positive impact if facilities currently used by Active components become available for Reserve component use. There may be an adverse impact on individual units if adequate replacement facilities are not located and funded in a timely manner. The Board anticipates that opportunities for consolidation and joint use may occur. The Board continues to urge that serious consideration be given to the impact of base closures on the Reserve components.

Environmental responsibilities are intertwined with facility management. The Reserve components not only have a responsibility to comply with existing Federal, state, and local environmental laws, but they are also involved in the engineering and budget activities to meet future requirements as well as correction of past problems.

The Board studied the effects of environmental issues on the Reserve components. The Board recognizes that the cost to comply with existing and anticipated future regulations will place major new demands on military construction as well as operation and maintenance budgets. The Board believes it can assist the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment to focus attention on the broad range of environmental issues facing the Reserve components.

The Board commends the efforts of the Department of Defense to assist the Reserve component to comply with environmental requirements. However, the Board is concerned about adequate funding for the problems already identified and about protection from personal liability (civil and criminal) for Reserve component commanders and members. The Board supports additional legislation, which may be unique to the Reserve components, to protect these commanders and other members who are operating reasonably and responsibly. (U)



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# Preface

## Purpose of Report

To fulfill its charter, the Board is composed of members of the Reserve components, representatives from the Active components, and secretariat appointees who have responsibility for National Guard and Reserve matters.

The Board considers issues from many sources including: Congress; Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Services; Service committees, councils, or boards; theater commanders; and individual National Guard or Reserve members. The Board establishes and maintains communications with public and private individuals and agencies outside the Department of Defense, as necessary, to accomplish its mission.

The law requires "an annual report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the Reserve programs of the Department of Defense . . ." (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report is submitted annually, by the Secretary of Defense, to the President and Congress, and includes the Coast Guard Reserve, which is in the Department of Transportation in peacetime. The report addresses recommendations for changes to policies, procedures, or laws which affect the Reserve components of the total military force of the United States.

The Board's independent review of Reserve component issues is presented, as well as a consensus evaluation of Reserve component programs. The report includes the collective views of the Board members, and does not necessarily reflect the official policy positions

of the Department of Defense or any other Department or agency of the United States government.

## Prologue

This report reflects the activities of the Board during fiscal year 1991 (October 1, 1990, through September 30, 1991). Operational missions in the past year have highlighted the need and the value of a ready and responsive Reserve force. Lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM are being documented and studied. The Board has followed this recent event and referenced impacts where applicable in this report.

## Organization of the Report

The report is divided into seven chapters: Contributions of the Reserve Components to the Total Force, Force Structure, Operational Missions, Personnel, Training and Mobilization Readiness, Equipment, and Facilities. Board recommendations follow each related topic within the chapters. Appendices A and B include a summary of Board activities during fiscal year



1991, Board staff, former Board members, and staff whose terms were completed during fiscal year 1991.

All data contained in this report is as of September 30, 1991, unless otherwise indicated. Certain policy and legislative changes have been enacted since the September 30, 1991 date, and are so noted in those cases where this information was available.

### **History of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board commemorates the 40th anniversary of its founding in 1992. Tracing its origin back to President Truman's Executive Order 10007 of October 15, 1947, the Board first operated as the Committee on Civilian Components. The Committee became the Civilian Component Board in 1949, and acted as an administrative body within the Department of Defense.

In 1952, Congress passed the Armed Forces Act. This Act established the Reserve Forces Policy Board to serve as "the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components." The Board has since operated as part of the Secretary of Defense's team, and is the means by which the Secretary brings into consultation the entire range of Active, National Guard, and Reserve expertise.

Individuals who have served as chairmen and military executives on the Board, from inception to the present, are as follows:

#### **Chairmen**

Charles H. Buford  
Inception - March 1953

Arthur S. Adams  
March 1953 - September 1955

Milton G. Baker  
September 1955 - September 1957

John Slezak  
October 1957 - September 1977

Louis J. Conti  
October 1977 - September 1985

Will Hill Tankersley  
October 1985 - October 1989

John O. Marsh, Jr.  
November 1989 - Present

#### **Military Executives**

RADM Irving M. McQuiston, USNR  
Inception - June 1959

MG Ralph A. Palladino, USAR  
July 1959 - December 1968

Maj Gen John S. Patton, USAFR  
January 1969 - January 1973

RADM John B. Johnson, USNR  
January 1973 - January 1975

MG W. Stanford Smith, USAR  
January 1975 - April 1979

Maj Gen Joseph D. Zink, ANGUS  
May 1979 - June 1983

LTG LaVern E. Weber, ARNGUS  
June 1983 - June 1984


MG James D. Delk, ARNGUS  
September 1984 - August 1986

MG William R. Berkman, USA  
August 1986 - Present

#### **Comments and Additional Copies**

The Board appreciates the helpful comments and recommendations that followed previous reports. Comments are invited and should be addressed to:

**Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Room 3E330, Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-7300**


A limited number of copies of this report are available for official distribution. Requests should be sent to the above address. 



# Contributions of the Reserve Components to the Total Force

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# 1



*"It belongs to the Regulars, to the Reserves, to the  
National Guard. This victory belongs to the finest  
fighting force this nation has ever known in its history."*

*President George Bush*

## Reserve Components in the Total Force Policy

The Department of Defense (DoD) defines the Total Force as "The totality of organizations, units, and manpower that comprise the Defense Department's resources for meeting the national military strategy. It includes the manpower resources comprising DoD Active and Reserve military personnel, DoD civilian personnel, contractor staff, and host-nation support personnel." The Department of Defense implemented the Total Force Policy in 1973. It has been fundamental to U.S. national security policy ever since.

Today, the Reserve components are full partners with the Active components under the Total Force Policy. The efforts made over the last decade to strengthen the Reserve components have paid great dividends--deterrence of conflict and reduction of tensions between the major powers of the world. During this decade, Reserve component units have been integrated into virtually all theater operational plans. It has been understood since the early eighties that large-scale combat operations could not be successfully conducted without the Reserve components. Their increased involvement in contingency operations has demonstrated that their use in even low intensity scenarios is no less essential, especially in early mobilization support and reinforcement roles. Since the Total Force Policy was implemented, the Reserve components have achieved

unprecedented levels of capability and readiness, which this year have been validated by the Reserve components' successful response to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL.

In its Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the Senate Committee on Armed Services acknowledged the contribution of the Reserve components and their essential role in the Nation's total defense capability:

"...Operation[s] Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated the vitality of the Total Force Concept. . . .The committee restates its conviction that a strong reserve component is an indispensable element of our military establishment. The committee remains committed to strengthening the National Guard and Reserve components during this period of substantial realignment in our forces..."


*The Board commends the Congress for its continued strong support of the Reserve components and the Total Force Policy.*

### Total Personnel Available at Mobilization

Table 1-1 provides the percentages of personnel, by category, who are available at mobilization.



**Table 1-1**  
**TOTAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE AT MOBILIZATION**



100% = 5,317,398 personnel

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

### **Composition of the Reserve Components**

The seven Reserve components are the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

All Reserve component personnel are assigned to one of three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the Retired Reserve. All National Guard members are in the Ready Reserve.

The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive National Guard. Some personnel are organized in units; others train as individuals. All are subject to being ordered to active duty in time of war or national emergency. In addition, members of the Selected Reserve

may be called to active duty under implementation of Presidential call-up authority under 10 USC 673b, which is discussed in the Operational Missions chapter. Reserve members may volunteer for short-term active duty to meet training requirements or operational needs of the Active components. All of these methods have been employed this year.

Table 1-2 provides the personnel strengths for the various categories of the Ready Reserve.

The Selected Reserve is comprised of Reserve component personnel assigned to units, Reserve component personnel assigned to Full-Time Support (FTS) programs, and individuals who serve as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). The Personnel chapter further details Reserve component personnel categories.

**Table 1-2**  
**COMPOSITION OF THE READY RESERVE**

Ready Reserve 1,776,300 <sup>1</sup>			
Selected Reserve 1,166,400			Individual Ready Reserve/ Inactive National Guard 609,900
Units & Full-Time Support 1,135,700 <sup>2</sup>		Individual Mobilization Augmentees 30,700	
Units <sup>3</sup> (Paid Drill Strength Only) 998,200	Full-Time Support (AGR, TAR, & Military Technician Only) <sup>4</sup> 137,500		

- Notes: 1. Includes 67,500 in the training pipeline, and 18,700 members of the Coast Guard Reserve.  
2. Military Technician strength counted only once.  
3. Includes Training Pipeline.  
4. AGR—Active Guard / Reserve; TAR—Training and Administration of the Reserve.

Numbers rounded to nearest hundred.

Sources. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.




Selected Reserve units may be either operational or augmentation units. Operational units train and deploy as units. Augmentation units train as units in peacetime, but are absorbed into Active units upon mobilization. Selected Reserve units are manned by drilling members of the Reserve components and supported by Full-Time Support civilian, Active or Reserve component personnel.

Selected Reserve units who have not completed initial training are mobilizable, but cannot be deployed on land outside the United States until completion of minimum training requirements.

Table 1-3 shows Selected Reserve contributions to the Total Force, by Service.

**Table 1-3**  
**PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE**  
 (Active and Selected Reserve Assigned Strengths)



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) are composed of Reserve component members not assigned to units. IRR/ING members are trained individuals who previously served in the Active component or Selected Reserve. IRR/ING members usually have a remaining military service obligation. They are liable for mobilization and for limited involuntary active duty for training. They may train voluntarily for retirement points and promotion, with or without pay.

The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who could be mobilized to fill specific manpower needs. The Standby Reserve consists of personnel, such as key federal employees, who are not required to train and are not assigned to units.

The Retired Reserve is comprised of:

- all Reserve personnel who are receiving retired pay resulting from Active and/or Reserve service.
- all Reserve personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay, but have not reached age 60 and have not elected discharge, and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve.
- retired enlisted members who retired with 20 or more years of active duty.

When members in the last category complete a total of 30 years of service, they are placed on the appropriate Regular or Reserve retired list. All retired members who



have completed at least 20 years of active Federal service, Regular or Reserve, regardless of the retired list to which they are assigned, may be ordered to active duty (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense) whenever required, as determined by the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department in accordance with 10 USC 688.



### **Employment of the Reserve Components**

Potential threats to the United States and its interests are the primary factors in shaping force structure decisions. As demonstrated on several occasions this year, (Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL are discussed in the Operational Missions chapter) some Reserve forces must be immediately available to deal with low intensity conflicts and contingencies. However, a hedge must also be maintained to allow for appropriate response across the entire spectrum of conflict. This requires careful deliberations of both force structure and force mix.

The Board believes, that although force structure decisions are dependent primarily on the senior military and political leadership perceptions of the future threat, it is desirable that all components, Active and Reserve, participate in such decisions to ensure that their respective capabilities, contributions, and cost effectiveness are appropriately considered for the most viable future force structure.

The Reserve components routinely accomplish a wide variety of training and

operational tasks in locations around the world. Numerous examples are cited throughout this report. Such varied and challenging training and operational missions enhance the readiness of the Reserve components, and prepare members of the Reserve components for actual mission assignments.

Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy became a Department of Defense mission in fiscal year 1990. It was greatly expanded during fiscal year 1991 and includes a significant role for the Reserve components. Members of the Reserve components became actively engaged, in conjunction with state and Federal agencies, in detecting and countering the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. These mission accomplishments again attest to the readiness, versatility, and cost effectiveness of using the Reserve components, even in nontraditional roles, to meet our national goals and objectives.

### **Resourcing the Reserve Components**

The President stated in the National Security Strategy of the United States, dated August 1991:

"We are a rich and powerful nation, and the elements of our power will remain formidable. But our wealth and our strength are not without limits. We must balance our commitments with our means and, above all, we must wisely choose now which elements of our strength will best serve our needs in the future. This is the challenge of strategy. In this country we make such choices for peace just as we make the awful choices of war — as a democracy. When the President and Congress work together to build an effective security posture and policy — as was done in the 1980s — we are successful. In the Gulf, our armed forces benefited from the legacy of investment decisions, technological innovations, and strategic planning that came in the decade before. Today's planning decisions will determine whether we are well or ill prepared for the contingencies that will confront us in the future."

The Reserve components provide a cost-effective means for augmenting the Active components and maintaining important capabilities in the Total Force. A Reserve citizen-soldier requires only a fraction of the cost of a full-time soldier. They provide a low-cost deterrent to conflict and a surge mobilization capability. The Reserve components have repeatedly demonstrated that they can accept additional, adequately resourced, roles and missions.

For the past seven years, Reserve component military spending, in real terms, has declined. Real world threats and fiscal concerns are leading to even greater budget reductions in both the near and distant futures. The National Defense Authorization Act and the National Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1992 again provide for reduced resourcing for the Department of Defense. As resolution of force structure decisions occurs, the resultant equipment redistributions within the Active components, and more importantly, between the Active and Reserve components, may well reduce equipment shortfalls and actually enhance modernization. Currently, there are required Full-Time Support positions in Reserve components units which cannot be funded or filled because of insufficient funds or authority. Military construction continues to be inadequately funded.

As stated by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "To the critics who say we must cut defense, I say we are cutting. There is a peace dividend, and we're paying it now. But we do not want to devastate our forces as we did in 1919, 1945, 1953, 1972-73. . . . In time, we came to regret each of those demobilizations. We must not repeat those mistakes. And we don't have to."

Budget cuts should be based on the threat and assigned roles and missions. An "equal share" approach to budget reduction among Active and Reserve components is neither cost-effective nor prudent.

The Board continues to recommend against the concept of "equal cuts" in Active and Reserve

component budgets without appropriate analysis. Further, the Board believes it important to:

- resource the Reserve components with the necessary personnel and equipment.
- provide training support through adequate facilities, ranges, and schools.
- provide sufficient ground vehicle miles, flying hours, and steaming days to maintain individual and unit proficiency.
- properly equip combat support and combat service support units, and greatly enhance training support for these units.

Table 1-4 displays Reserve component appropriations for fiscal years 1990 through 1992. Amounts shown for procurement reflect the combined total of Service and dedicated procurement funding.

The Reserve components are funded by four separate budget areas: personnel, operation and maintenance, military construction, and various equipment procurement funds which are provided by the Services. Service procurement funding has been supplemented by dedicated Congressional appropriations each year since fiscal year 1982. Dedicated procurement data is discussed in the Equipment chapter.



**Table 1-4**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT APPROPRIATIONS**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>% Change FY 1990-91</u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>				
Personnel	3,294.7	3,266.4	3,336.7	-1%
Operation and Maintenance	1,864.0	2,015.1	2,211.6	8%
Military Construction	237.1	313.2	231.1	32%
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	2248.1	1,665.9	1,071.4	-26%
<b>Army Reserve</b>				
Personnel	2,199.2	2,178.8	2,378.8	-1%
Operation and Maintenance	868.0	942.5	1,021.3	9%
Military Construction	96.1	77.4	110.4	-19%
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	596.7	295.6	331.2	-50%
<b>Naval Reserve</b>				
Personnel	1,571.7	1,606.1	1,714.6	2%
Operation and Maintenance	908.0	1,016.9	877.5	12%
Military Construction	56.6	80.3	59.9	42%
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	395.3	959.2	362.6	143%
<b>Marine Corps Reserve <sup>2</sup></b>				
Personnel	314.4	285.7	348.9	-9%
Operation and Maintenance	78.4	84.7	91.7	8%
Military Construction	—	—	—	
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	149.5	202.6	123.7	36%
<b>Air National Guard</b>				
Personnel	1,063.9	1,099.5	1,148.5	3%
Operation and Maintenance	2,020.4	2,325.6	2,346.4	15%
Military Construction	235.8	180.6	217.6	-23%
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	1,145.6	1,074.6	549.8	-6%
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>				
Personnel	662.1	597.4	722.9	-10%
Operation and Maintenance	1,018.1	1,084.3	1,155.2	7%
Military Construction	46.2	38.6	9.7	-16%
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	298.6	281.3	157.5	-6%
<b>DoD Total</b>				
Personnel	9,106.0	9,033.9	9,650.4	-1%
Operation and Maintenance	6,756.9	7,468.9	7,703.7	11%
Military Construction	671.8	690.1	628.7	3%
Procurement	4,833.8	4,478.6	2,596.2	-7%
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>				
Personnel	63.0	66.0	67.0	5%
Operation and Maintenance	8.0	8.0	8.0	0%
Military Construction	—	—	—	
Procurement	—	—	—	
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,169.0</b>	<b>9,099.9</b>	<b>9,717.4</b>	<b>-1%</b>
Personnel	6,764.9	7,476.9	7,711.7	11%
Operation and Maintenance	671.8	690.1	628.7	3%
Military Construction	4,833.8	4,478.6	2,596.2	-7%
Procurement	—	—	—	

Notes 1 Includes P-IR amounts budgeted by the Services, plus 2 appropriated funds for Guard and Reserve accounts and Drug Interdiction funds.

2 Marine Corps Reserve figures included in Naval Reserve Military Construction

Sources DoD Comptroller and the Coast Guard  
Data as of January 31, 1992





# Force Structure 2

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*"Tested in combat, the Total Force concept remains an important element of our national defense"*

*Honorable Dick Cheney  
Secretary of Defense*

## General

The mission of the Reserve components is to provide trained, well-equipped units and individuals for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or at such other times as the national security requires. In addition to this Federal mission, the National Guard has a state mission, when called upon, to protect life and property, and to preserve peace, order, and public safety under state authority. The dual Federal-state status of the National Guard is derived from the United States Constitution.

The Total Force Policy has served our Nation well. The Reserve components made a substantial contribution to the strategy of deterrence in Europe. Reserve components were also involved in the mission support of major operations, such as Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL. Reserve components were also involved in ongoing operational missions, including drug interdiction activities and disaster relief.

*The Board recommends that lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL be carefully considered as they apply to the Total Force and future force mix decisions.*

Army National Guard and Army Reserve units provide essential combat, tactical support, and general support units to the Total Army.

Naval Reserve units are an integral part of most mission areas of the Navy. They include carrier air wings, fleet logistic support wings, maritime patrol wings, surface combatants, and air and medical support.

The Marine Corps Reserve includes a division, an air wing, and a force service support group, which provide combat, combat support, and combat service support of the same types as the Active component.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units perform many combat and combat support missions, including tactical fighter and

reconnaissance, strategic and tactical airlift, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, aerospace rescue and recovery, and special operations.

The Coast Guard Reserve provides port security elements and augmentation of the Coast Guard.

The following sections and tables demonstrate that the Reserve components are an integral and significant part of the Total Force upon which our country relies for national security.

The future structuring of our military forces is receiving attention within and outside the Department of Defense. Some express caution about reductions because of experience after demobilizations in 1919, 1945, 1953, and 1972-73, noting that they are in essence extremely difficult to reverse. Some recommend that the Reserves not be cut as much as proposed to allow trained personnel being separated from the Active forces an opportunity to continue their service in the Reserves. It is also suggested that Total Force readiness and capability would be cost effectively maintained and enhanced.

*The Board recommends that additional or enhanced mission assignments be considered for the Reserve components, including continued involvement in drug interdiction and demand reduction programs.*

*The Board further recommends that careful analysis be conducted before approving Reserve component budget reductions, to ensure full consideration of Reserve component cost effectiveness and force capability requirements resulting from the projected threats. If budget constraints cause the Services to make force structure reductions in the Active forces, a thorough analysis should be conducted on the feasibility and cost effectiveness of transferring that capability to the Reserve components*

## Army

The Army relies on Army National Guard and Army Reserve units to augment its wartime organization. Over half of the Army force

structure currently exists in the Reserve components, including approximately 55 percent of combat units, 51 percent of combat support, and 66 percent of combat service support. The Army National Guard has an assigned strength of 446,121, plus 8,073 personnel who are in an Inactive National Guard status. The Army Reserve has an assigned strength of 309,681 in the Selected Reserve and an additional 359,074 members assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve.

The Army's Reserve components are given missions under the Army's CAPSTONE program. This program aligns Army Active and Reserve component units with their wartime gaining commands. The program integrates all levels of Active and Reserve component units. The program also allows Reserve component units to focus training on wartime tasks for regions of the world where they are programmed to deploy upon mobilization.

The composition of the Total Army is shown on Table 2-1.

Certain Army National Guard and Army Reserve units assigned to fill out Active divisions are called "roundout" units. The roundout program merges either a Reserve component battalion or a brigade with a number of similar sized Active component units to form a "composite" higher echelon organization. The Army National Guard currently has six brigades and nine battalions operating under this program, and the Army Reserve has one roundout brigade. Reserve component roundout units are given the same equipment priorities as their parent Active component units. They are programmed to be an integral part of the parent division they roundout. Nevertheless, as occurred during the operations this year, final interpretation of unit readiness and current mission requirements may necessitate other units, considered more ready, be deployed in place of the roundout unit.

Table 2-1  
**COMPOSITION OF TOTAL ARMY**

	Percent of Structure			
	Active	ARNG	USAR	
Combat Divisions	56%	42%	2%	Armor, Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry, Mechanized
Non-Divisional Combat Units	28%	55%	17%	Armored Cavalry, Separate Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Engineers, Pathfinders, Special Forces
Tactical Support Increment	27%	31%	42%	Aviation, Ammunition, Chemical, Civil Affairs, Combat Electronics, Intelligence, Supply and Service, Engineers, Finance, Judge Advocate, Logistics, Medical, Military Police, Petroleum, Psychological Operations, Railway Signal and Transportation
Special Theater Forces	62%	20%	18%	Theater Defense Brigades, Engineer and Support to Other Services
General Support	62%	11%	27%	Training Divisions and Brigades, Hospitals, Dental, Intelligence, Military Police, Schools, Reception Battalions, Garrisons, Maneuver Area and Training Commands, Transportation, Selective Service and Army Reserve Commands

Source: Department of Army.  
Data as of September 30, 1990



The Department of the Army has recommended significant reductions throughout the Army National Guard and Army Reserve over the next five years. These reductions include the loss of two divisions, four brigades, an armored cavalry regiment, and a significant number of combat support and combat service support units, as well as the conversion of two more divisions to partially filled cadre units to be used as a reconstitution base if needed. Many members of the defense community have raised concerns regarding these reductions, including their impact on readiness, the potential loss of trained Active component soldiers from the entire military structure because of lack of sufficient Reserve positions, unprogrammed costs associated with equipment transfers, and the fear that the Reserve components will be relegated and resourced for missions which will lead to the "hollow force" situation that existed in the seventies.

During fiscal year 1991, the Army National Guard continued consolidation of three divisions into one armored division, with a completion date established in fiscal year 1993. Implementation of recommendations from various force structure studies, as well as normal Total Army Analysis decisions, have resulted in a number of inactivations and activations. Numerous headquarters elements of direct support/general support ammunition and maintenance battalions, as well as headquarters elements of four command and control battalions, and various company and

detachment-sized elements have been inactivated. During this same period, two movement control detachments, four signal companies, three missile support teams, several other company-sized units, and two linguist battalions have been activated. The National Guard expects an initial drop in readiness while units are configured, equipment redistributed, and personnel trained. Care is being taken to ensure that transitions are carefully managed and timed so as not to conflict with operational missions.

There were 398 units and 63,398 personnel mobilized in the Army National Guard for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The National Guard notes that Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM demonstrated the need to be prepared to deploy to an area where the required infrastructure is not in place. Any loss of the type units deployed in those operations will negatively impact on the Army's ability to conduct future operations requiring such infrastructure. The 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, both Active component divisions, have reassigned missions to their Army National Guard roundout brigades. The 48th Infantry Brigade and the 155th Armored Brigade now serve as a fourth brigade (roundup brigades) for their respective divisions.

The most significant structure impact on the Army National Guard during fiscal year 1991 was the initiation of the Department of the Army-directed force structure reductions, complicated by the uncertainty in forecasted modernization efforts resulting from the reductions. These reductions will result in an Army National Guard end-strength reduction from 457,300 to 338,000 by fiscal year 1995. The initial result of these reductions is the inactivation of two maneuver brigades and numerous combat support/combat service support units, losing a total of 11,744 personnel spaces in fiscal year 1991, while reducing two Army National Guard divisions to two maneuver brigades each. Preparation is ongoing for an additional loss of 43,421 spaces in fiscal year 1992 and the dramatic reconfiguration of two full-strength divisions to cadre configurations. While the cadre

conversions are not programmed for activation until fiscal year 1993, considerable work remains to be done concerning division design, doctrine and organization. Converting two full-strength divisions to cadre configuration will result in two divisions requiring a minimum of 12-15 months post-mobilization training time prior to deployment.

Currently, the budget provides for force structure and end-strength authorizations for a two-year period. The beginning year is often finalized within a month of the beginning year budget, and the second year is usually modified during subsequent budget submissions. These factors cause force structure planners to focus on the short-term, rather than long-term planning.

Consequently, readiness is degraded due to turbulence caused by short reaction time necessary to program Congressionally-approved force structure actions. Stabilization of the impacts caused by force structure reductions and the management of change throughout the Total Force is necessary to promote effective long-term planning.

The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve could assume additional missions in the area of forward presence and nation assistance. Their units are an excellent source of intermittent forward presence as the Active component draws down. This effect has been clearly demonstrated in their role at the Equipment Maintenance Center-Europe. Army National Guard units are also an effective instrument of national policy in the area of nation assistance as is being demonstrated in Central America through the use of Army National Guard engineer and medical units.

The Army Reserve activated 57 units, inactivated 68 units, and converted 173 units in fiscal year 1991. Inactivations included one engineer battalion, two artillery battalions, six hospitals, eight logistics groups, two headquarters garrisons, a reception battalion and numerous company, detachment, and team-level combat support and combat service support organizations. Activations included two finance groups, two hospitals, two

nuclear, biological, chemical reconnaissance companies, a theater aviation company, five cargo transfer companies, two movement control battalion headquarters, and numerous combat support/combat service support elements of less than thirty personnel each.

There were 647 Army Reserve units, or elements thereof, mobilized in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Additionally, 13,170 soldiers of the Individual Ready Reserve, 1,558 Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and 5,536 individual volunteers mobilized in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Reprogramming actions resulted in the retention of all Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM units, at least through the end of fiscal year 1991. Every effort is being made to ensure that units and individual soldiers who were mobilized are retained in the Selected Reserve to preserve their experience for the future.

Force structure is the single most important issue facing the Army Reserve. Force structure reductions cause turmoil in the force and concern in the local communities. The most significant structure impact for the Army Reserve in fiscal year 1991 was the reduction of 43 units and approximately 9,500 personnel spaces. Many of the units selected for inactivation in fiscal year 1991 were of a type considered critical for the conduct of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, which





are not available within the Active force. Two of the inactivating units were determined to be required specifically for Operation DESERT STORM, thus the inactivations were cancelled and the units mobilized. Because of the short duration of the ground campaign and the absence of a chemically-influenced battlefield, the inactivated units were not required. Sixty-three percent of the inactivated units were habitually broken in terms of readiness and another seven percent were programmed activations with no personnel assigned. The equipment and personnel available from these inactivations have been absorbed in the remainder of the Army Reserve structure, enhancing the overall readiness of the remaining units.

The Army Reserve participated in the cadre division study and expressed a desire to field one, or both, of the approved cadre divisions designs. The Army Reserve has received a directive to develop a plan to build a cadre division from training division assets for use as future reference only.

The Army Reserve assumed an expanded role in assisting Allied governments in building national infrastructure. In the areas of civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces, public affairs, postal operations, and legal assistance, Army Reserve forces have the expertise to provide valuable assistance to host governments. Nation assistance provides realistic training in addition to rehearsing mobilization and overseas deployment skills.

Army Reserve military intelligence units provided security assistance through ground surveillance radar, imagery intelligence, and order of battle analysis and production in contingency, low-intensity conflict, and counterterrorist operations. Readiness and mobilization capabilities were improved because the nation assistance mission and security assistance approximate the demands of wartime missions for many Army Reserve units. The Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM experience, particularly in the Kuwaiti theater of operations and in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, underscored the importance of Army Reserve civil affairs, nation assistance, and security assistance forces.

Additionally, Army Medical Department units made significant contributions to civil works projects, from disaster relief projects to cleanup of landfills. Military police, military intelligence, and special operations forces were used effectively in the fight against illegal drugs. Their skills in electronic warfare, signal intercept, order of battle analysis, imagery interpretation, surveillance, security, and support of law enforcement agencies, make each of these units especially valuable in the roles of interdiction and eradication of illegal drugs.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve contributions to the Total Army are reflected in Table 2-2.



**Table 2-2**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL ARMY**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Army National Guard Number Units</u>	<u>Army Reserve Number Units</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Heavy Helicopter Units	5	0	100
Chemical Brigades	1	3	100
Water Supply Battalions	2	3	100
Rail Battalions	0	2	100
Training Divisions	0	12	100
Training Brigades	0	3	100
Judge Advocate General Units	4	191	100
Enemy Prisoner of War Brigades	0	1	100
Theater Area Support Groups	0	1	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	36	97
Petroleum Support Battalions	5	6	92
Medical Brigades	3	4	88
Public Affairs Units	53	26	87
Chemical Battalions	2	9	85
Infantry Divisions	5	0	83
Medical Groups	3	13	80
Separate Brigades	11	1	80
Theater Defense Brigades	5	1	75
Hospitals	23	88	74
Psychological Operations Units	0	36	72
Corps Support Groups	4	13	71
Motor Battalions	13	14	71
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	14	17	70
Petroleum Groups	0	2	67
Maintenance Battalions	27	18	66
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	42	16	64
Aviation Assault Battalions	14	5	63
Field Artillery Battalions	102	17	62
Terminal Battalions	0	4	57
Military Police Battalions	9	7	55
Transportation Commands	0	1	50
Military Police Brigades	3	2	50
Medium Helicopter Battalions	2	2	50
Area Support Groups	9	9	50
Ordnance Battalions	4	6	45
Attack Helicopter Battalions	21	3	45
Special Forces Groups	2	2	44
Corps Support Commands	1	2	43
Movement Control Center	1	2	43
Armor Divisions	2	0	40
Theater Army Area Commands	0	2	40
Armored Cavalry Regiments	2	0	40
Signal Battalions	33	4	37
Military Intelligence Battalions	5	15	36
Personnel Commands	0	1	33
Finance Commands	0	1	33
Movement Control Agencies	0	1	33
Aviation Brigades	11	0	32
Air Defense Battalions	17	0	30
Mechanized Infantry Divisions	2	0	25
Engineer Battalions (Topographical)	1	0	25
Light Infantry Divisions	1	0	20

Notes Percentages determined by counting like-type units

Sources Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Army (DAMO-FDF)

Data as of September 30, 1991

## Navy

The Naval Reserve has 151,510 personnel in the Selected Reserve and 107,345 personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve is organized into two types of units for alignment with gaining commands.

- **Commissioned Units (20%):** Reserve combat units, with organic equipment, such as aircraft squadrons, Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships, or construction battalions. These units are tasked to deliver a complete operational entity to the operating force, are commanded by either Active or Reserve component officers, and manned primarily by Selected Reserve personnel. Thirty percent of Selected Reserve personnel are assigned to commissioned units.
- **Augmentation Units (80%):** Units which augment Active component commissioned units and operating staffs with trained personnel. Such units are tailored to augment designated ships, aircraft squadrons, craft, special warfare commands, Marine expeditionary forces, and to provide augmentation to security groups, intelligence, communications, meteorological activities, intermediate maintenance units, and to staff naval station and headquarters organizations. Their function is to allow peak operations for an



indefinite period of time. They also provide a surge capability, and sustain the high level of activity required to support deployed forces. Seventy percent of the Selected Reserve personnel serve in augmentation units.

Naval Reserve Force ships are under the operational control of the Commanders-in-Chief, Atlantic or Pacific Fleet. Naval Reserve personnel train on Active and Naval Reserve Force ships and craft. Reserve personnel provide the NRF ships approximately one-third of their mobilization manpower. Naval Reserve Force ships are manned (at reduced strength from normal peacetime levels) by Active component personnel, Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) program personnel, and Selected Reservists.

In fiscal year 1991, the Naval Reserve established two commissioned and 104 augmenting units, while disestablishing five commissioned and 109 augmenting units. The balance between established and disestablished units prevented any significant problems from occurring during fiscal year 1991. The most significant structural change that transpired during fiscal year 1991 was the implementation of billet management under the Billet Stability Plan. Transition has begun on P-3B airframes to P-3C, A7E airframes to F/A-18, and HH-1K airframes to HH-60H. In addition, the first Naval Reserve C-130T air squadron has been established at Naval Air Station, New Orleans. This last addition provides a heavy-lift, long-range, worldwide cargo transport capability for the Naval Air Reserve Force. The Naval Air Reserve Force continues to pursue maximum mobilization and combat readiness by obtaining state-of-the-art fleet compatible aircraft.


The Naval Surface Reserve Force has begun transition to a new Reserve Frigate Training (FFT) program for Naval Reserve Force combatants. During the development of this program, the inventory of Naval Reserve Force FF-1052s grew to 15 ships. Following program implementation, the NRF will have 8 FF-1052's (Type II *Assess*), which will be redesignated as FFTs.

The FFT program is a new mission assigned to Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Forces. It involves 2,688 Selected Reserve billets, 64 ashore Full-Time Support billets, and 1,840 Active component support personnel on-board Naval Reserve FFT's. Since the recommissioning crews are priority-manned units, there will be short-term degradations to other unit manning at centers with recommissioning crews.

Planned force structure changes include 32 FF-1052's (Type III vessels) to be placed in an inactive status in fiscal year 1992. The eight FFT's will train their own Selected Reserve crews as well as act as the training platform for four Selected Reserve crews for each of the inactive Type III ships. These Type III Selected Reserve crews will reactivate the Type III ships upon mobilization. Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force will assume administrative and operational control of the Type III ships. During this transition, readiness of the in-training crews will be reduced. Further reductions of 675 billets from Military Sealift Command and reductions of 3,030 billets from the Hospitals and Clinics program are also programmed.

Three FF-1052 class frigates and three minesweepers were decommissioned. There was a 30 percent reduction (979 billets) in the Naval Control of Shipping. Three Surface Reserve activities were deactivated in fiscal year 1991, and approximately 10 other activities are being considered for closure. Additionally, two new explosive ordnance disposal mobile units were commissioned, and two Naval Reserve fleet hospitals were deactivated in fiscal year 1991.

A total of 26 commissioned units were mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, with a total mobilized personnel strength of 18,839. HCS-4's transition to the HH-60H aircraft enabled the Naval Air Reserve to mobilize a second Strike Rescue/Combat Search and Rescue (SAR) detachment in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. None of the units mobilized was disestablished in fiscal year 1991, though one construction battalion is under consideration



for inactivation in fiscal year 1992. Although lessons learned from operations conducted during fiscal year 1991 are still being developed, there are three specific areas of concern which require solutions before future conflicts. Sufficient uniform items must be readily available for activated Individual Ready Reserve members, the transportation portion of the mobilization system should be revamped so it will be responsive to both individual and unit recalls, and a single Navy military personnel data base should be designed to serve as the official source of all Navy military personnel information.

In addition to craft and personnel, transition to new/upgraded equipment has significantly enhanced the capability and compatibility of the Naval Reserve Force. New platforms, with up-to-date equipment have increased Reservists' training opportunities.

Contributions by the Naval Reserve to the Total Navy are displayed in Table 2-3

**Table 2-3**  
**NAVAL RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL NAVY**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Naval Reserve Percent of Navy</u>
Fighter Composite/Service Squadrons (U.S. Based)	100
Logistic Aircraft Squadrons (U.S. Based)	100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	100
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams (NEAT)	100
Strike Rescue/Special Warfare Support Helicopter Squadrons	100
Naval Control of Shipping (Military Personnel)	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	93
Military Sealift Command (Military Personnel)	84
Mobile Construction Battalions	68
Intelligence Program Personnel	60
Mobile Diving & Salvage Units	60
Ocean Minesweepers	59
Mobile Mine Assembly Groups	48
Fleet Hospitals	47
Airborne Mine Countermeasures	40
Special Boat Units	40
Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons	39
Frigates (FFG-7s/FF-1052s)	36
LAMPS MK-1 Anti-Submarine Warfare Squadrons	33
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units	32
Naval Special Warfare Units	28
Carrier Air Wings	14
Amphibious Warfare Ships	8

Note: Percentages determined by counting like-type units or personnel.


Source: Naval Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1991.

### **Marine Corps**

The Marine Corps Reserve has 44,933 personnel in the Selected Reserve and 50,401 in the Individual Ready Reserve. Mobilization missions for the Marine Corps Reserve are:

- to augment selectively the Active component to field three Marine Expeditionary Forces at full wartime strength.
- to reinforce selectively Active component Marine Expeditionary Forces with Selected Marine Corps Reserve units.
- to provide the capability to field a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (with reduced aviation and limited combat service support capability) to reinforce an Active component Marine Expeditionary Force.
- to provide the capability to field a division, wing, and force service support group, if augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered.
- to provide a nucleus to reconstitute a division, wing, and force service support group, if augmentation/reinforcement is ordered.



There were no significant force structure changes made in the Marine Corps Reserve during fiscal year 1991. A total of 250 units, including 27,670 Marine personnel, were mobilized in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Both Active and Reserve component Marine forces are equipped with the same equipment, enjoy total interoperability, and are either mirror-image or like-image in structure. These are the primary reasons for the quick integration of units into a viable Marine force. Some concerns which surfaced during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM included equal compensation for volunteers, the need for contingency funds to pay for the early support provided by key personnel, and the need for sufficient medical/dental personnel at the mobilization processing centers to avoid significant backlogs during mobilization processing.

The Marine Corps Reserve has become increasingly involved in drug interdiction operations. As the tempo of these operations increases, there will be a need for additional funding. These operations provide realistic training and increase mobilization readiness.

The most significant structure impact results from the proposed budget cuts. The single most important issue involving future force

structure is authorized end strength. Congressionally-approved end strengths are required in order to proceed with force reduction planning and implementation. A concern for Marine Corps Reserve aviation is the reduction of Active Marines assigned in support of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. Potential impacts of readiness and mobilization exist if end-strength reductions are severe and require significant reductions in personnel with attendant retraining costs based on shifting mobilization priorities.

Both the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and 4th Marine Division are currently supporting the fight against illegal drugs on an "as required" basis. They could field an additional Marine Expeditionary Brigade with initial reduced communication capability or field an additional Marine Expeditionary Force command element, if so required. The assumption of contingency missions for joint and combined missions is also feasible. All training that is accomplished in conjunction with these type operations is conducive to increased combat readiness.

Contributions by the Marine Corps Reserve to the Total Marine Corps are displayed in Table 2-4.

**Table 2-4**  
**MARINE CORPS RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL MARINE CORPS**

<u>Unit Types</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>Marine Corps Reserve Percent of Marine Corps</u>
Civil Affairs Groups	100
Force Reconnaissance Companies	50
Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	50
Tank Battalions	40
Infantry Regiments	27
Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalions	25
Low Altitude Air Defense	25
Engineer Support Battalions	25
Landing Support Battalions	25
Artillery Regiments	25
 <u>Aircraft Types</u> <sup>2</sup>	
Adversary Aircraft	100
Aerial Refueling Aircraft	33
Observation Aircraft	31
Electronic Warfare Aircraft	25
Light Attack Aircraft	22
Helicopters	14
Fighter Aircraft	12

Notes: 1. Percentages determined by counting like-type units.

2. Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

Source: Marine Corps Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1991.

## **Air Force**

In fiscal year 1991, there were 117,786 Air National Guard and 84,539 Air Force Reserve personnel assigned to the Selected Reserve. There were 78,681 Air Force Reservists in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Most Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units are aligned with wartime gaining commands and train with them regularly. This facilitates integration into the Active force upon mobilization. In addition to flying and maintaining Reserve component aircraft, thousands of Air Force Reserve personnel fly

and maintain Active component aircraft in the Air Force Reserve Associate Program.

During fiscal year 1991, the Air National Guard activated the 168th Air Refueling Group, and its numerous support units, at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. It also inactivated the 110th Communications-Electronics Maintenance Squadron and the 110th Direct Air Support Center Squadron. In addition, numerous conversions took place including F-4E to F-16 aircraft and replacement of the older HH-1 and HH-3 helicopters with MH-60Gs.


The most significant structure impacts during fiscal year 1991 were a result of equipment conversions and Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. A few flying units under conversion and communications units receiving new equipment were not able to respond to mobilization. As the conversions and required training are completed, these units will again be capable and ready.

None of the units called in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were decommissioned in fiscal year 1991. Strategic airlift aircraft, such as the C-141s and C-5s, have a similar configuration throughout the fleet, allowing either Active or Reserve aircrews to effectively operate the aircraft. The C-130 fleet, however, is composed of many models and designs reducing aircraft interoperability. The results are logistics difficulties, additional manpower requirements, and differing operational capabilities.


The Air National Guard had some roles reduced or expanded during fiscal year 1991. Without additional forces, the Air National Guard is not able to take on additional missions, unless priorities or force structure roles are changed. By changing the role of the existing forces, the Air National Guard could assume possible missions in special

operations, counterdrug, space operations, arms control verification, and training. Initial efforts are underway within the Air National Guard to restructure unit maintenance organizations to bring them in line with the current Active duty objective wing and two-level maintenance concept. Integral to the implementation of this concept is the establishment of regional intermediate-level repair capabilities. The Air National Guard is suited to take on this mission for both Reserve component and Active duty units utilizing existing manpower made excess by this reorganization. Establishment of regional repair facilities may reduce transportation costs associated with forwarding all assets to depots, decrease asset turnaround times, retain a pool of trained personnel for deployment to both the operational theater and to depots during wartime, and provide a potential to reduce overall repair cost. As demonstrated in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, in-theater intermediate repair proved invaluable and must be planned for future contingencies.

The Air Force Reserve force structure remained fairly constant during fiscal year 1991. Units in conversion status will temporarily report "non-combat ready due to conversion" until their conversions are completed. Significant changes in fiscal year







1991 included the assumption of the total weather (hurricane) reconnaissance mission for the Department of Defense. This responsibility encompasses the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean, as well as the Pacific Ocean between the West coast and Hawaii. Annually, 1,600 flying hours are dedicated to this mission. No Air Force Reserve fighter units were deactivated in fiscal year 1991, and the last two F-4 units were modernized to F-16s.

In addition to the mobilization of a significant amount of Air Force Reserve strategic airlift, one A-10 tactical fighter squadron and two special operations squadrons with AC-130 gunships and helicopters were mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. A total of 22,536 unit members, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and Individual Ready Reservists were also mobilized. None of the units participating in Operations DESERT SHIELD/

STORM was deactivated in fiscal year 1991, nor are any programmed for deactivation in fiscal year 1992.

The Air Force Reserve has received no additional missions during fiscal year 1991, and has, therefore, been optimizing its current asset allocation. The most cost-effective mission for the Air Force Reserve is one with a low peacetime training intensity. Missions with high peacetime training intensity requirements diminish or negate the cost savings normally associated with an Air Force Reserve unit. However, there has been no degradation in wartime capability regardless of mission assignment. Additional mission tasking would require a commensurate transfer of resources.

Contributions by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to the Total Air Force are displayed in Table 2-5.

Table 2-5  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE  
 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL AIR FORCE**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Air National Guard Percent of Air Force</u>	<u>Air Force Reserve Percent of Air Force</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Air Force</u>
<b><u>Flying Units</u></b>			
Aircraft <sup>1</sup>			
Aerial Spraying	0	100	100
Strategic Interceptor Force (U.S. Based)	92	0	92
Air Rescue/Recovery	32	42	74
Tactical Airlift	38	26	64
Tactical Reconnaissance	60	0	60
Tactical Air Support	41	0	41
Weather Reconnaissance	0	100	100
Tactical Fighters	25	9	34
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	20	5	25
Special Operations	11	18	29
Support Aircraft	23	0	23
Strategic Airlift	6	11	17
Aircrews <sup>2</sup>			
Aeromedical Evacuation	26	71	97
Strategic Airlift (Associate)	0	50	50
Tanker/Cargo (Associate)	0	43	43
Aeromedical Evacuation (Associate)	0	30	30
<b><u>Non-Flying Units</u></b>			
Aircraft Control & Warning	94	0	94
Aerial Port	12	58	70
Engineering Installation	70	0	70
Combat Communications	65	0	65
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons	0	59	59
Tactical Control	49	0	49
Civil Engineering	26	18	44
Strategic Airlift Maintenance (Associate)	0	40	40
Medical <sup>3</sup>	11	7	18
Weather	14	1	15
Reconnaissance (Technical)	13	0	13
Communications Squadrons	3	3	6
Electronic Security	1	0	1

Notes: 1 Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft

2 Percentages determined by counting authorized personnel

3 Excludes aeromedical evacuation personnel

Sources: Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve

Data as of September 30, 1991



## Coast Guard

There are 11,773 personnel in the Coast Guard Selected Reserve and 6,294 in the Individual Ready Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve units are primarily training units, responsible for augmentation of Active component commands. Except for three deployable port security units which mobilize as units, the Coast Guard Reserve augments Active component units upon mobilization.

In fiscal year 1991, there were no significant force structure changes in the Coast Guard Reserve. Three port security units, consisting of 279 members, and 1,409 additional personnel, involved in loading at various U.S. outports, were activated in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. However, these units were not mobilized or used as planned, equipped, and trained. The

port safety element of each unit was not mobilized, resulting in a shortage of the personnel necessary for effective sustained operations. The configuration of these units requires dependence upon the support command for services such as advanced medical, food, water, berthing, and transportation. Much of this support was not available from the support command. Replacement units received modified training and were organized specifically for employment in the Persian Gulf. These later-reporting units experienced fewer support problems. None of the Coast Guard Reserve port security units is programmed for decommissioning in fiscal year 1992.

No new missions were assigned to the Coast Guard Reserve in fiscal year 1991. It does retain its mobilization responsibility in all Coast Guard missions. The most important issue affecting the Coast Guard Reserve remains the need for Congressional funding of the Coast Guard Selected Reserve strength at the same percentage of mobilization requirements as the other Reserve components. The funding is essential to ensure that the Coast Guard will be capable of performing its mobilization mission.

Contributions by the Coast Guard Reserve to the Total Coast Guard are displayed in Table 2-6.

**Table 2-6**  
**COAST GUARD RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL COAST GUARD**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Coast Guard Reserve Percent of Coast Guard</u>
Deployable Port Security Units	100
Marine Safety office	44
Operational Shore Facilities	32
Command & Control	27
Repair/Supply/Research	22
Vessels	16
Air Stations	2

Notes: Percentages determined by counting mobilization billets

Source: Coast Guard Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1991

## Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces bring unique and important operational capabilities to all military operations in both peacetime and conflict. Special operations forces include special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations, and civil affairs as Army components. Naval components include Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) teams, and special boat units. Air Force representation includes both rotary and fixed wing aircraft units and personnel.

Congressional language, 10 USC 167, provides that "unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all Active and Reserve component special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)." Such assignment includes control of peacetime operations and training, as well as budget execution.

Reserve component special operations forces provide the Department of Defense with a significant capability. Unit personnel stabilization provides the Total Force with a "bank" of hard-to-train skills available whenever the need arises. The Army National Guard contributes two special forces groups and one special operations aviation battalion to special operations. The Army Reserve also contributes 2 special forces groups, as well as 3 psychological operations groups consisting of 6 psychological operations battalions, which contain 22 psychological operations companies, and 3 civil affairs commands consisting of 5 civil affairs brigades and 4 civil affairs groups, which contain 24 civil affairs companies. Approximately, 40 percent of the Army Reserve component civil affairs force and 5 percent of their psychological operations capability were deployed in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Naval Reserve units in the Naval Special Warfare Program provide planning, staffing, equipment maintenance, and training support to their various Active component commands. The 15 augmenting units in the program consist of 7 staff units, 3 field units, 4

operating SEAL teams and 1 equipment maintenance unit. The Naval Special Warfare Program also includes two special boat squadrons and four special boat units. During the Persian Gulf crisis, Naval Special Warfare Program personnel were recalled to augment and backfill Active component commands, train follow-on personnel, and selectively deploy into theater.


Reserve contributions to the Air Force's special operations force includes airframes from the 193rd and 919th Special Operations Groups, and the 71st and 711th Special Operation Squadrons. Numerous Air Reserve component special operations personnel and weapons systems were mobilized and deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, including 260 personnel and 10 aircraft. They flew combat, combat rescue, infiltration, and exfiltration missions, as well as numerous close-air support missions.

The Marine Corps Reserve does not have units that are formally designated special operations units, however, the Marine Corps does have two Reserve civil affairs groups that could be designated to deploy a detachment with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), which is capable of carrying out maritime special operations missions.

The Coast Guard Reserve does not have units that are characterized as special operations units. The Reserve component contributions to special operations forces are found in Table 2-7.



**Table 2-7**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS**  
**TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**



Source: USSOCOM J-5.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

### **Force Structure Summary and Considerations**

Today, greater dependence is being placed on the Reserve components. Most warfighting contingency plans and peacetime operations include the Reserve components. The use of the Presidential call-up authority, and employment of Reserve component personnel in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL demonstrate the realities of global threat and the requirement for a ready Total Force.

The Board believes that equal-share Reserve component reductions when the Active component is reduced, without careful analysis, is not prudent.

*The Board recommends that appropriate analysis, with total involvement of all components, and strong attention to the lessons learned from the various military operations*

*undergone this year, be accomplished before approving such reductions. The impact of implementation of recommendations from one study must be carefully compared to the recommendations of the numerous other studies to effectively assess the net impact on the Total Force. Final analysis must ensure full consideration of Reserve component cost-effectiveness and total force capability requirements resulting from the projected threats and scenarios of the future.*

*The Board further recommends that as budget constraints and consideration of reduced threats cause the Services to make force structure reductions in the Active forces, there should be a thorough analysis on the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of transferring that capability to the Reserve components. Concepts such as the cadre division, when tested and validated, may be appropriate for each component, Active and Reserve*





# Operational Missions 3

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*"We landed our first crew in Saudi Arabia on the first day of the operation and were some of the last ones out "*

*Major General John J. Closner, USAF  
Chief of the Air Force Reserve*

## **Operations DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL**

The United States' response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait resulted in the first large-scale deployment of forces since the adoption of the Total Force Policy. More than a quarter of a million Reservists participated in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and approximately 116,000 of those served in the theater of operations.

Within 60 days of the request from the King of Saudi Arabia to the President for assistance, United States military presence in the region grew from 10,000 personnel to 200,000, including Active and Reserve component personnel. Volunteers from the Reserve components augmented the Active component force from the first day of the deployment. These volunteers proved essential to the operation, especially early in the deployment. According to the Department of Defense's *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict – An Interim Report to Congress*, The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve accounted for over 40 percent of all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of air refueling missions during the month of August 1990 alone. Other Reserve component personnel made significant contributions in areas such as linguistics, transport services,



port operations, water purification, movement control, military police, medical support, legal support, and port security requirements. By the time the President authorized the involuntary call-up of Reservists on August 22, 1990, more than 10,500 volunteers were already on active duty.

The Board recognizes the enormous contributions made by Reserve component volunteers to support both previous operations and those conducted during fiscal year 1991. The success of the initial deployment in Operation DESERT SHIELD was due in no small part to the outstanding response of Guard and Reserve volunteers who augmented Active component forces from the very beginning of the operation. These vital contributions are likely to continue in future operations. However, it should be noted that there are inherent limitations to the use of volunteers for a long period of time and that those individuals who are ordered to active duty for less than 31 days are currently ineligible for full military benefits and entitlements.

Forward presence of Naval forces, rapid deployment of Air Force fighter squadrons and B-52 bomber squadrons, and prepositioned equipment in the region were essential for the initial establishment of United States resolve. Virtually all force presence had to be delivered through strategic lift capabilities. Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM taxed United States' airlift and sealift assets close to the maximum, fully employing nearly 90 percent of the Military Airlift Command's organic fleet and requiring the chartering of more than 120 privately-owned ships for additional support.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL required maximum utilization of existing Active and Reserve component airlift and sealift capacity. Particularly in the case of the C-141 aircraft, heavy use further reduced the service life of these aging aircraft. There is an urgent need for early procurement of adequate numbers of newer, improved equipment to replace the aging aircraft. Additionally, there is a need for an adequately maintained and available Merchant Marine capacity.

The use of the Presidential call-up authority under 10 USC 673b provided immediate Reserve component support to augment the Active components. The activities performed by Reservists ranged from augmenting deployed Active component units to filling critical military support vacancies both in the United States and abroad.

Reserve components participated in many mission areas including, but not limited to:

#### **Army National Guard/Army Reserve**

- Artillery
- Civil Affairs
- Command and Control
- CONUS Augmentation and Training
- Engineer
- Infantry
- Intelligence
- Maintenance
- Medical
- Military Police
- Supply and Services
- Transportation

#### **Naval Reserve**

- Cargo Handling
- Construction
- CONUS Augmentation and Training
- Intelligence
- Logistics Support
- Medical Support
- Minesweepers
- Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare
- Search and Rescue

#### **Marine Corps Reserve**

- Aerial Refueling
- Civil Affairs
- Communications
- CONUS Base and Station Augmentation
- Engineering
- Helicopter Support
- Infantry, Artillery and Armor
- Maintenance
- Motor Transport

#### **Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve**

- Air Defense
- Aerial Port Operations
- Aerial Refueling
- Communications Support
- CONUS Augmentation and Training
- Logistics
- Medical Services
- Military Police
- Tactical and Strategic Airlift
- Tactical Fighters
- Tactical Reconnaissance


#### **Coast Guard Reserve**

- CONUS Augmentation and Training
- Port Security
- Supervision of Hazardous Cargo Loading/Off-Loading

The call-up of the Army's Reserve component combat forces was initially omitted from the authority to call Selected Reservists. Every Reserve component unit activated was available at the time, though some units required personnel and equipment cross-leveling to attain levels required. The Reserve components demonstrated that they were, in fact, ready and able to serve as an integral part of the Total Force.

In November 1990, the Army's Reserve components combat forces were authorized for activation, and three combat Army National Guard brigades, the 48th, the 155th, and the 256th, were called into service. These brigades underwent post-mobilization training to achieve validation under a specially developed training program designed to provide the highest assurance of success in operations in the Persian Gulf environment. When combat operations began, 202,337 Selected Reservists and 20,277 Individual Ready Reservists had been called to active duty. One hundred hours later, a cease fire was called. The trained and validated Army National Guard brigades were no longer required to be deployed.





Reserve component air squadrons were generally combat-ready and able to deploy on short notice. However, many Reserve component ground combat units would require additional training time (and consequently more notification lead-time) to permit their planned post-mobilization training to be completed prior to deployment.

Soon after the cease fire was announced on February 27, 1991, a humanitarian effort, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, commenced in Northern Iraq and Turkey to care for refugees. Similarly, Operation SEA ANGEL, which provided disaster relief for the people in Bangladesh, commenced. Both Active and Reserve personnel were involved in the care, feeding, and eventual return of these peoples to their homes. Even while this was occurring, phase-down operations from Operation DESERT STORM were being implemented.

*The Board commends the many Reserve component personnel who contributed to the success of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and SEA ANGEL. The Board encourages the application of lessons learned in the refinement of future doctrine, technology, policies, and procedures. However, the Board cautions that the uniqueness of the Persian Gulf War requires severe constraints to be applied to any lessons learned. Individual Services may find more Service-specific applicability to some of the lessons*

*announced, than the Department of Defense may find applicable to the Total Force. Nevertheless, at least five lessons which emerged in many studies, appear applicable for inclusion in future Total Force strategies:*

- *The use and response of the Reserve components validates the Total Force Policy and lends strong support to the concept of national resolve through the inclusion of Reserve forces.*
- *An edge in technology and use of innovative doctrine contributes substantially to success with minimum loss of life.*
- *A competent, highly -trained, and professional military force is essential to properly operate the highly technical equipment and to make the sound tactical decisions which accompany a successful military operation.*
- *The concept of a military strategy based on regional involvement is sound and should remain the focus for future involvement. Such a strategy includes sound planning for the use of strategic lift, forward forces, and prepositioned equipment.*
- *Aspects of operations plans which are exercised during peacetime enhance the likelihood of success with reduced losses of personnel and equipment.*

*The Board recommends that:*

- *continuing efforts be made to inform the public about the role performed by the Guard and Reserve in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.*
- *Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM be classified as a "war" for Title 5 purposes, and that the Secretary of Defense support the necessary legislative changes to 5 USC 2108 to provide the veterans' preference benefit, effective August 2, 1990, to all Active and Reserve component members and retirees who served on active duty during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, regardless of where they served.*

- *the Department of Defense consider the development of policy guidance to direct the combatant commands and Services to release mobilized Reserve component members and retirees from active duty as rapidly as possible following the end of hostilities, subject to operational considerations. Such a policy would have positive effects on recruiting and retention, and also reflect appropriate sensitivity to the Reserve component members and retirees, their families, their civilian careers, and the support of their employers.*
- *members of the Reserve components, who served honorably in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, be provided access to military legal assistance for a period of six months, unemployment compensation for up to 26 weeks, and an extension of health (either CHAMPUS or military) and dental care for a period of 90 days, following their release from active duty.*
- *consideration be given to establishing a service medal signifying service in the Southwest Asian theater during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.*
- *a mobilization medal be established to recognize the unique contributions and sacrifices of members of the Reserve components and retirees who were involuntarily called or volunteered for active duty during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, regardless of where they served.*
- *the eligibility criteria for the National Defense Service Medal be changed to include all members of the Selected Reserve.*
- *a device be developed and authorized for wear on the National Defense Service Medal, providing appropriate recognition for Reservists and retirees who served on active duty as a result of a mobilization*

The Board believes special recognition should be given to members of the Reserve components and retirees who served on active duty, involuntarily or voluntarily, in support of

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM or PROVIDE COMFORT, regardless of where they served. Of the 228,561 Reservists called, 106,000 (46%) served in theater and are eligible for the Southwest Asia Service Medal. The remaining Reservists and retirees served in the continental U.S., Europe, Okinawa, and other locations, and are not eligible for the Southwest Asia Service Medal. Having served on active duty as a result of a mobilization of the Reserve components is a unique circumstance, and should be recognized.

### **Use of Presidential Call-Up Authority**

Title 10 USC 673(b) provides statutory authority for the President to call up members of the Selected Reserve (which includes Individual Mobilization Augmentees). Under this authority, the President may activate not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve involuntarily, for not more than 90 days, without declaring a national emergency. The President may use this authority when he determines it necessary to augment Active component forces for an operational mission. In cases where the President determines such action necessary, he may extend the original 90-day period for not more than an additional 90 days. Prior to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, this authority had not been used.

On August 22, 1990, pursuant to 10 USC 673b, the President of the United States authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to the Coast Guard) to order to active duty organized units and individual members of the Selected Reserve. The initial call-up authorized a maximum of 50,050 personnel be called to active duty in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. On subsequent dates that number was further increased, and on January 19, 1991, under 10 USC 673, the Services were authorized to call up to a total of 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve (which in addition to the Selected Reserve includes the Individual Ready Reserve). On January 24, 1991, the Coast Guard authorization was increased to 1,988 Reservists, bringing the

total Service authorization to 361,988 Reservists.

*The Board has long supported the appropriate use of the Presidential call-up authority of 10 USC 673b, and commends the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the consideration they have given to the use of the Reserve components in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The Nation's justifiable reliance on the Total Force Policy was demonstrated by the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Capabilities which were deliberately placed in the Reserve components were called upon to meet operational requirements. These experiences will be of exceptional value in evaluating the Total Force Policy and should be fully integrated into all lessons learned studies which result.*

*The Board recommends that lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM be reviewed with respect to the adequacy of 10 USC 673b call-up authority, to include authority to call up members of the Individual Ready Reserve members possessing critically needed skills.*

### **Use of Derivative Unit Identification Codes and Tailored Unit Training Codes for Mobilization**

Unit Identification Codes (UIC) and Unit Training Codes (UTC) were initially developed for strength accounting and unit administration. However, because they also identify individual units, these codes were extensively utilized for mobilization during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The Department of Defense defined a unit as any group of two or more individuals organized to perform a particular function, whether or not such a group is a part of a larger group. In those instances where only a part of a unit was required, the Army utilized "derivative" UICs and the Air Force used "tailored" UTCs to mobilize only those individuals who were needed, qualified, and available for a particular mission.

The use of derivative UICs created difficulties for the Army National Guard in reporting the status of personnel and equipment, and caused problems of command and control, potentially reducing wartime fighting capability.



While the use of derivative UICs saved mobilization of unnecessary Army Reserve personnel, unit integrity was lost, medical teams that had trained together were broken up, sub-elements were not ready for separate mobilization, and units that were fragmented could not later be deployed as viable units. Cross-leveling of personnel and equipment adversely affected the readiness of the remaining units.

The Naval Reserve did not use derivative UICs. When Commander-In-Chief requirements did not specify complete units, individuals were identified using a Reserve Billet Sequence Code/Reserve UIC/Active UIC match. The recall of selected portions / individuals from units did not pose a major problem. The bulk of Naval Reserve units are organized as units for administrative purposes only and members are trained to function as individual as well as group augmentees.

The Marine Corps task-organizes all of its Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Forces. Activating companies, platoons, sections, and detachments from parent Reserve component units and attaching them to other units is a normal operating procedure. An advantage of this procedure is that it allows only personnel required for a specific mission to be called up. However, a disadvantage is that personnel remaining behind in a deployed unit may not have the capability of performing all unit missions. The morale of "remain behind" personnel may decrease and equipment readiness may suffer as a result of the best equipment being deployed first.

The disadvantage of tailored UTCs for the Air National Guard was that units had trained for the past 20 years to "fight as a unit". Therefore, when this new procedure was implemented, unit integrity was lost and there was much discontent among the units. However, after further explanations, and in retrospect seeing how well this new concept worked, many agreed that it served the best interest.

Problems were experienced in the Air Force Reserve because supported commands were tempted to request tailored UTC packages



without adequate command and administrative infrastructure. Also, Reservists who had trained together for long periods with the expectation of deploying as a unit were separated, which had a negative effect on morale.

The Coast Guard did not utilize derivative UICs.

Recall by UTC worked well for some organizations while it hindered mission accomplishment in others. The Reserve components have included the following in lessons learned studies:

- The use of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and Functional Area Assessment (FAA) process could identify those sub-units that have a high probability of deploying apart from the current Active Army level unit, and establish requirements for them as sub-unit level units with a unique Standard Requirement Code. The policy of not using Army Reserve Component unit members as individual or team fillers could be continued; the Active Army level UIC unit should continue to be the norm for a deployable unit.

- To maintain maximum unit integrity, greater utilization of individuals in the Services' Individual Mobilization Augmentee and the Individual Ready Reserve programs should be considered.
- Use of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Services' automated data processing (ADP) systems will permit a more flexible response to future recall requirements.
- When several UTCs are required from the same unit, there must be sufficient personnel and equipment remaining in that unit to support any following UTCs. Consideration should be given to reconstituting UTCs at a single location by combining previously called UTCs and recalling the remainder of the unit.

The Board is concerned that calling individuals from units, rather than calling the entire units, is a departure from the provisions of 10 USC 672(c) and a long-standing understanding that Reserve component units would be called to serve only as units. Unit members were recruited with that understanding. However, if not designed, preplanned, and institutionalized in the force in peacetime, the creation of derivative UICs

make the mobilization process more difficult and complex by depleting other existing units, lowering their readiness, and potentially rendering them nondeployable. Preplanned and well designed derivative UICs can be cost-effective, be more easily made combat-ready, and facilitate the mobilization process. If operational requirements dictate use of individuals rather than units, there should be planning for such eventualities.

*It is the Board's position that, to the maximum extent practicable, Reserve component units should be called to active duty under 10 USC 673 or 673b as complete units to maintain their unit integrity and readiness, in accordance with policy set forth in 10 USC 672(c) and DoD Directive 1235.10 of October 24, 1986. There may be occasions when an entire unit may not be needed.*

*Accordingly, the Board recommends that future requirements to mobilize only parts of units (derivative UICs/tailored UTCs) be identified in advance for various stages of mobilization and that affected unit personnel be notified accordingly.*

### **Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve in Operations in the Persian Gulf**

The call-up of Selected Reserve units and individuals for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM prompted many questions from families, employers whose employees had been called to active duty on short notice, and the Reservists who received the orders. Because this was the first time use of the 10 USC 673b call-up authority, issues surfaced that had not been addressed before. Many of these issues concerned reemployment rights and legal concerns.

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) provides advice and counsel to employers and Reservists. In early August 1990, NCESGR began to receive inquiries regarding the possible call-up of Reservists for operations in the Persian Gulf. Inquiries came from the media, as well as employers and Reservists and their families.





Most Reservists who called were only requesting information, and few difficulties or problems were reported. In addition to wanting to know their obligations under the law, many calls related to voluntary extension of insurance, benefits, pay continuation, and incremental pay supplements. The vast majority of employers supported their employees. Larger employers are more capable of minimizing the impact of employees in the Guard and Reserve being called to active duty because of their ability to realign their workforce. However, the majority of the Nation's employers are smaller, employing less than 25 people. These employers often found a large percentage of their force involved, and suffered a greater burden.

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve and family support activities throughout the Nation performed a vital role in responding to questions relating to called up Reservists, their benefits, and relationships with their employers. In addition, many organizations provided voluntary counseling and support to the families of personnel deployed. For example, Century Health Care Corporation, a private health care company, developed two 30-page booklets, one targeted at 3-8 year old children and the other for older children, to

help reduce the trauma associated with the deployment. They also established a toll-free number for guardians of children who were having problems coping with the fact their parent(s) had deployed.

*The Board commends all such extraordinary efforts made by thousands of organizations and individuals throughout this Nation.*

*The Board also commends the efforts of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress in resolving many of the Reserve component issues and inequities that this Board, and others, identified during fiscal years 1990 and 1991. These include the updated provisions to the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act, the return to the status quo of those members activated from educational institutions, and providing for relief from malpractice insurance claims during activation. In addition, the Congress is seeking appropriate compensation for professionals and self-employed members whose business or practice failed during his/her absence, and continues to provide recognition to the serving members, their employers, and organizations who supported the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who served their country during this conflict*

*The Board recommends that:*

- *a certificate of appreciation, signed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, be presented to all employers, who had an employee or employees who served on active duty in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. It is suggested that such certificates be issued to and presented by the appropriate local Reserve component field commander.*
- *employer support problems be closely monitored upon the return of Reserve component members from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, anticipating that the final test of employer support occurred following the release of called-up Reservists from active duty.*

### **Fight Against Illegal Drugs**

On September 18, 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued a broad, new guidance to the Department of Defense, which was designed to assist in the swift and effective implementation of the President's Drug Control Strategy within the Department. The

Secretary directed the Department of Defense to employ the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively.

During the fiscal years 1990 and 1991, the Active and Reserve components of the Armed Forces continued to be heavily engaged in the counterdrug efforts of the Nation at the same time that they were engaged in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Reserve components have been an essential part of the Department's counterdrug program, and have participated fully throughout the full range of activities that support the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs at every phase of the flow: in the countries that are the sources of the drugs, in transit to the United States, and in the United States.

Detailed information outlining the Reserve components' fiscal year 1991 activities and involvement in the Department of Defense's counterdrug strategy is provided in the Training and mobilization readiness chapter.





# Personnel

# 4



*"I think now, more than ever, since DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the nation has an appreciation for the important role the Reserves play in our ability to go to war."*

*General George Joulwan, USA  
Commander-in-Chief  
U S Southern Command*



## General

The maintenance of Reserve component personnel strength remains an area of primary importance. As a result of Active component "stop-loss" programs, which were instituted during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, some of the Reserve components experienced difficulty in attaining their fiscal year 1991 Selected Reserve budgeted strength objectives. However, all achieved 97 percent or more of their objective. It should also be noted that some Reserve components chose not to fill all of their positions, in anticipation of strength reductions which were programmed for fiscal year 1992.

One of the key issues continuing to impact on the Reserve components is Full-Time Support (FTS) manning. Currently, only 73 percent of Army National Guard and 64 percent of Army Reserve Full-Time Support requirements are funded. Adequate numbers of Full-Time Support personnel are essential to accomplish Reserve component administrative requirements, to ensure adequate maintenance of equipment, and to improve training and mobilization readiness.

Recruiting and retention of health care professionals are being closely monitored, to allow corrective action to be taken in response to any potential long-term adverse effect resulting from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Results to date have generally been positive.

The attrition of trained personnel from the Selected Reserve continues to require attention, even though a large percentage of these personnel go into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), on active duty, or to other Reserve components. Replacing Selected



Reservists who depart prior to completion of their term of service is costly and time consuming. Retention of trained personnel should continue to have a high priority.

## Personnel Strengths

The Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air Force Reserve and Coast Guard Reserve ended the year slightly below their authorized end strengths. The Marine Corps Reserve and the Air National Guard exceeded their authorized end strength. It should be noted that budgeted strength can be significantly less than wartime requirements. Current funding levels prevent the Reserve components from filling to wartime requirements, and in some cases, to authorized peacetime levels.

Army National Guard assigned strength represents 97.6 percent of budgeted strength for fiscal year 1991. However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 calls for a reduction in Army National Guard end strength of 17,300 in fiscal year 1992 and a further reduction of 14,550 for fiscal year 1993.

Army Reserve assigned strength represents 97.2 percent of budgeted strength for fiscal year 1991. Similarly, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 requires a reduction of 10,700 in Army Reserve end strength in fiscal year 1992 and an additional reduction of 11,770 in fiscal year 1993.

Naval Reserve assigned strength represents 98.8 percent of the fiscal year 1991 budgeted strength. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 reduces the authorized strength of the Naval Reserve 9,400 in fiscal year 1992 and by an additional 2,445 in fiscal year 1993.

Selected Marine Corps Reserve assigned strength represents 102 percent of the fiscal year 1991 budgeted strength. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve end strength authorization is reduced by 1,500 for fiscal year 1992 and by an additional 170 for fiscal year 1993.

Assigned strength represents 100.6 percent of the fiscal year 1991 budgeted strength for the Air National Guard. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 authorizes an increase in Air National Guard of 1,000 for fiscal year 1992 and a further increase of 1,300 for fiscal year 1993.

Assigned strength represents 98.8 percent of the fiscal year 1991 budgeted strength for the Air Force Reserve. The Air Force Reserve end strength authorization is reduced by 2,195 for fiscal year 1992 and by an additional 925 for fiscal year 1993.

Assigned strength represents 92.7 percent of the fiscal year 1991 budgeted strength for the Coast Guard Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve end strength authorization is increased by 2,450 for fiscal year 1992 and remains at 15,150 for fiscal year 1993. However, it should be noted that available

fiscal year 1991 funding within the Department of Transportation allowed for a Coast Guard Selected Reserve budgeted strength of only 12,100, notwithstanding the fact that an end strength of 12,700 had been authorized by Congress.

*The Board recommends that the authorization of Coast Guard Selected Reserve end strength not be taken out of the Defense Authorization Act, changing the jurisdiction of Coast Guard Selected Reserve end strength from the Armed Services Committee to the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.*

Table 4-1 lists authorized end strengths for the Selected Reserve as contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Table 4-2 shows the actual assigned Selected Reserve end strength for fiscal year 1991.

**Table 4-1**  
**AUTHORIZED END STRENGTHS**  
**Selected Reserve**

	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Army National Guard	457,300	440,000	425,450
Army Reserve	318,700	308,000	296,230
Naval Reserve	153,400	144,000	141,545
Marine Corps Reserve	43,900	42,400	42,230
Air National Guard	117,035	118,400	119,400
Air Force Reserve	85,591	83,596	82,400
Coast Guard Reserve	12,700 <sup>1</sup>	15,150	15,150
<b>Total</b>	<u>1,188,626</u>	<u>1,151,046</u>	<u>1,122,405</u>

Note: <sup>1</sup> DoT budgeted strength was 12,100.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Reserve components Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 4-2**  
**SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS**  
**(Includes IMA, AGR, TAR and Statutory Tour Personnel)**

	<u>Wartime Requirement</u>	<u>Authorized Strength</u>	<u>Budgeted Strength</u>	<u>Assigned Strength</u> <sup>1</sup>
Army National Guard	487,645	457,300	457,300	446,121
Army Reserve	335,000	318,700	318,700	309,681
Naval Reserve	162,000	153,400	153,400	151,510
Marine Corps Reserve	42,400	43,900	43,900	44,933
Air National Guard	121,998	117,035	117,035	117,786
Air Force Reserve	89,138	85,591	85,591	84,539
DoD Total	1,238,181	1,175,926	1,175,926	1,154,570
Coast Guard Reserve	27,500	12,700	12,000	11,773
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,265,681</b>	<b>1,188,626</b>	<b>1,187,926</b>	<b>1,66,343</b>

Note. 1 includes 17,059 National Guardsmen and Reservists called to active duty pursuant to sections 672 and 673 of Title 10 U S C

Sources Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the DoD Comptroller, and the Coast Guard

Data as of September 30, 1991



### **Age Differentials (Active Components/Reserve Components)**

There is a common misconception that Reserve component members are significantly older than their Active component counterparts, and that this might somehow limit their effectiveness. Accordingly, the Board's staff conducted an analysis of the average age, by grade, of Active and Reserve component members of each of the Services and for Army combat arms soldiers.

To briefly summarize the findings as they pertain to the Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve, enlisted personnel were found to be approximately four years older than their Active component counterparts. The greatest differential occurs in pay grades E5 and E6, where the average age differential increases to

6 years. For officers, the overall age differential is approximately three years. For warrant officers, the overall age differential is nearly 6 years. Averaging all categories, the Army's Reserve component soldiers are approximately four years older than members of the Active component.


With regard to Army combat arms personnel, Reserve component enlisted soldiers were approximately three years older; the average age of officers was about the same; Army National Guard warrant officers were an average of four years older; and Army

Reserve warrant officers were slightly younger than Active component warrant officers.

The Board does not consider these differentials to be significant, particularly in view of current estimates that approximately 45 percent of Reserve component enlisted personnel and over 50 percent of officers have prior service (active duty) experience.


Tables 4-3 and 4-4 show the overall average age differentials for each of the Services, and the Army combat arms personnel.

**Table 4-3**  
**ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT**  
**AVERAGE AGE DIFFERENTIALS**



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs  
Data as of September 30, 1990

**Table 4-4**  
**AVERAGE AGE DIFFERENTIALS**  
**COMBAT ARMS-ARMY**



Source. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1990.

### Attrition

Attrition from the Selected Reserve represents a loss of trained personnel from units. However, individuals with a military service obligation continue to serve as members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

No significant differences in attrition have been noted between units which were mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and those not mobilized. In some instances, fiscal year 1991 losses are less than fiscal year 1990. The Air National Guard Selected Reserve attrition rates are the lowest, with overall job satisfaction being given as the primary reason. Discharges and transfers appear to be the only cause for Air National Guard attrition.

Improvements in training, pay systems, incentives, advancement opportunities, and reenlistment bonuses have been helpful in reducing attrition. However, a review of reasons given for Selected Reserve attrition in enlisted pay grades E1 through E5 and junior officer pay grades O1 through O3 continue to include promotion and grade stagnation, Reserve pay problems, family concerns, job scheduling conflicts, and geographic considerations to be the most common decision factors. These reasons seem to apply to all the Reserve components, except the Air National Guard, and continue to impact retention.

The Reserve components' fiscal year 1991 attrition rates for pay grades E1 through E5 and for pay grades O1 through O3 are listed in Table 4-5.

**Table 4-5**  
**SELECTED RESERVE ATTRITION**  
**Fiscal Year 1991**

	<u>E1 – E5</u>	<u>O1 – O3</u>
Army National Guard	16%	9%
Army Reserve	20%	7%
Naval Reserve	23%	18%
Marine Corps Reserve	19%	13%
Air National Guard	11%	5%
Air Force Reserve	16%	8%
Coast Guard Reserve	18% (Overall)	

Source: The Reserve components.  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

*The Board recommends that retention continue to receive priority attention as a means of improving readiness.*

### **Automated Personnel Management Information Systems**

Lessons learned during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM have reinforced the requirement for effective interfaces between Active and Reserve component management information (automated data processing) systems. Ideally, the Active and Reserve components would utilize the same systems. Existing incompatibility between Active and Reserve component pay, personnel, logistics, and mobilization management systems made it necessary during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM to retrain mobilized Reserve component personnel to operate Active component systems. Manual "work arounds" were developed to offset shortcomings in automated systems, resulting in numerous pay and personnel record problems.

Detailed information regarding Services' automated personnel data system initiatives is provided in the Equipment chapter.

*The Board recommends that action be taken to ensure effective interfaces between*

*Active and Reserve component management information (automated data processing) systems.*

### **Civil Affairs**

Civil affairs units performed important roles in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The predominant civil affairs capability in the Armed Forces is represented by the 36 Army Reserve and two Marine Corps Reserve civil affairs units. One civil affairs battalion is in the Active Army. Civil affairs functions include: governmental (legal, finance, public health, public safety, welfare, sanitation), public facilities (public works, communications, transportation, engineering), economic (finance, food/agriculture, property control), and special functions (displaced persons/refugees, cultural affairs, arts/monuments/archives).

Reservists filling civil affairs positions acquire their functional expertise from their civilian education, professions, careers, and organizations, as well as through military training. Reserve component civil affairs units and members supported the combat commanders in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM at all levels. They also engaged in the formulation of plans and assisted the Kuwaiti government in the reconstitution of that country. The proper utilization of civil affairs units and personnel requires the involvement of civil affairs prior to, during, and subsequent to military operations.

*The Board recommends that the Navy and Air Force consider identifying members of their Reserve components who, by reason of civilian education and professional experience, could be of potential value in civil affairs operations.*

### **Civilian Education Levels**

Table 4-6 shows the percentage of enlisted personnel in the Selected Reserve who have high school diplomas or equivalency credentials, and those officers in pay grades O1 through O3 who have college degrees

**Table 4-6**  
**CIVILIAN EDUCATION LEVELS**  
**Selected Reserve**

	<b>Enlisted with HS Diploma/GED</b>	<b>Officers (O1-O3) with BA/BS Degree</b>
Army National Guard	86%	53%
Army Reserve	95%	77%
Naval Reserve	98%	91%
Marine Corps Reserve	99%	99%
Air National Guard	99%	84%
Air Force Reserve	99%	96%
Coast Guard Reserve	95%	86%

Source: The Reserve components  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 contains a new educational requirement for Reserve component officers. The Act states, "after September 30, 1995, no person may be appointed to a grade above the grade of first lieutenant or lieutenant (junior grade) unless that person has been awarded a baccalaureate degree by an accredited educational institution."

*The Board recommends that efforts be continued toward a goal of increasing the civilian education level of enlisted personnel to a high school diploma, or equivalent, and a baccalaureate degree for officers.*

### **Critical Skills Shortages**

Each of the Reserve components are experiencing shortages of ten percent or more in various officer, warrant officer, and enlisted skills. Personnel shortages caused many units to be below minimum readiness standards or necessitated extensive cross-leveling to meet mobilization requirements for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM

In the Army's Reserve components, skill shortages were further aggravated by the lack of a Reserve component Trainee/Transient/

Holdee/Student (TTHS) or "Individuals" Account, as discussed later in this chapter, which would have provided separate accountability for trainees, transients, holdees, and students who are currently assigned to unit positions.

The Army National Guard has 34 officer, 37 warrant officer, and 155 enlisted specialties with less than 90 percent fill against requirements. The enlisted shortages constitute 48 percent of the 322 critical military occupational specialties (MOS) in the Army National Guard. However, some are between 80 and 90 percent filled. Recruiting and retention managers at the state level continue to focus their efforts on identifying qualified individuals, both prior service and nonprior service, to fill these positions. Bonuses continue to be used as an incentive to reduce shortages.

The Army Reserve has 6 officer, 29 warrant officer, and 8 enlisted specialties which are less than 90 percent filled. While the fill rate is a major concern, the low percentage of duty qualified personnel in these MOSs further limits the ability of some units to deploy. It should also be noted that the Army Reserve has a total of 1,564 warrant officer vacancies.

The Naval Reserve has three officer, three chief warrant officer, and eight enlisted specialties which are less than 90 percent filled. The inventory of enlisted personnel holding specific medical classifications was virtually exhausted during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Additional personnel with these skills would not have been available if Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM had been protracted. Shortages in cryptotechnological technicians (68 percent manned) and construction force ratings (77 percent manned) also limit full mobilization of the force.

The Marine Corps Reserve has 5 officer, 3 warrant officer, and 11 enlisted specialties with less than 90 percent fill. Recruiting and retention efforts are being targeted in an effort to reduce shortages in critical specialties. In addition, Selected Marine Corps Reserve units

are training/retraining personnel to fill critical vacancies.

The Air National Guard has five officer (pilot, air traffic control, weather, chaplain, and medical) and four enlisted (intelligence, air traffic control, explosive ordnance disposal, and medical) specialties with less than 90 percent fill. Air National Guard mobilization for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was accomplished by utilizing tailored Unit Type Codes (UTCs) to fulfill specific mission requirements, rather than to call up complete units. Consequently, unit commanders had the option of determining who would be mobilized, and could work around existing critical skill shortages. A combination of factors are causing the shortages, such as manning changes, conversions, retirements, eligibility requirements, long technical schools and recruiting competition. Actions taken to reduce shortages include advertising for critical skills specialties at unit level and expanded use of incentive bonus programs.

The Air Force Reserve has 11 officer and 9 enlisted specialties with less than a 90 percent fill. Officer specialties which have shortages are: operations management, visual information, weather, missile maintenance, supply management, logistics plans and programs, education and training, public affairs, intelligence, and biomedical sciences. Enlisted specialties with fill rates of less than 90 percent are: in-flight refueling, imagery interpreter, weather, wire communications systems maintenance, explosive ordnance disposal, communications-computer systems maintenance, open mess management, cryptotechnology, and courier. Because of shortages of physicians and officers in the biomedical sciences, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and retired members were mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Shortages of enlisted cryptotechnologists in the Selected Reserve resulted in the mobilization of IRR members to fill these requirements.

The Coast Guard Reserve has seven of 33 officer specialties with fill rates of less than 90 percent. They are: engineer, personnel,

general administration, general management, operations, finance, and supply. Shortages range from 34-61 percent. There are 13 of 20 enlisted specialties with fill rates of less than 90 percent: fire control technician, sonar technician, radarman, fire and safety technician, telephone technician, radioman, quartermaster, gunnersmate, public affairs, investigator, hospital corpsman, yeoman, and subsistence specialist. Shortages range from 11-88 percent. The Coast Guard Reserve has intensified its recruiting and training efforts to resolve these shortages. Many of these ratings are also inadequately manned within the Active component.

One critical consequence of these personnel shortages common to all Services is that additional time is required upon mobilization to identify personnel with the required specialties and to transfer or cross-level them to fill these positions.

*The Board recommends that continuing emphasis be placed on reducing critical skill shortages in each of the Reserve components.*





## Officer Shortages (by Pay Grade)

Selected Reserve officer shortages impact both peacetime operations and mobilization readiness. Many Army National Guard and Army Reserve officers enter directly from commissioning programs into Reserve component O1/O2 pay grade positions; other Services draw primarily from officers leaving the Active component. In those instances where positions must be filled by an officer of a lower pay grade, readiness is typically reduced due to the differential in training and experience.

Reserve component officer shortages for fiscal year 1991 are as follows:

### Army National Guard

Army National Guard			
Pay Grade	Authorized	Assigned	Short/Over
O1/O2	13,066	18,102	+5,036
O3	13,954	10,935	-3,019
O4	7,220	6,596	-624
O5	3,266	3,460	+194
O6	990	1,456	+466

The shortage of Army National Guard captains (O3) somewhat degraded leadership experience in mobilized units. Army National Guard overstrength policy permits accessioning of lieutenants (O1/O2) to cover shortage of captains. Included in this number are chaplain, medical, and nursing students awaiting graduation and commissioning in their branch.



The assignment of lieutenants has an adverse impact on unit readiness if a substantial number of those officers have not completed an officer basic course. Officers who have not attended an officer basic course are not mobilization assets.

### Army Reserve

Army Reserve			
Pay Grade	Authorized	Assigned	Short/Over
O1/O2	9,645	13,856	+4,211
O3	16,241	13,889	-2,352
O4	11,005	14,014	+3,009
O5	5,886	10,491	+4,605
O6	1,447	3,105	+1,658

The shortage of captains (O3) in Army Reserve troop program units has resulted in lieutenants (O1/O2) being assigned to fill these positions. In those situations where officers in the pay grades of O1/O2 perform O3 duties, they do so without the benefit of the experience and training that they would have gained with additional training and developmental assignments. Also, some lieutenants may not have had an opportunity to attend the Officer Advanced Course, which is designed to prepare them to fill a captain's position.

### Naval Reserve

Naval Reserve			
Pay Grade	Authorized	Assigned	Short/Over
O1/O2	3,253	2,157	-1,096
O3	5,814	9,253	+3,439
O4	9,258	9,275	+17
O5	5,861	4,792	-1,069
O6	1,937	1,878	-59

### Marine Corps Reserve

Marine Corps Reserve			
Pay Grade	Authorized	Assigned	Short/Over
O1/O2	1,525	87	-1,438
O3	1,411	1,317	-94
O4	871	835	-36
O5	541	524	-17
O6	211	198	-13

**Air National Guard**

<b>Air National Guard</b>			
<b>Pay Grade</b>	<b>Authorized</b>	<b>Assigned</b>	<b>Short/Over</b>
O1/O2	291	2,430	+2,139
O3	5,009	3,982	-1,027
O4	5,052	3,964	-1,088
O5	3,635	2,993	-642
O6	625	630	+5

**Air Force Reserve**

<b>Air Force Reserve</b>			
<b>Pay Grade</b>	<b>Authorized</b>	<b>Assigned</b>	<b>Short/Over</b>
O1/O2	918	2,058	+1,140
O3	5,957	4,714	-1,243
O4	5,570	5,137	-433
O5	3,801	3,725	-76
O6	1,295	1,223	-72

**Coast Guard Reserve**

<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>			
<b>Pay Grade</b>	<b>Authorized</b>	<b>Assigned</b>	<b>Short/Over</b>
O1/O2	294	199	-95
O3	505	515	+10
O4	339	384	+45
O5	180	174	-6
O6	33	33	0

*The Board recommends that increased efforts be made to fill officer positions with qualified officers of the appropriate grade.*

**Personnel Problems on Mobilization**

The activation of Reserve component units and personnel for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was the first major mobilization of the Reserve forces in almost 40 years. The call-up resulted in the identification of a number of matters requiring attention.

The Reserve components identified major administrative and personnel problems encountered at mobilization sites, stations in preparing Reserve component personnel (both unit and IRR) for deployment and

actions which should be taken to facilitate future call-ups.

Personnel assigned direct responsibility for the mobilization process were inadequately trained to perform mobilization-related duties. The need for effective automated data processing systems interface between the Reserve components and the Active components was clearly evident from the start of the mobilization. Mobilization sites were not adequately equipped to handle family support problems associated with the large influx of Reserve dependents, many of whom had not used military dependent benefits before and lacked information about their rights and entitlements. Many Reservists experienced delays in receipt of pay. Expanded policy and guidance were needed to provide Reserve center support to Reserve families at mobilization, including establishment of a permanent ombudsman program, legal assistance, and employer liaison and information. Many problems reported by the Reserve components applied universally, though for some components, appeared more critical and difficult to resolve.

The Army's Reserve components reported the following problems:

- Reproduction of mobilization data resulted in duplication.
- Weapons requalification requirement duplicated home station training.
- Failure of mobilization stations to follow Standard Operating Procedures.
- Confusion about storage of personnel records.
- Need for advance direct deposit and personnel pay documentation
- Incomplete mobilization packets/personnel records not updated.
- Failure to identify nondeployable soldiers prior to reaching mobilization station
- Ability to fill mobilizing units was initially

hampered by 50-mile unit proximity requirement.

- Nondeployability due to dental problems/ lack of dental panoramic radiograph (x-ray).

In-processing problems for the Naval Reserve included:

- Insufficient manning of processing sites for mobilization surge.
- Processing site personnel not experienced/ trained in mobilization-related duties.
- Centers overwhelmed/unprepared for influx of dependents/family support, including ombudsman program, legal assistance, and employer liaison and information.
- Lack of embossing machines to produce "dog tags".
- Incomplete/outdated personnel and medical records.
- Extensive reproduction of manual orders.
- Need for medical examinations.
- Insufficient time for processing of HIV tests.



The Marine Corps Reserve proposes mobilization plans and procedures be revised to include provisions for activating Selected Marine Corps Reserve personnel, IMAs, or volunteer IRR personnel to fill critical billets in advance of a partial or full mobilization. Had the mechanisms been in place, most critical billets could have been filled with volunteer or IRR personnel.

Timely, accurate pay for Reservists was a problem for the Marine Corps, as it was for all the components. Confusion resulted from unclear guidelines for initial pay record entry responsibility. The timely replacement of deployed Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) personnel is critical. When Active units departed with their FAP personnel, critical FAP billets were vacant for several months pending arrival of Reserve replacements. Also, adequate billeting and messing facilities were not adequately prepared to accommodate unannounced bus loads of Reserve Marines.

The Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan should be revised to include provisions for activating Selected Marine Corps Reserve personnel, IMAs, or volunteer IRR personnel to fill critical positions.

The Air National Guard requires all members to make and maintain dependent care arrangements which will allow him/her to be available for worldwide deployment at all times. Because some Air National Guard members did not take care of their dependent care responsibilities prior to the call to active duty, these Guardsmen and their dependents suffered needless complications when the service member was activated and deployed.

For all Air Force Reservists who were mobilized (except the IRR), the home station was their mobilization station. No significant problems were encountered, because the Air Force Reserve practices short-notice deployments on a regular basis. However, many members did not have dental panoramic radiographs (x-rays), which slowed down processing. Also, many Reservists had not executed wills or other matters that put a strain on unit legal personnel.

The major problem encountered at Coast Guard Reserve mobilization stations was in pay and processing. For over 90 percent of the families, significant problems were encountered in getting personnel onto active duty, including pay processing, personnel Management (MIS/JUMPS), scheduling, and correct the problems encountered. The problems did significantly impact the quality of life after mobilization.

Unexpected problems, as occurred during this first major mobilization since the Korean War, have short-term impacts. These impacts include: decreased time available for other training; delay in pay; incomplete or missing personnel records for individuals deploying to other locations; unexpected extra attention required for nondeployables; emergency dental care for members called up, whose dental health did not meet standards for deployment; understaffed mobilization stations, staffed at peacetime levels, but experiencing wartime workloads; and the need for family support centers to be adequately manned from mobilization through demobilization. Manning levels and standard operating procedures need to be reviewed for adequacy, and in preparation for various levels of mobilization.

Effective leadership, joint Service cooperation, and innovative solutions at all levels enabled most problems to be overcome and not impact deployment of mobilized Reservists.

The Board believes that as much advance notification as possible should be provided to Reserve component units and individuals who are called to active duty. The Board noted that some call-up notifications were very short, and did not provide adequate time to arrange personal affairs prior to reporting for active duty. The Board was also advised that last minute notification of 90 day extensions of active duty caused pay problems and unnecessary preparation for out-processing.

## Nondeployables

Each of the Services exercised compassion and discretion in determining the deployability of service members called to active duty for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Under existing law, Reserve component personnel can be mobilized, but they cannot be deployed outside the continental United States until they have completed a minimum of 12 weeks basic training. There is a constant flow of recruits in the training pipeline who cannot be deployed. Consequently, some nondeployables can be predicted, such as new members who have not completed basic training. Others had completed their military service obligation, but had not yet been administratively transferred from the unit. Some had temporary problems, such as medical, which were later resolved. However, in each case, other personnel had to be reassigned to fill these positions so that units could be mobilized at full strength.

Failure to identify Reservists with medical problems prior to mobilization unnecessarily strained mobilization support resources. The number of personnel identified as nondeployables varied in each Reserve component.

The Army National Guard had 4,684 soldiers (even percent) who were nondeployable for the following reasons: awaiting basic training, awaiting discharge, medical reasons, legal, and other reasons.

The Army Reserve had 6,699 troop program unit members (8 percent) and approximately 3,200 (18 percent) members of the IRR who were initially found to be nondeployable. It should be noted that data was not adjusted for those who subsequently deployed later. The Board noted that expanded IRR screening could have reduced the number of nondeployables. The primary reasons given for unit personnel were medical and awaiting basic training. The primary reasons given for IRR personnel were medical and compassionate reasons.

Of the 20,108 Naval Reservists recalled, only 683 (three percent) were nondeployable for the following reasons: medical, medical school residency programs, basic training, and legal.

Of the 25,710 members of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve activated, only 300 (one percent) were nondeployable for the following reasons: medical, legal, compassionate reasons, education, and designated key employees.

Of the 6,898 members of the Marine Corps IRR activated, 341 (five percent) were nondeployable for the following reasons: medical, dependency, compassionate reasons, legal, and other.

Because the Air National Guard's mobilization consisted of tailored UTCs, commanders had the option of who would be mobilized. As problems were identified, substitute personnel were selected. Medical problems were not identified because entry medical examinations were not performed and the weight control regulation was put on hold. Single parents would have been deployed in the event of full mobilization. Only those Air National Guard members who were in their second or third trimester of pregnancy were reported as nondeployable.

The Air Force Reserve had 301 (one percent) members who were designated as nondeployables. Effective screening programs enforced at time of enlistment and maintained throughout Reserve affiliation have ensured that most members are prepared for mobilization and deployment. Another contributing factor was that units were tasked by UTC or tailored UTC, rather than as a complete unit. This enabled units, for the most part, to mobilize only those individuals who were qualified and available. The reasons for nondeployability were: medical, pregnancy, school (civilian), humanitarian reasons, and dependent care.

The Coast Guard Reserve screened 790 Selected Reserve personnel for possible mobilization. Of these, 31 (four percent) were disqualified, all for medical reasons.

*The Board recommends that increased efforts be made to identify nondeployable personnel prior to mobilization.*

## **Employer Support**

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) played a large role in providing information to employers and their Reserve component employees who were called up for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. A summary of major employer-related issues affecting Reserve component personnel called to active duty was provided by NCESGR.

The activation of Selected Reserve units and individuals for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM prompted thousands of queries from families, employers, and called up Guardsmen and Reservists. From August 1990 through July 1991, NCESGR received 75,973 telephone calls on its toll-free number. The monthly average of telephone calls during this period was 6,331, as compared with 2,774 calls per month pre-Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. While, generally speaking, employers proved to be supportive and understanding of their Reservist-employees' concerns, many issues arose and were brought to the attention of NCESGR.

Initially, inquiries from Reservists and employers dealt with job and benefit protections, reemployment rights, and responsibilities. As Reservists began to return from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the requests for information dramatically shifted to problems from employers and Reservists concerning hardships, discontent, or abuses. In some instances, employers may not have wanted their Reservist-employees back at their workplaces. Other employers may have penalized their Reservists for being gone for extended time following Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, resulting in forfeiture of seniority related promotion opportunities and other benefits. Sometimes jobs were eliminated illegitimately or through misrepresentation. Some jobs held by Reservists were terminated upon their return. In other cases, Reservists may have been fired for poor performance or other employee

abuses while claiming Veterans Reemployment Rights (VRR) violations as their primary reason for termination.

In reality, the number of Reservists experiencing reemployment problems as a percentage of the total activated was exceptionally small. In most inquiries, employers were supportive of their Reservist-employees' participation in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and merely wanted to confirm that their policies towards Reservists were in compliance with the law.

A positive issue that surfaced was the large number of employers who found ways to support their activated employees and their families. While NCESGR did not accumulate specific statistics, it appears that significant numbers of employers provided support beyond the scope of the law. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), for example, provided policy guidance to Federal agencies which was extremely beneficial. The Office of Personnel Administration recommended that Federal employees called to active duty for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM be placed on a leave-without-pay (IWOP) status, rather than a military separation. Leave-without-pay status allows for a continuation of benefits, such as health insurance. Many government agencies followed an OPM recommendation to bear the full cost of the continued benefits. This was especially helpful to the dependents of Reservists. Similarly, many private employers provided such benefits as pay differentials, continuation of health insurance, family assistance, and other family support benefits.

Some companies even went so far as to provide full civilian pay and benefits for the period of activation. According to a February 1991 survey, employers generally exceeded what is required of them by law. Almost one-third of the companies surveyed chose to maintain Reservists' pay and benefits at their civilian levels for some specified duration of time. However, 12 percent of the employers said they paid full salary regardless of the military pay Reservists received, but usually only for one month. In another survey, 16 percent of the companies surveyed continued



full pay without reduction for military pay, typically for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM from two weeks to two months.

Negative issues encountered by NCESGR's Ombudsman office had to do with reinstatement of employees upon their release from active duty. Issues encountered were, confusion over the time to apply for reemployment; missed pay raises; accrual of civilian vacation and sick leave; failure to reemploy, improper reemployment in a lesser job, layoffs, both justified and unjustified, and others. In most cases, problems were resolved quickly by explaining the relevant provisions of the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Statute to the employer and/or the employee.

Problems experienced by Federal employees generally were of the same types as those experienced by employees of private companies or state, local governments. Although OPM policy guidance strove to make the Federal government a model employer, it is evident that some agency personnel managers failed to understand the guidance. Another complicating factor is that non-appropriated fund organizations are not entirely bound by OPM policy.

Some of the principal problems experienced by Federal employees called to duty for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were: failure of employers to understand that protections for activated Reservists are virtually the same whether the active duty is voluntary or involuntary; failure of employers to realize that activated employees had a period of time to apply for reinstatement in employment, even though on leave-without-pay status; withholding of automatic step pay increases which would have occurred during the active duty period; and the failure of employees to realize that they did not accrue civilian vacation time while on active duty.

Even though the bulk of ombudsman work is on individual inquiries, NCESGR has taken advantage of a number of opportunities to reach the business community and educate them on the rights and responsibilities contained within the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Statute. Additionally, briefing guides and informational fact sheets have been sent to demobilization sites or state Adjutants General for distribution to Reservists during their out-processing. Members from throughout the NCESGR staff have directly participated in demobilization briefings.

*The Board commends the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve for its outstanding efforts and success in improving employer support of the Reserve components.*



*The Board recommends that:*

- *an appeal process be implemented which would permit employers to voice their concerns when mobilization of their employees threatens survival of their business or services.*
- *tax benefit legislation be considered for employers who provided extraordinary support, such as supplementing salaries, maintaining health care coverage, and other types of benefits, for employees called to active duty in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.*
- *the Secretary of the Defense support Service programs to ensure that all Reserve component commands have liaison officer positions with the state ESGR organizations which support their units.*
- *a demobilization policy be adopted which reflects a sensitivity to citizen-soldier and employer issues unique to the Reserve components.*

### **Family Support Programs**

Family support is essential to members of the Reserve components, whose service inevitably means time away from their families. Activation of Reserve component members for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM added even greater emphasis to the importance of family support programs.

Shortly after the initial call to active duty in August 1990, the Reserve components produced mobilization handbooks for Reservists and members of their families which provided timely and pertinent information on family issues and concerns. Some of the Reserve components also formed unit-level family support groups and information briefings, which played an important role in providing information to families. These programs, and others, were most helpful in assuring mobilized Reservists that their families, many of whom were new to active duty, were receiving appropriate support.

Reserve component family support programs worked remarkably well, given the limited staffing provided. A total of 471 Family Assistance Centers served 257,731 family members from all Services, both Active and Reserve, handled 591,125 telephone inquiries, and served 10,156 IRR family members. The need for increased and expanded training for family members, military members, paid staff, and volunteers on family issues, human behavior, and group dynamics was noted and is being planned. Some funding is necessary to support this requirement.

The National Guard's Family Program was in place and worked exceptionally well during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The recall of retirees provided essential staffing. Family Assistance Teams prepared unit family members for deployment and participated in casualty assistance. Family Assistance Centers assisted families and community agencies throughout the operation, and Family Program Coordinators, chaplains, and community mental health professionals worked with reunion issues and briefings for both the Army and Air National Guard.

The Army Reserve published a family mobilization handbook, implementing recommendations from a conference of Army Reserve spouses. A number of conferences were held which identified lessons learned and improved information flow. A number of other important publications were developed to provide information for family members. The Army also developed a reunion program. Non-appropriated funds were authorized for use in Army Reserve family support activities for the first time, providing needed funding.

The Army's Human Factors Study showed that mission effectiveness of forward deployed personnel was directly linked to the quality of support rendered the family. Families receiving timely information felt supported. Lack of information fostered rumors. The better informed the Army family, the more realistic their expectations and the less likely they are to communicate feedback that would detract from their sponsor's combat effectiveness. Units with rear detachments were most effective in keeping family

members informed. Family Assistance Centers also played a crucial role in assisting families. Any improvement in communication with family members concerning mobilization issues will enhance the morale and unit cohesion of deploying soldiers.

Unlike their Active counterparts, Naval Reservists and families live in diverse civilian communities and had no "institutional" support system. The Naval Reserve developed Project RESTAR—"Reserve Transition and Recognition"—to support the demobilization of Naval Reservists. A network of 31 transition managers and coordinators was established at Naval Reserve Centers and Naval Reserve Air activities. Key elements included coordination with other governmental programs and agencies. A hotline was established to answer dependents' questions, and Naval Reserve Activities were tasked to disseminate family information. What's Next was published, as well as a follow-on supplement to aid in the transition of recalled Reservists. The concentration of effort to resolve all problems, family and occupational, through personal contact by transition managers, demonstrated a commitment to valuable resources and may be the key factor in decisions to stay in the Naval Reserve.

The Marine Corps Reserve utilized existing programs for formal family support, including key-spouse programs, with success throughout the Marine Corps Reserve. Family Support Centers at installations throughout the Marine Corps expanded their services to provide assistance to Reserve dependents. Headquarters, Marine Corps established a toll-free number to provide casualty information to family members of deployed Marines. The phones were manned exclusively by activated Reserve Marines, who fielded over 250,000 calls during the period from January 14, 1991 through April 19, 1991. The quick access to family support groups, Family Support Centers, and the resources at Headquarters, Marine Corps were instrumental in solving many problems for Marine dependents thereby allowing activated Marines to concentrate on their professional duties with less apprehension about family problems.



The Air Force's Reserve component members and their families were kept informed through a number of services which included: family deployment briefings and handbooks, volunteer support, special-help classes, local school briefings, mobilization video tapes, a toll-free hotline phone service, hometown newspapers, personal phone calls, and support from private industry.

Air Force Reserve units were very innovative in ensuring that family member needs and concerns were met, but the existing infrastructure of support organizations and associated manpower was stretched beyond their peacetime capacity. Volunteers were used extensively for a myriad of support activities. Deployment handbooks were developed and given to family members along with extensive briefings. Hot lines were established and families were personally contacted for meetings and classes on a variety of subjects in addition to many other activities.

Family Program Administrators (FPA) incorporated families of Coast Guard Reserve members into their programs. A toll-free number was provided on a 24-hour basis. The FPAs provided deployment seminars for all units and reunion seminars for members when they returned. The FPAs provided ongoing crisis intervention counseling, information and referral on a 24-hour basis. Providing these extra services without any additional personnel was done with great difficulty, placing an additional workload on understaffed FPAs.

Family support, together with employer support, were perhaps the two most important elements of concern to members of the Board and the Reserve mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Family support activities should be funded for all Services well after the cessation of hostilities, the return of the mobilized personnel and demobilization.

*The Board commends the State Area Commands for the outstanding service provided to the families of Service members who were called to active duty in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.*

The Board recognizes that, notwithstanding major efforts to address family concerns, there are instances where family support did not meet the expectations of those involved.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *support of family action programs be continued and expanded.*
- *the Services ensure that dependents of Reserve component members are kept fully informed of family support programs and military benefits. The Board believes that how well Reserve component families believe they were treated during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and how well they were kept informed of their rights, will have a significant impact on family support of the Reserve program in the future.*
- *a Reserve component family support network be developed, that it be adequately resourced, and that appropriate consideration be given to expanded use of retirees to staff these programs.*

### **Dental Issues and Concerns**

Significant numbers of National Guard and Reserve members recalled in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were found to be in poor dental health, which had an adverse impact on their readiness capability. The Services concurred that the present standards are appropriate, but that enforcement of the standards is not adequate. An Ad Hoc Committee of the Department of Defense Dental Chiefs Council considered a number of suggestions to alleviate this problem, including insurance programs. The committee recommended that the dental needs of Reserve component personnel could best be accomplished by utilizing existing Department of Defense treatment facilities.

To implement this recommendation would require a significant change in policy as well as legislative changes affecting the benefits of Reserve members and resources of the Active component force. The committee recommended that any legislative action be

jointly pursued by each Service; the Air Force has been designated to serve as lead agent.

For a number of years, the Board has been closely monitoring the implementation of a Department of Defense policy which requires that a dental panoral radiograph (x-ray) be completed by all members of the Selected Reserve, and a duplicate copy to be filed at the Central Panograph Storage Facility in Monterey, California. Evolving Department of Defense policy requires replacing dental panoral radiographs with DNA testing, once that procedure is sufficiently developed. Until then, dental panoral radiographs remain the primary means for identification of casualties.

All personnel mobilization for DESERT SHIELD/STORM were required to have a dental panoral radiograph as a part of mobilization processing. Table 4-7 indicates the percent of dental panoral radiographs currently on file.



**Table 4-7**  
**DENTAL PANORAL RADIOGRAPHS**  
**Selected Reserve**

	<u>Panographs Taken</u>	<u>Duplicates on File</u>
Army National Guard	91%	91%
Army Reserve	89%	87%
Naval Reserve	76%	76%
Marine Corps Reserve	100%	92%
Air National Guard	75%	41%
Air Force Reserve	85%	55%
Coast Guard Reserve <sup>1</sup>	0%	0%

Note 1 Currently, the Coast Guard does not perform dental panoral radiographs because the program remains unfunded

Source Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs  
Data as of September 30, 1991

*The Board recommends that:*

- *legislative changes be considered to permit members of the Selected Reserve to receive dental care in existing Department of Defense treatment facilities during inactive duty training (IDT).*
- *applicable laws be amended to give Reserve component dental care professionals the authority to provide Selected Reservists with a level of dental care commensurate with pre-mobilization requirements, during annual training and/or inactive duty training.*
- *annual goals be established for dental panoramic radiographs, to ensure compliance with Department of Defense policy.*
- *special attention be directed to the dental panoramic radiograph program of the Coast Guard Reserve, which the Board understands was not funded.*
- *the Department of Defense review directives on the dental panoramic radiograph program to resolve any inconsistencies between Active and Reserve component time requirements, and to ensure that the Services remind their units that panoramic radiographs are to be shipped separately from personnel in a transit status.*



## **Force Alignment/Skill Mismatch**

The Army National Guard's emphasis is on increasing the strength of understrength units, while qualifying each soldier in their duty military occupational specialty (MOS). Those units that are currently overstrength are managing their force to reduce strength to the authorized level and qualifying each soldier in their duty MOS. Promotions are based on a position vacancy system. A position must be vacant or projected to be vacant within one year. Soldiers considered for promotion must be qualified for the MOS in which they are to be promoted.

The Army National Guard is participating in two new programs to increase the percentage of soldiers qualified in their duty MOS:

- A combined training system is currently being implemented, in conjunction with U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Reserve, to eliminate duplication of schools and to increase opportunities for soldiers to become MOS-qualified through the U.S. Army Reserve school system
- A Management Analysis Profile identifies, by state, the level of duty MOS qualification. This assists commanders in identifying soldiers who are not duty military occupational specialty-qualified (DMOSQ) so that they may become qualified.

A two percent reduction in the Army Reserve's skill mismatch was accomplished by limiting the number of nonskill matched prior-service soldiers allowed to affiliate with a Army Reserve unit. As of June 1991, the Army Reserve had a skill matched force of 76 percent. This compares to 74 percent for 1990, 71 percent for 1988, and 62 percent for 1986. Future plans to enhance skill match include implementation of automation programs to maximize the potential of Army Reserve-offered skill training. Reduction in skill mismatch enhances readiness by ensuring that there is a qualified soldier in each duty position.

Naval Reservists are not considered qualified in any rating unless they have completed initial active duty for training or until required qualifications or training are obtained for their designation. Of the 7,984 personnel not qualified, 6,712 are enlistees in the Delayed Entry Program and the remaining 1,272 are in the Reserve Allied Medical Program. Skill mismatch is most notable in the medical community. Thirty-eight percent of Naval Enlisted Code (NEC) mobilization requirements are filled by personnel not holding the required NEC. During fiscal year 1991, the following initiatives were undertaken to improve skill qualification levels in the Naval Reserve:

- A regional recruiting accession plan was developed for the Naval Reserve that distributed recruiting authorizations based on each recruiting region's percent of billets for each rating, channeling recruiting efforts to access exact ratings by region.
- Development of a rating/NEC bonus incentive program for critical ratings and NECs.
- Review and validation of all Selected Reserve NEC requirements.
- "Automated Billet to the Reservist" program to match billets with locations where qualified personnel are available.
- Authorization for substitution of a like rating/NEC when exact rating/NEC is not possible.
- On-board Training program for refresher training to maintain NEC skills.

Marine Corps Reservists who are mismatched in their MOS are being retrained and recruiting procedures are being refined to fill billets with MOS-qualified individuals. All non-prior service personnel that join the Selected Marine Corps Reserve must qualify for a particular MOS that is on the unit's table of organization. Prior service personnel can join, providing the unit needs the individual and he/she agrees to retrain (if not MOS-qualified for a position vacancy) within 18 months. During the 18

months, the Prior Service Training Assignment section tracks the individual and attempts to obtain the required schooling. Some individuals are able to become qualified through approved on-the-job training. Prior service personnel who do not agree to retrain are not accepted.

At the end of fiscal year 1991, only 3.7 percent of Air National Guard enlisted personnel were not qualified in the Air Force Skill Code for their assigned position, a slight decrease from the level of 4 percent reported for fiscal year 1990. The Air National Guard is generally able to obtain individuals in the right grade with the right skill for each position, which enhances readiness. The promotion system is also used to maintain an aligned force.

As of September 1991, less than one percent of the Air Force Reserve were not qualified in their Air Force Skill Code. The Air Force Reserve enlisted promotion system is managed on a unit vacancy basis. Generally, an individual must possess the basic skill qualifications as a prerequisite to assignment to a vacant position that offers promotion potential to the next higher grade. Promotion in that position is dependent upon job performance and the commander's recommendation. Promotion management policies described above have achieved an aligned force.

The only Coast Guard Reservists who are not qualified for their position are those who have not yet completed basic training, or those who have completed basic training and are awaiting further training through formal schooling or on-the-job training. As of September 30, 1991, 37 individuals were awaiting basic training and 179 individuals were awaiting formal schooling or on-the-job training. This represents two percent of the Selected Reserve.

*The Board recommends that increased emphasis be given to improving force alignment and reducing skill mismatch, both officer and enlisted, in the Reserve components*



## Full-Time Support

Full-Time Support (FTS) is essential to unit readiness. Full-Time Support personnel enable units to meet their mobilization mission by performing the day-to-day administration and operations necessary to enable drilling Reservists to devote the majority of their time to training. Adequate FTS is instrumental not only in preparation for mobilization, but also in the actual process of mobilization and deployment.

Full-Time Support personnel provide assistance in administration, logistics, personnel management, recruiting, retention, and training. These functions are essential if Reserve component units are to meet their readiness requirements and commitments to the Total Force. FTS personnel also accomplish the bulk of the maintenance mission, again freeing up Reservists from routine maintenance requirements. FTS personnel working at various headquarters produce plans, issue guidance, and apply standards to provide unit commanders the capability to meet mobilization requirements. FTS personnel are also a "force multiplier," enabling drilling reservists to take maximum advantage of the limited training time available and allow commanders to be relieved of administrative requirements so that they can concentrate their efforts on unit training.

The categories of Full-Time Support personnel are briefly described below.

### • Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Personnel

National Guard or Reserve members on active duty for 180 days or more, who provide full-time support to the Reserve components and are paid from the Reserve Personnel Appropriations of the military departments concerned. This classification includes Naval Reserve Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) personnel and statutory tour personnel.

### • Military Technicians (MT)

Civilian personnel who occupy technician positions. They are required to be members of the Selected Reserve in the component which they support and simultaneously maintain civil service status.

### • Active Component (AC) Personnel

Military personnel on active duty who directly support the Reserve components. They are paid from Active component appropriations. All Coast Guard military personnel assigned to FTS positions are in this classification, however, these positions are paid from Coast Guard Reserve training appropriations, and not Active component appropriations.

### • Civil Service (CS) Personnel

Federal (Title 5) and state civil service personnel, other than military technicians, who provide full-time support to the Reserve components but do not occupy technician positions. They are not required to be members of the Selected Reserve.

The numbers in each category vary for each component. Differences are based on many Service-unique factors, which have been carefully analyzed to provide the best program to support readiness.

Requirements for FTS (AGR/TAR) personnel were funded at over 90 percent during fiscal year 1991 in all Reserve components except

the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve. Their FTS requirements were funded at 61 percent, 49 percent, and 82 percent, respectively. Additional FTS personnel authorizations are needed to fill unfunded requirements.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 includes a provision to reduce, over the next five years, the number of AGR members on active duty in support of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, and to replace them with Active component members.

Table 4-8 lists AGR/TAR authorizations for each Reserve component, as provided in the fiscal year 1992 Defense Authorization Act. With the exception of the Air National Guard, which was increased, AGR/TAR authorizations



**Table 4-8**  
**AGR/TAR AUTHORIZATIONS**

	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Army National Guard	26,199	25,112	24,860
Army Reserve	13,707	13,116	12,862
Naval Reserve	23,237	22,501	20,926
Marine Corps Reserve	2,301	2,285	2,282
Air National Guard	8,168	9,081	9,081
Air Force Reserve	655	649	636
DoD Totals	74,567	72,807	70,617
Coast Guard Reserve	711	711	711


Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Coast Guard  
Data as of January 15, 1992



for the other Reserve components were reduced commensurate with reductions in Selected Reserve end strength. Sufficient FTS is critical to Reserve component readiness. It should be noted that FTS authorizations for the Army's Reserve components were significantly lower (as a percentage of requirements) at the beginning of this process than the other Reserve components.

Table 4-9 provides a comparison of the level of required Full-Time Support personnel versus fiscal year 1991 authorized strength for each Reserve component. Table 4-10 lists Full-Time Support strength, by category, for each Reserve component.

**Table 4-9**  
**PERCENTAGE OF FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED**



Note. Percentage based on all categories of FTS personnel assigned

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Reserve components  
Data as of September 30, 1991

**Table 4-10**  
**FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL STRENGTH**

	<b>Army National Guard</b>	<b>Army Reserve</b>	<b>Naval Reserve</b>	<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>	<b>Air National Guard</b>	<b>Air Force Reserve</b>	<b>DoD Total</b>	<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>AGR/TAR Personnel<sup>1, 2</sup></b>									
Required	43,188	28,205	23,237	2,301	8,662	797	106,390	0	106,390
Authorized	26,199	13,707	23,237	2,301	8,468	655	74,567	0	74,567
Assigned	26,005	13,704	23,209	2,310	8,630	655	74,513	0	74,513
<b>Military Technicians<sup>2</sup></b>									
Required	33,180	10,326	0	0	28,352	10,316	82,174	0	81,174
Authorized	28,521	8,237	0	0	24,460	10,316	71,534	0	71,534
Assigned	29,280	8,463	0	0	24,488	9,527	71,758	0	71,758
<b>Active Component<sup>3</sup></b>									
Required	576	1,200	7,866	4,908	636	664	15,850	599	16,449
Authorized <sup>4</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assigned	576	1,124	8,851	5,416	644	661	17,272	599	17,871
<b>Civil Service</b>									
Required	414	4,908	2,974	292	2,053	4,435	15,076	112	15,188
Authorized <sup>4</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assigned	726	5,155	2,974	292	2,048	4,749	15,944	112	16,056
<b>Total</b>									
Required	77,358	44,639	34,077	7,501	39,703	16,212	219,490	711	220,201
Assigned	56,587	28,446	35,034	8,018	35,810	15,592	179,487	711	180,198

- Notes 1 Includes AGR in the Army, officers and enlisted on Statutory Tours in the Air Force Reserve, TAR in the Naval Reserve, and military FTS in the Marine Corps Reserve
- 2 Air National Guard AGR and MT positions can be filled by either status personnel USAR has included SOF technicians.
- 3 Includes AC assigned or attached to RC organizations who provided support exclusively to the Army Reserve
4. Not applicable

Sources. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Reserve components, and the DoD Comptroller

Data as of January 15, 1992



The Army National Guard FTS fill rate was 73 percent of requirements. Due to inadequate resourcing, the Army National Guard is experiencing critical shortages of AGR personnel in the areas of logistics and supply, administration, and maintenance. As maintenance-intensive new generation equipment is fielded to the Army National Guard, shortages in FTS maintenance personnel will downgrade readiness. A study is in process to determine the effect of FTS on Army National Guard readiness for mobilization, applying Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM lessons learned. Full-Time Support impact on maintenance readiness is a specific area being studied.

Army Reserve FTS is the lowest of any of the Reserve components. Only 64 percent of Army Reserve FTS requirements were funded during fiscal year 1991. The Army Reserve has over 6,300 validated FTS requirements yet to be authorized by Congress for fill. Army Reserve FTS is currently funded at a ratio of 7.7 percent of Selected Reserve end strength, significantly below the Congressionally-approved goal of 14 percent. The Army Reserve units that deployed were selected based on readiness as a factor. The readiness level of these units was due in large part to the FTS force.

The addition of Active Army soldiers to the Army Reserve FTS force in areas common to both the Active component and Reserve component will increase Army Reserve readiness and improve its mobilization posture. Replacement of Army Reserve AGR soldiers with Active Army soldiers, however, would serve little useful purpose. The opportunity does exist, however, to bring the Army Reserve FTS program to levels comparable with the other military services. Maintaining Army Reserve FTS at the current levels, and augmenting it with Active component soldiers in selected areas, can have an immediate impact—both by bringing Active component expertise to the Army Reserve and by bringing overall FTS staffing levels up to the required levels.

Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve FTS requirements (both military and civilian) were

funded at or near 100 percent of established requirements. The Air National Guard was initially funded at 90 percent of its FTS requirements for fiscal year 1991. Congress has authorized an increase of 613 FTS positions for the Air National Guard in fiscal year 1992. Air Force Reserve FTS requirements were funded at 96 percent for fiscal year 1991. Continued adequate funding of FTS requirements is of vital importance to readiness and mobilization capabilities of the Air Force Reserve.

There are 711 FTS positions established for the training, administration, and support of the Coast Guard Reserve. All of these positions were funded in fiscal year 1991. However, the Coast Guard Reserve ratio of FTS to Selected Reservists is 1:17 while the Department of Defense ratio is 1:8, 65 percent less. This shifts much of the administrative work load to Reserve units and detracts from training.

Full-Time Support personnel deployed with their Reserve component units in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, as follows:

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• Army National Guard	2,373
• Army Reserve	1,355
• Naval Reserve	1,125
• Marine Corps Reserve	417
• Air National Guard	2,509
• Air Force Reserve	397
• Coast Guard Reserve	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,176</b>

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*The Board recommends that Full-Time Support authorizations be fully funded in each of the Reserve components.*

*The Board supports the Full Time Support program and reaffirms its previous recommendation that "opposes any proposal that would mandate the replacement of Active Guard/Reserve members with those from the Active component, or reduce the current compensation or benefits provided to*

*Active Guard/Reserve members. The Active Guard/Reserve force is a dedicated, professional force, which makes a vital contribution to overall Reserve component readiness by assisting drilling Reserve component members to achieve and maintain their readiness requirements."*

### **General and Flag Officer Management**

The Conference Report which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990 Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of general and flag officer requirements in the Reserve components and to report findings by March, 1991. Subsequently, the Chairman of each of the Armed Services Committees was advised that a comprehensive analysis consistent with the results of the Total Force Policy Study, as directed by the Conference Report, could not be provided prior to June 30, 1992.

Reserve component general and flag officers on active duty in connection with the administration and management of the Reserve components are currently counted against Active component general and flag officer ceilings. Some examples are: Chief and Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau; Chief and Deputy Chief, Army Reserve; Chief and Deputy Chief, Air Force Reserve; Directors and Deputy Directors, Army and Air National Guard; Program Manager, Reserve Component Automation System; Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board; and Director, Naval Reserve, when that position is filled by a member of the Selected Reserve.

Since 1982, the Board has recommended that legislation be enacted to exclude positions filled by National Guard or Reserve flag/general officers on active duty from Active component grade ceiling accountability.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendations that:*

- *legislation be enacted to exclude positions filled by National Guard or Reserve flag/general officers on active duty from*

*Active component grade ceiling accountability.*

- *when a Reserve component unit commanded by a flag or general officer is called to active duty, assigned flag or general officer should normally be called to active duty with his/her unit and that legislation should be enacted to exclude positions filled by National Guard or Reserve flag/general officers on active duty from Active component grade ceiling accountability.*

*The Board recommends that appropriate increases in the statutory ceilings for Reserve general and flag officers be adopted.*

### **Individual Mobilization Augmentees**

The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program provides pre-trained individuals to augment, upon mobilization, Active component organizations which have wartime requirements above their peacetime strength authorizations. As Active component strength is reduced, the IMA program can be a cost-effective way of retaining critical skills to satisfy Active component wartime requirements.



Individual Mobilization Augmentees were among the first Reserve component personnel to serve in Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. They also were among the first to be called to active duty for service in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The following lists the number of IMAs who were called to active duty in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM:

• Army Reserve	1,784
• Naval Reserve	34
• Marine Corps Reserve	828
• Air Force Reserve	2,333
• Coast Guard Reserve	0
• Total	4,979

Department of Defense policy, as stated in DoD Directive 1235.11, requires all IMAs to perform 12 to 14 days of annual training (AT) in their wartime assignment status. Inactive duty training (IDT) drills are optional, depending upon component. However, not all IMA positions are funded. The Army Reserve, for example, was able to fund only 65 percent of officer and 75 percent of enlisted IMAs to attend annual training. Subject to the availability of funds, IMAs also are eligible for professional development and educational opportunities.

Table 4-11 shows the number of IMAs in the Reserve components at the end of fiscal year 1991. The National Guard does not have Individual Mobilization Augmentees.

Table 4-11  
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES

	Officer			Enlisted			Percentage Attending Annual Training FY 91	
	Required	Budgeted	Assigned	Required	Budgeted	Assigned	Officer	Enlisted
Army Reserve	14,143	10,436	10,899	1,816	3,602	3,294	65%	75%
Naval Reserve	125	125	1 <sup>1</sup>	459	459	2,540 <sup>1</sup>	100%	99%
Marine Corps Reserve	1,062	822	693	1,256	578	498	82%	92%
Air Force Reserve	9,514	8,121	7,492	8,860	5,526	5,177	95%	90%
DoD Total	24,844	19,504	19,085	15,391	10,165	11,509		
Coast Guard Reserve	34	34	34	0	0	74	100%	0
Total	24,878	19,538	19,119	15,391	10,165	11,583		

Note 1 Includes Sea/College IMAs/Cat "B"

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Services, and the Coast Guard Data as of September 30, 1991

There are over 18,959 Army Reserve IMA positions required by the Army. However, only 14,038 of these positions were funded. The funding level is reduced to 11,392 in fiscal year 1992. 14,228 Army Reservists were assigned to the IMA program as of September 30, 1991. Of the over 14,000 IMAs available, only 1,784 Army Reserve IMA soldiers were called to active duty. One of the major reasons is that agency requests for IMA call-up were managed individually, a very slow process. However, other IMAs volunteered and were called up as individuals with other than their assigned IMA agency.

The Naval Reserve has only a small number of IMAs who are used to fill Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Coast Guard chaplain, Selective Service System, and Federal Emergency Management Agency requirements. Because these IMAs muster with organized units, unlike IMAs in the other Services, comparisons are difficult to make. Most of the enlisted billets are filled and all are funded for annual training. The Naval Reserve counts approximately 2,500 enlisted personnel, who are part of the Sea College program, in their IMA program.

The Marine Corps has a wartime requirement of 2,318 IMA positions. Currently 1,400 (60 percent) are funded and 1,141 are filled. The 918 unfunded billets would be filled at M+1, or shortly thereafter, dependent upon Marine Corps requirements. There are adequate numbers of qualified personnel available to fill the positions, if funded. IMAs played a major manpower role during Operations DESERT SHIELD/ STORM in manning critical wartime positions billets within mobilization processing centers.

The Air Force IMA program currently has approximately 478 vacancies. Recruiting has been restricted to critically hard-to-fill positions to reduce the personnel impact of a reduction of 2,057 positions in fiscal year 1992. Annual training is fully funded.

Coast Guard IMA positions are utilized to fill positions in other agencies, rather than the Active Coast Guard. Most Coast Guard IMA positions are filled and fully funded.



*The Board reaffirms its long standing position that Individual Mobilization Augmentee program authorizations be filled and adequately funded.*

*The Board recommends the Joint Staff consider the expanded use of Individual Mobilization Augmentees including general and flag officers. Such augmentees could provide valuable Reserve component knowledge and expertise.*

### **Individual Ready Reserve**

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) consists of trained individuals who, in most cases, have previously served on active duty or in the Selected Reserve. Individual Ready Reserve members may have some period of contractual military service obligation remaining, or they may have voluntarily extended their military affiliation. Subject to the availability of funds, they may voluntarily participate in annual training. Others perform inactive duty training for retirement points only.

The Army issued activation orders to 20,103 members of the IRR who had been in the IRR less than 12 months. Approximately 15,800 of those receiving orders reported to their mobilization station. This "show rate" of approximately 75 percent was substantially higher than planning estimates.

Table 4-12 provides fiscal year 1991 personnel strengths for the IRR and the Inactive National Guard.

**Table 4-12**  
**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE AND**  
**INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD**  
**PERSONNEL STRENGTHS**  
**Fiscal Year 1991**

Army National Guard	8,073
Army Reserve	359,074
Naval Reserve	107,345
Marine Corps Reserve	50,401
Air National Guard	0
Air Force Reserve	78,681
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DoD Total	603,574
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Coast Guard Reserve	6,299
<b>Total</b>	<b>609,873</b>

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1991

### **Individual Ready Reserve Screen**

The Department of Defense initiated mandatory annual screening of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) in 1987 to provide the Services updated information about their IRR members. Data on IRR members has been significantly improved as a result of the screening process. Personnel data is updated and briefings are provided concerning their military status, entitlements, and responsibilities. The IRR screen has proven its value both in managing IRR personnel and as a recruiting tool to provide information about opportunities for service in the Selected Reserve. As a result of previous IRR screening, there were fewer IRR "non-locatees" during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and personnel data on IRR members was generally more accurate.

As a result of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Army and Air Force cancelled all

fiscal year 1991 IRR screening after January 1991. However, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard continued to screen their IRR, resulting in a 59 percent screening rate for the Naval Reserve, a 98 percent screening rate for the Marine Corps Reserve, and a 100 percent screening rate for the Coast Guard Reserve.

*The Board recommends that adequate funding be provided to conduct annual musters and screenings of the Individual Ready Reserve.*

### **Medical Personnel**

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT have reemphasized the importance of Reserve component health care professional personnel. Substantial numbers of physicians, nurses, and other Reserve component health care professional personnel volunteered or were called to active duty in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Fortunately, because of low numbers of casualties, these health care professionals did not have to be fully utilized for casualty care.

The Army National Guard has filled over 54 percent of its authorized physician positions. It is still short 751 physicians. There are significant shortages of anesthesiologists, general surgeons, and orthopedic surgeons. Total nurse strength is 142 short of budget authorizations; significant shortages of nurse anesthetists and operating room nurses remain. Total enlisted medical strength exceeds budgeted authorizations. Licensed practical nurses are filled to 88 percent, with a shortage of 213.

The Army Reserve has made substantial progress in eliminating long standing shortages of medical personnel. The Army Reserve has filled 91 percent of authorized physicians and 105 percent of authorized nurses, through intensive recruiting and increased availability of incentives. Now that overall fill rates have achieved, emphasis is shifting to filling critical specialties. The major remaining shortages are orthopedic surgeons (61 percent fill), nurse anesthetists (66 percent fill) and licensed practical nurses (72 percent fill).

The National AMEDD Augmentation Detachment (NAAD) provides a flexible training alternative for Army Reserve physicians and nurses in critical specialties who otherwise would probably not have joined or would have left the Selected Reserve. The current strength of the NAAD (assigned and pending) is 431 physicians and 649 nurses. A total of 178 physicians and 182 nurses were ordered to active duty for Operations DESERT SHIELD/ STORM. Not only did NAAD personnel fill vacancies in their assigned units, but 84 were cross-levelled to meet shortages in other Selected Reserve units. An overall increase of over 20 percent in Selected Reserve physician and nurse strength has significantly increased the mobilization readiness and deployability of Army Reserve medical units.

The Naval Reserve has been successful in filling 119 percent of its physician positions and 103 percent of its nurse positions and has reduced the number of specialties with critical shortages to two (anesthesiologist and orthopedic surgeon). Over 93 percent of Naval Reserve enlisted health care positions

are filled. Naval Reserve medical personnel supporting Marine Corps Reserve medical units are included in Naval Reserve figures.

The Air National Guard has an overall fill rate of 86 percent for physicians, 88 percent for nurses, and 93 percent for enlisted health care personnel.

The Air Force Reserve has an overall fill rate of 91 percent for physicians, 102 percent for nurses, and 101 percent for enlisted personnel. The remaining shortages are general surgeons (91 percent fill) and physicians (87 percent fill).

Coast Guard Reserve medical personnel consist of commissioned warrant officers who serve as physicians assistants and medical administrators and enlisted personnel who serve as hospital corpsmen. Both specialties have a fill rate of less than 70 percent.

Tables 4-13 and 4-14 list Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve medical strengths by specialty.



**Table 4-13**  
**SELECTED RESERVE MEDICAL STRENGTHS BY SPECIALITY**

<u>Category</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Fill Percent</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Fill Percent</u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>				<b>Air National Guard</b>			
Physicians				Physicians			
General Surgeon	267	114	43%	General Surgeon	0	0	0%
Anesthesiologist	34	27	79%	Anesthesiologist	0	0	0%
Orthopedic Surgeon	86	21	24%	Orthopedic Surgeon	0	0	0%
All Other Physicians	1,253	727	58%	All Other Physicians	574	495	86%
Total Physicians	1,640	889	54%	Total Physicians	574	495	86%
Nurse Corps				Nurse Corps			
Nurse Anesthetist	186	65	35%	Nurse Anesthetist	0	0	0%
Operating Room Nurse	241	166	69%	Operating Room Nurse	0	0	0%
All Other Nurses	960	1,014	106%	All Other Nurses	880	774	88%
Total Nurses	1,387	1,245	90%	Total Nurses	880	774	88%
Enlisted				Enlisted			
LPN <sup>1</sup>	1,719	1,506	88%	LPN	0	0	0%
All Other Enlisted	20,334	21,344	105%	All Other Enlisted	4,662	4,325	93%
Total Enlisted	22,053	22,850	104%	Total Enlisted	4,662	4,325	93%
<b>Army Reserve</b>				<b>Air Force Reserve</b>			
Physicians				Physicians			
General Surgeon	628	708	113%	General Surgeon	103	94	91%
Anesthesiologist	193	268	139%	Anesthesiologist	24	38	158%
Orthopedic Surgeon	358	218	61%	Orthopedic Surgeon	49	59	120%
All Other Physicians	2,350	2,106	90%	All Other Physicians	706	612	87%
Total Physicians	3,521	3,300	94%	Total Physicians	882	803	91%
Nurse Corps				Nurse Corps			
Nurse Anesthetist	806	529	66%	Nurse Anesthetist	105	101	96%
Operating Room Nurse	936	1,015	108%	Operating Room Nurse	106	148	140%
All Other Nurses	6,382	6,969	109%	All Other Nurses	2,182	2,188	100%
Total Nurses	8,124	8,513	105%	Total Nurses	2,393	2,437	102%
Enlisted				Enlisted			
LPN <sup>2</sup>	7,060	5,096	72%	LPN	0	0	0%
All Other Enlisted	25,130	28,096	112%	All Other Enlisted	7,690	7,776	101%
Total Enlisted	32,190	33,192	103%	Total Enlisted	7,690	7,776	101%
<b>Naval Reserve<sup>3</sup></b>				<b>Coast Guard Reserve<sup>4</sup></b>			
Physicians				Physicians			
General Surgeon	143	150	105%	General Surgeon	0	0	0%
Anesthesiologist	126	137	109%	Anesthesiologist	0	0	0%
Orthopedic Surgeon	96	90	94%	Orthopedic Surgeon	0	0	0%
All Other Physicians	1,448	1,772	122%	All Other Physicians	0	0	0%
Total Physicians	1,813	2,149	119%	Total Physicians	0	0	0%
Nurse Corps				Physicians Assistants	32	21	66%
Nurse Anesthetist	100	128	128%	Nurse Corps			
Operating Room Nurse	237	283	119%	Nurse Anesthetist			0%
All Other Nurses	2,282	2,296	101%	Operating Room Nurse	0	0	0%
Total Nurses	2,619	2,707	103%	All Other Nurses	0	0	0%
Enlisted				Total Nurses	0	0	0%
LPN	0	0	0%	Enlisted			
All Other Enlisted	11,591	11,259	97%	LPN	0	0	0%
Total Enlisted	11,591	11,259	97%	All Other Enlisted	232	158	68%
				Total Enlisted	232	158	68%

Notes 1 Only 850 of 1,506 assigned LPNs are duty MOS-qualified

2 Only 2,971 of 5,096 assigned LPNs are duty MOS-qualified

3. Naval Reserve medical personnel strengths supporting Marine Corps Reserve medical units are included with Naval Reserve figures

4 The Coast Guard utilizes the U.S. Public Health Service as its main source of physicians, as well as the Army, Navy, and Air Force

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991

**Table 4-14**  
**MEDICAL IRR/ING STRENGTH IN**  
**SELECTED SPECIALTIES**

<u>General Surgeon</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
Army	248
Navy	54
Air Force	42
<u>Anesthesiologist</u>	
Army	109
Navy	54
Air Force	39
<u>Orthopedic Surgeon</u>	
Army	126
Navy	49
Air Force	25
<u>Nurse Anesthetist</u>	
Army	134
Navy	12
Air Force	38
<u>Operating Room Nurse</u>	
Army	304
Navy	18
Air Force	93

Source: The Reserve components  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

*The Board recommends that continued emphasis be given to filling health care positions with adequate numbers of qualified personnel.*

### **Recruiting and Retention of Medical Personnel**

The Board is closely monitoring medical personnel strengths to permit early identification of potential recruiting or retention problems resulting from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. To date, there is cautious optimism that attrition levels will not be significantly greater than prior years.

Congress enacted two programs in 1987 to attract and retain health professionals: the

Health Professional Loan Repayment (HPLR) Program and the Stipend Program. In 1989, Congress also authorized a Selected Reserve Recruitment Bonus Test program.

The Health Professional Loan Repayment Program provides reimbursement for each year of satisfactory Reserve service. In 1990, the financial limits were expanded to allow reimbursement of up to \$3,000 per year to a maximum of \$20,000 per individual. With these new limits, 560 individuals enrolled in the HPLR during fiscal year 1991, for a cumulative program total of 1,344.

The Stipend Program assists in recruiting student physicians and nurses who are training in critically- short wartime specialties. Recent modifications to this program have further enhanced its attractiveness. This included an increase in the stipend amount to a range of \$381-\$762 per month, depending on status of recipient and Service policy. In fiscal year 1991, the Stipend Program attracted 422 new participants, for a program total of 3,283.

The Selected Reserve Recruitment Bonus Test is a more recent initiative to test the effect of bonuses on the recruitment of physicians and nurses in critically-short specialties within specific geographic areas. Bonuses can be as much as \$10,000, depending upon the medical specialty. The Bonus Test results for fiscal year 1991 are still being analyzed, along with the impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Initial indications are that the bonus program shows considerable promise, prompting some of the Services to request that the program be expanded nationwide. However, before this can be considered, the test results must be analyzed and a report furnished to Congress. This report should be completed during fiscal year 1992.

Congress has directed the Selective Service System to develop a standby program for the registration and classification of health care professionals. Such a program would only be implemented after the President declares a national emergency and after Congress passes legislation providing specific registration authority. The Selective Service System has



developed an operational concept, functional description, and automated portions of the program. The program was tested in 1991 and is scheduled to be on line by the end of fiscal year 1992.

The Board believes that Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM may have a significant impact on future recruiting and retention of health care professionals into the Selected Reserve.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *recruiting and retention incentives for Reserve component health professionals be continued at their current levels.*
- *the Services continue to closely monitor the recruiting and retention of Reserve component health care personnel.*
- *the Department of Defense study ways to assist Reserve component physicians called to active duty to deal with problems associated with their private practices.*

### **Mail Delivery Overseas**

Numerous concerns were expressed by Service members and their families regarding excessive delays in mail delivery encountered during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.



*The Board recommends that:*

- *planning for future mobilization contingencies include appropriate consideration for timely mail delivery.*
- *the Department of Defense place high priority on mail delivery and allocate resources to ensure the prompt delivery of mail to and from personnel deployed overseas. Additionally, the Board recommends that the Department of Defense consult with the United States Postal Service on ways to achieve more timely mail delivery.*

### **Merchant Marine Manning**

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM demonstrated the importance of sealift for any major contingency. The Merchant Marine is a critical element of the Nation's sealift capability; it provides the necessary seagoing personnel to man cargo ships which are essential to provide sealift for the majority of war materiel.

The Board is concerned that there is a declining number of Merchant Marine personnel and that there may not be sufficient qualified personnel to meet future contingencies.

The Board supports the efforts of the Department of Transportation to seek new initiatives and sources for Merchant Marine Ready Reserve Fleet manpower. The identification of civilian Merchant Mariners who are pretrained and already familiar with the ships in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) will complement the Naval Reserve in providing a force ready to respond quickly to a future crisis.

Consideration should be given to utilizing Merchant Marine Academy graduates and Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC)/Student Incentive Program (SIP) graduates from state maritime academies, each of whom have a six-year Naval Reserve obligation upon graduation. This program could provide an additional means for these

individuals to fulfill their Merchant Marine-oriented Naval Reserve obligation as mandated by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 13 USC 1295 while at the same time enhancing the manpower pool of the Maritime Administration's proposed civilian Merchant Marine Reserve, the purpose of which is to provide manning backup for the RRF in time of war or national emergency.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *the Departments of Defense and Transportation study the feasibility of creating a new Naval Reserve/Merchant Marine Reserve program to enhance the ability of the Maritime Administration's Civilian Reserve Force and the Merchant Marine to mobilize the Ready Reserve Fleet.*
- *Merchant Marine personnel be included in the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act, which is currently being considered by the Congress.*

### **Military Compensation (7th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation)**

On November 6, 1990, the President signed the charter for the 7th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (7th QRMC). Its charter is to:

- conduct a fundamental review of the overall compensation system;
- assess its ability to continue to attract and retain high quality men and women;
- in particular, evaluate basic pay, allowances, special pays and bonus programs, and periodic adjustment mechanisms;
- report recommendations in time to reflect necessary changes in the fiscal year 1993 budget and legislative programs.

The 7th QRMC's principal focus will be to "assess the adequacy of the compensation system to support both transitional changes and future force structures." Recommendations will be coordinated in March 1992 and forwarded to the Secretary of

Defense by May 1992. The final report is expected to be published in September 1992.

### **Reserve Pay and Entitlement Problems Encountered during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM**

Following the commencement of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Board held special meetings, in addition to regular quarterly meetings, to receive information on the situation. During these meetings, the Board discussed numerous Reserve component pay and entitlements issues and submitted policy recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

Some of the pay and entitlement problems encountered by Reserve component personnel during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM included:

- overpayment of advance/casual pay, resulting in an indebtedness to the government.
- temporary storage of household goods.
- transitional health care.
- Dental care for Selected Reserve members.
- Delta Dental Plan only authorized for families of Reservists called to active duty for a period of two years or more.
- Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) bonuses discontinued while Reservist is on active duty.
- BAQ entitlements for enlisted members without dependents.
- updating provisions of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act and the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Law.
- loss of tuition funds by students.

The Board noted that there were major inequities in laws, policies, and regulations, which affect members of the Reserve components who were either voluntarily, or involuntarily, ordered to active duty.

Additional relief measures which should be considered for future call-ups include changes which will:

- authorize burial rights in National Cemeteries for all Selected Reserve members.
- amend 10 USC 1074 to permit the Secretary of Defense to provide a self-funded (no cost to the government) medical and dental insurance plan for Reserve component members.
- Extend unemployment insurance benefits for former servicemembers from 13 to 26 weeks.
- Improve veterans rights to include reinstatement of health insurance.
- Remove limitation on the amount of leave that may be accrued toward leave payable upon discharge.
- Provide Selected Reserve members with VA home loan program eligibility.

Special legislation was enacted during 1991 to provide relief to Reserve component members called to active duty.

*The Board recommends:*

- *appropriate actions be initiated to reduce future pay problems for members of the Reserve components called to active duty.*
- *the Department of Defense continue to encourage the use of direct deposit pay programs by members of the Reserve components. The Board noted that*



*advance enrollment in the direct deposit program can reduce the potential for pay problems upon entry on active duty.*

- *the Delta Dental Plan contract should be modified to provide dental care for the dependents of Reservists called to active duty under the provisions of 10 USC 673b or partial mobilization, after 30 days. Existing law, 10 USC 1076a, provides the Secretary of Defense with the authority to establish dental benefit plans for spouses and children of members of the Uniformed Services who are on active duty for more than 30 days. However, the current contract provisions for the Delta Dental Plan contains an additional requirement that to be eligible for coverage under the plan the Service member must have been called to active duty for "at least two years."*

## **Military Retirees**

The Retired Reserve consists of personnel who have been placed in a retirement status based on completion of 20 or more qualifying years of Reserve component and/or Active component service, or physical disability. A member of the Retired Reserve does not receive pay until reaching age 60, unless he or she has 20 or more years active Federal service.

The Army utilized retirees extensively in Family Assistance Centers to provide support to dependents of Service members. Retirees were also utilized as helicopter pilots, casualty assistance officers, in various medical specialties, and as replacements in critical skills for active duty soldiers in Southwest Asia.

The Marine Corps utilized retirees in various critical specialties. All Air Force retirees recalled were in medical specialties, and all were deployed in the continental U.S. to backfill deployed Active component personnel.

Table 4-15 lists the total number of retirees by Service, plus the number called to active duty for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

**Table 4-15**  
**MILITARY RETIREES**  
**Fiscal Year 1991**

	<b>Personnel Strengths</b>	<b>Number Called to Active Duty</b>
Army	604,448	1,254
Navy	467,037	0
Marine Corps	94,684	586
Air Force	<u>609,412</u>	<u>118</u>
DoD Total	1,775,581	1,958
Coast Guard	<u>27,625</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	1,803,206	1,958

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1991.

Retirees are an important asset, because those who have completed 20 or more years of active service may be involuntarily called to active duty at any time. The availability of this highly-trained and experienced manpower pool of Active and Reserve component retirees significantly enhanced the operating capabilities and the training/deployment of

Reserve component personnel. Retirees were utilized in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

*The Board recommends applicable statutes be amended to provide eligibility for an enlisted member of any Service and/or component, who otherwise meets applicable requisites for the receipt of retired or retainer pay, to receive a 10 percent increase in that retired or retainer pay, if the member has been credited by the member's Service Secretary with "extraordinary heroism in the line of duty."*

### **Montgomery G.I. Bill**

The Montgomery G.I. Bill (MGIB) is a highly effective recruiting and retention incentive. One measure of the value of this legislation is its effect on the number of six-year enlistments. The number of applicants continues to increase. There are 490,212 Reserve component officer and enlisted personnel eligible for the MGIB program. Of that number, 240,949 members of the Selected Reserve have applied for benefits and 163,250 are participating. A breakout of qualified personnel, total applicants, and participants as of September 30, 1991 is shown in Table 4-16.

**Table 4-16**  
**MONTGOMERY G.I. BILL USAGE**

	<b>Eligibles</b>	<b>Applicants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Army National Guard	208,773	95,476	46%
Army Reserve	94,643	59,023	62%
Naval Reserve	42,209	24,718	59%
Marine Corps Reserve	26,842	17,618	66%
Air National Guard	61,038	26,386	43%
Air Force Reserve	<u>52,522</u>	<u>15,833</u>	30%
DoD Total	486,027	239,054	49%
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>4,185</u>	<u>1,895</u>	45%
Total	490,212	240,949	49%

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Coast Guard  
Data as of September 30, 1991.



For the National Guard and Reserve, the MGIB is a non-contributory program. Applicants must have a high school diploma or equivalent, and are required to enlist or agree to serve in the Selected Reserve for a period of six years. Participants who remain members of the Selected Reserve have up to 10 years (after becoming eligible for the MGIB) to use the entitlement.

Benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill were expanded on October 1, 1990, to include vocational/technical programs, cooperative study programs, approved correspondence courses, and flight training. In order to receive assistance for these benefits, an individual must enlist, re-enlist or extend his Reserve service obligation for six years on or after October 1, 1990.

Montgomery GI Bill benefits are payable for up to 36 months of education at the rates of \$170, \$128, \$85, and \$43 per month for full-time, three-quarter, half-time, and less than half-time study, respectively. The maximum total benefit is \$6,120 for study in a VA-approved program of education.

*The Board recommends that consideration be given to expanding the Montgomery GI Bill program to permit attendance at graduate school, as an additional means of reducing the shortage of company grade and mid-career officers.*

## Recruiting Results

Recruiting was difficult during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, due to a "wait and see" attitude of applicants and parents, and the impact of Active component stop-loss programs.

The Army National Guard did not meet its fiscal year 1991 strength objective of 457,300. Both officer and enlisted accessions were below that required to achieve the programmed end strength. The Army National Guard is programmed for a reduction in end strength for fiscal year 1992. The fiscal year 1991 shortfall will reduce the impact of fiscal year 1992 reductions.

The Army Reserve experienced a negative impact on nonprior service recruiting and prior service recruiting (due to Active component stop-loss actions) and consequently did not meet its fiscal year 1991 strength objective of 318,700. The transitioning of Active component soldiers to the Army Reserve was severely curtailed as a result of stop-loss actions. The Army Reserve ended the year at 97.2 percent of its budgeted end strength.

The Naval Reserve attained 98.8 percent of fiscal year 1991 end strength requirements. Recruiting goals were reduced slightly. Due to an anticipated reduction in end strength for

fiscal year 1992, the management decision was made to end fiscal year 1991 slightly under end strength, thereby reducing the fiscal year 1992 rampdown slope.

The Marine Corps Reserve attained 102 percent of its strength objective. Officer/warrant officer strength for fiscal year 1991 was 3,468. This was 317 short of the fiscal year 1991 plan for 3,785 officers and warrant officers. Enlisted end strength was 1,374 personnel above the planned end strength of 40,115. Recruiting was stopped for various periods during fiscal year 1991 because of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The only short-term difficulties were in filling unanticipated vacancies. The Marine Corps requested and received the approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to exercise the authority in the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 to exceed the end strength prescribed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991.

The Air National Guard exceeded its strength objective for fiscal year 1991, ending the year with an assigned strength of 117,786, or 100.6 percent of its programmed end strength. At the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD, many Air National Guard locations reported a definite negative impact

on recruiting. At the start of Operation DESERT STORM, however, assigned strength began to rise. Overall impact on recruiting has been minimal for fiscal year 1991, and impact on future recruiting may, in fact, be positive.

The Air Force Reserve achieved 98.8 percent of its programmed strength level. Prior service accessions were not attainable, due to Active component stop-loss. Also, the Air Force Reserve reduced its manning level somewhat to accommodate anticipated reductions in fiscal year 1992 end strength.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM appeared, initially, to have some adverse effect on the Coast Guard Reserve recruiting effort. Additionally, the Coast Guard experienced reduction in cooperation from some secondary and post-secondary learning institutions. In some areas (most notably Southern California, the San Francisco Bay area, and Portland, Oregon) recruiters were banned by local policies from making visits to area high schools. Notwithstanding, the Coast Guard met 98.1 percent of its budgeted fiscal year 1991 overall officer and enlisted strength.

Table 4-17 lists the number of enlisted accessions during fiscal year 1991 and Table 4-18 compares year-end enlisted strength to budgeted levels for each Reserve component.



**Table 4-17**  
**ENLISTED ACCESSIONS**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Prior Service</b>	<b>Non Prior Service</b>	<b>Objective</b>	<b>Total</b>
Army National Guard	35,223	32,870	83,400	68,093
Army Reserve	30,967	25,860	75,200	56,827
Naval Reserve	21,158	7,941	28,700	29,099
Marine Corps Reserve	2,034	7,172	4,100	9,206
Air National Guard	6,748	3,621	10,900	10,369
Air Force Reserve	7,579	1,723	16,000	9,302
DoD Total	103,709	79,187	218,300	182,896
Coast Guard Reserve	205	570	950	775

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 4-18**  
**ENLISTED STRENGTH BY COMPONENT**

	<b>Budgeted Strength</b>	<b>Assigned Strength</b>	<b>Shortage/ Over</b>	<b>Fill Rate</b>
Army National Guard	397,188	395,988	-1,200	99.7%
Army Reserve	247,896	249,626	1,730	100.7%
Naval Reserve	124,135	123,727	-408	99.7%
Marine Corps Reserve	40,211	41,472	1,261	103.1%
Air National Guard	102,651	103,670	1,019	101.0%
Air Force Reserve	67,594	67,603	9	100.0%
Coast Guard Reserve	10,473	10,234	-239	97.7%

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

*The Board recommends that continued emphasis be placed on recruiting to fill high-priority units and critically short skills.*

### Reenlistment Rates

The Army National Guard noted a stabilization of the force. The enhancement of the Montgomery GI Bill to include vocational-technical study could be a contributing factor to increased extension rates.

The Army Reserve noted a positive impact on retention for nonprior service soldiers. First term reenlistment rates went from 61 percent in fiscal year 1990 to 84 percent in fiscal year 1991. The reenlistment rate for career soldiers was 78 percent, slightly below the programmed rate of 80 percent.

Table 4-19 provides reenlistment rates for each of the Reserve components.

**Table 4-19  
REENLISTMENT RATES**

	<b>First Term</b>	<b>Beyond First Term</b>
Army National Guard	63%	77%
Army Reserve	84%	78%
Naval Reserve	88%	92%
Marine Corps Reserve	75%	95%
Air National Guard	82%	97%
Air Force Reserve	97%	92%

Note: Data not available for Coast Guard Reserve.

Sources: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.


### Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act

The Board is required by 10 USC 113(c)(3) to review Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) policies pertaining to appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the Reserve components.

In adopting the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 for Active component personnel, Congress directed that a similar statute be submitted for the Reserve components. Current statutes pertaining to the Reserve components are based upon the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 (ROPA). To modernize the provisions of ROPA, and to provide common statutes for the appointment, promotion, separation and retirement of all Reserve component officers, the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) was developed by the Department of Defense and initially introduced to the 99th Congress in February 1986. It was subsequently introduced to the 100th and 101st Congresses, but again not passed. ROPMA has yet to be reintroduced to the 102d Congress.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act be enacted by the Congress.*
- *the current Reserve component promotion requirements remain unchanged and that educational requirements be left to each Service.*





## Reserve Retired Pay Cap

Some Federal employees who are retired members of the Reserve components are unfairly discriminated against at age 60 when they are eligible for Reserve retired pay.

This occurs because the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-454, October 13, 1978) reduces their retired pay by the amount that the combined rates of their Federal civilian salary and Reserve military retired pay exceeds Level V of the Executive Schedule.

Reservists eligible for retired pay at age 60 who are employed other than by the Federal government (civilian sector, self-employed, or state and local governments) receive their full retirement pay. Active component retirees are treated in a similar manner.

*The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support legislation to remedy this inequity and unfair discrimination against Federal employees who have earned their full Reserve retirement.*

## Social Security Offset to the Survivor Benefit Plan

Current law (P.L. 96-402) unfairly provides for reductions of the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) annuity to surviving spouses of Reservists.

When P.L. 96-402 was enacted in 1985, it eliminated the little-understood Social Security offset to SBP survivors annuity under previous law. Reserve component retirees were basically exempted from a Social Security offset if they paid maximum Social Security taxes based on their civilian employment.

Thus, P.L. 96-402, with its automatic reduction of the survivor annuity, from 55 percent to 35 percent at age 62, discriminates against the Reserve retiree whose survivors had previously been protected from an unjustified Social Security offset. Active component retirees are treated in a similar manner.

*The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support legislation to remedy unfair Survivor Benefit Plan reductions resulting from current law, which affect the surviving spouses of eligible members of the Total Force.*

## Standby Reserve

Personnel assigned to the Standby Reserve have completed all obligated or required service or have been removed from the Ready Reserve because of civilian employment, temporary hardship, or disability. Standby Reservists maintain their military affiliation, but are not required to perform training or be assigned to a unit.

Fiscal year 1991 Standby Reserve personnel strengths, by Reserve component, are shown as follows:

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• Army National Guard	0
• Army Reserve	1,189
• Naval Reserve	12,106
• Marine Corps Reserve	655
• Air National Guard	0
• Air Force Reserve	14,234
	<hr/>
• DoD Total	28,184
	<hr/>
• Coast Guard Reserve	506
	<hr/>
• Total	28,690

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## Student Call-Up Issues

Today's Guard and Reserve units include many members who are students enrolled in institutions of higher learning. Federal law does not afford similar rights to members of the Guard and Reserve called to duty from the Nation's colleges and universities as those afforded to members called from the Nation's businesses. Current law does not guarantee recalled student members of the Guard and Reserve refunds of tuition and fees paid for the semester they were unable to complete, nor does it guarantee them the right to return to the college or university upon completion of their active duty service.

*The Board recommended that policy changes and legislation to protect students, if required, as in the case of reemployment rights, be made, addressing areas such as nonprejudicial reinstatement and reimbursement of student educational benefits or scholarships/loans, which otherwise may be forfeited.*

Consistent with the Board's recommendation, the Secretary of Defense sent a letter on January 29, 1991, to each of the Nation's governors, asking them to seek enactment of new state laws, if necessary, to refund student members of the Guard and Reserve, tuition and fees paid for the semester they cannot complete, and to give them the right to return to their colleges and university upon completion of active duty service.

### **Timeliness of Reserve Pay**

Pay problems are one of the most often mentioned reasons for leaving the Reserve components. Prompt and accurate pay has a direct impact on morale, which affects readiness. Reducing pay problems and pay lags will enhance retention. Significant efforts are underway to reduce Reserve component pay lags.

The current Army National Guard pay system allows for two paydays each month, due to available processing cycles. Total elapsed time for receipt of pay is normally 15 days. The Army National Guard plans to implement the Joint Service Software system in December 1991. This system will reduce the pay lag to seven days.

The Army Reserve also has two paydays each month. Pay is normally received within 22 days of drill attendance. The Army Reserve also plans to implement the Joint Service Software system in December 1991. Once implemented, the pay lag from date of duty should be reduced to seven days.

Pay support for Army National Guard/Army Reserve members for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was accomplished on the Active Army pay system. The roll-over did not work well. Many soldiers were paid

incorrectly and delays were encountered in receiving Leave and Earnings Statements. The Reserve components did not receive responsive pay service. Some families were left with serious pay problems, which could have been prevented. The Army's Reserve components need a single pay system which readily interfaces with the Active component.

Naval Reservists currently receive their pay in approximately 20 days after drill attendance. Utilizing Joint Service Software, scheduled for implementation in December 1991, elapsed time will be reduced to seven days.

The typical time for Marine Corps Reserve drill and bonus payments is two weeks. Further improvements are being pursued.

Air National Guard drill pay is typically received 7-14 days after drill attendance.

The Air Force Reserve has instituted a personal computer-based automated sign-in procedure, utilizing magnetic card readers and expedited data processing at unit level. In addition, the Defense Finance and Accounting Center at Denver is providing twice-weekly pay computation. The result is that the average Reservist, enrolled in the Direct Deposit program, receives a pay statement and bank deposit receipt by mail, in seven to ten days, an improvement over earlier payments one month after drill.

Coast Guard Reserve drill pay is normally received in 30 days. A new pay system is planned which will merge Reserve pay into the Coast Guard Uniform Military Pay System. This will give the Coast Guard a single integrated pay system, resulting in more timely and accurate pay. It will also result in a smooth transition to active duty when a member is mobilized. The Coast Guard is also encouraging increased participation in the Direct Deposit pay system.

*The Board recommends.*

- *that efforts be continued to pay Reserve component personnel within one week of drill attendance*

- *Reserve component pay regulations be reviewed to ensure that Reserve component members are permitted more than one payroll allotment deduction, from inactive duty pay, if requested.*

### **Transitioning Capacity/Funding**

Congress enacted a provision in fiscal year 1991 which provides preference for "a person who is involuntarily separated from the Armed Forces during the five-year period beginning on October 1, 1990, and who applies to become a member of a National Guard or Reserve unit within one year after the date of such separation, shall be given preference over other equally qualified applicants for existing or projected vacancies within the unit to which the member applies, and may be retained in that unit for up to three years without regard to Reserve component strength limitations so long as the individual maintains good standing in that unit." If sufficient drill pay is provided, this will provide the needed transitioning capacity for Active component personnel who wish to continue their military career in the Reserve components.



The key elements of a successful transitioning program are the availability of a Reserve component unit within a reasonable commuting distance of the member's residence and a funded position vacancy which requires the former Active component member's specialty.

Due to the Active component stop-loss program during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, very few Active component soldiers transitioned into the Army National Guard.

The Army Reserve has an effective transition program to accept MOS/grade matched Active component soldiers into Army Reserve units and could accept additional Active component soldiers, if adequately resourced for drill pay. The fiscal year 1991 ceilings allowed the Army Reserve to transition Active component personnel without resorting to overstrength. However, reductions in the fiscal year 1992 budget may force the Army Reserve to reduce accessions to achieve budgeted end strength. This would severely limit the number of transitioning Active component soldiers the Army Reserve could integrate into troop program units. It should be noted that the majority of soldiers leaving active duty possess combat arms skills. The skills required by the Army Reserve are mainly combat service support, and in the lower pay grades. Substantial funding would be required for retraining.

There is a need to maintain sufficient Reserve component end strengths in order to provide adequate transitioning capacity to support the movement of former Active component members into the Reserve components, during the drawdown of Active component end strengths. Not only would this increase the active duty experience level of the Reserve components, but it would also preserve the training investment in former Active component members.

An effective transitioning program can retain the Nation's investment in trained and experienced active duty personnel and concurrently improve Reserve component readiness. A review of effective transitioning programs indicate the following aspects should be considered:

- Early identification of personnel desiring to transition.
- Joint-Service seminars to discuss civilian job finding skills, education opportunities, veterans rights and entitlements, and opportunities for service in the Reserve components.
- Time to locate employment before leaving active duty.
- A referral network between the various recruiting commands to enable those leaving active duty to reserve a unit vacancy prior to separation.
- Adequate funding for drill pay.

### **Individual's (TTHS) Account**

Forming an Individual's Trainee, Transient, Holdce, Student (TTHS) account for the Reserve components would allow for central management of nondeployable personnel and will result in a more accurate picture of personnel readiness. The bulk of the nondeployable population in the Reserve components is in the training pipeline.

The placement of recruits against a unit position places a severe burden upon commanders in the Reserve components

which is not shared by their Active component counterparts. This serves to distort the personnel status of the unit on mobilization, since unit members who have not completed basic training (officer and enlisted) cannot be deployed outside the continental United States.

When units were mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, in many cases they reported to the mobilization station with a significant number of nondeployables, such as trainees or personnel pending discharge or reassignment. This lowered the readiness rating of the unit and placed a burden on the mobilization station to provide filler personnel. These individuals should have been assigned to an Individual's Trainee, Transient, Holdce, Student (TTHS) account, rather than filling unit positions for which they were not able to deploy.

*The Board recommends that an Individual's TTHS account be developed and tailored to the individual needs of the Reserve components, as an alternative to assigning nondeployable personnel to units.*

### **Minorities in the Reserve Components**

Table 4-20 provides data on minority representation in the Reserve components.



**Table 4-20**  
**DISTRIBUTION OF THE SELECTED RESERVE**  
**BY RACE AND ETHNIC CATEGORY**

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Asian/ Pacific Islander</u>	<u>American Indian/ Alaskan Native</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Hispanics<sup>1</sup></u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>							
Officer	45,779 91.3%	3136 6.3%	467 0.9%	162 0.3%	589 1.2%	50,133	1,731 3.5%
Enlisted	311,664 78.7%	66,550 16.8%	3,315 0.8%	3,544 0.9%	10,915 2.8%	395,988	25,846 6.5%
Total	357,443	69,686	3,782	3,706	11,504	446,121	27,577
<b>Army Reserve</b>							
Officer	50,626 84.3%	6,255 10.4%	877 1.5%	116 0.2%	2,181 3.6%	60,055	1,724 2.9%
Enlisted	164,641 66.0%	68,832 27.6%	3,394 1.4%	973 0.4%	11,786 4.7%	249,626	17,294 6.9%
Total	215,267	75,087	4,271	1,089	13,967	309,681	19,018
<b>Naval Reserve</b>							
Officer	25,333 91.2%	866 3.1%	198 0.7%	8 0.1%	1,378 5.0%	27,783	306 1.1%
Enlisted	101,729 82.2%	15,920 12.9%	1,770 1.4%	347 0.3%	3,961 3.2%	123,727	6,310 5.1%
Total	127,062	16,786	4,271	355	5,339	151,510	6,616
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>							
Officer	3256 94.0%	146 4.2%	198 0.7%	4 0.2%	48 1.4%	3,461	61 1.8%
Enlisted	30,597 73.8%	6,717 16.2%	1,770 1.4%	162 0.4%	3,116 7.5%	41,472	3,551 8.6%
Total	33,853	6,863	1,968	166	3,164	44,933	3,612
<b>Air National Guard</b>							
Officer	13,345 94.5%	496 3.5%	7 0.2%	19 0.2%	98 0.7%	14,116	324 2.3%
Enlisted	91,231 88.0%	8,812 8.5%	880 2.1%	301 0.3%	1,725 1.7%	103,670	4,627 4.5%
Total	104,576	9,308	887	320	1,823	117,786	4,951
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>							
Officer	15,846 93.6%	708 4.2%	158 1.1%	1 0.1%	379 2.2%	16,936	298 1.8%
Enlisted	52,701 78.0%	11,776 17.4%	1,601 1.5%	15 0.1%	3,069 4.5%	67,603	3,555 5.3%
Total	68,547	12,484	1,759	16	3,448	84,539	3,853
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>							
Officer	1,554 95.8%	36 2.2%	2 0.1%	2 0.1%	21 1.3%	1,623	Unknown
Enlisted	8,848 86.5%	585 5.7%	42 0.1%	60 0.1%	565 5.5%	10,234	Unknown
Total	10,402	621	44	62	586	11,857	Unknown

Note 1 Figures for Hispanics are the sum of Hispanics identified in each racial category

Source Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System  
Data as of September 30, 1991

## Warrant Officer Management

The Army's Reserve components currently have about 3,800 warrant officer vacancies (approximately 1,560 Army Reserve and 2,200 Army National Guard) in troop program units. To address this problem, the Army has developed a Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) containing 13 issues and 28 recommendations which address the appointment, training, development, and utilization of warrant officers. Twelve recommendations directly address the Army's Reserve component warrant officer shortage. The key recommendation is to appoint Reserve component warrant officers upon graduation from Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS), rather than requiring completion of Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification. This would reduce the waiting period for initial appointment by two to three years and would eliminate a major disincentive in the current program. Final approval of the WOLDAP is scheduled for early 1992.

The primary reason for the long-standing warrant officer shortage is the difficulty in locating the quality NCOs who can leave their jobs for the period of time required to complete the lengthy warrant officer training and certification process. The Warrant Officer Leadership Development Action Plan includes the following initiatives:

- Early appointment of warrant officers (following completion of WOCS).
- Accession of warrant officers at 5-8 years of service.
- Standardize Active/Reserve component appointment criteria.
- Expand Reserve component Tactical/Technical Certification training methods (diagnostic testing).
- Utilize challenge examinations to shorten Tactical/Technical Certification for the Reserve components.

The major warrant officer shortages in the Army National Guard are in the technical service branches. Many of these shortages occur in units with only one or two authorizations of these positions, which cause a major impact on unit readiness. Cross-leveling and use of volunteers helped to overcome warrant officer shortages in units called for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Shortages of Army Reserve warrant officers were overcome by recall of retirees in aviation and a few other specialties. As a short-term fix, the Army Reserve established all warrant officer positions as "grade immaterial" beginning October, 1991.

The Naval Reserve is authorized 477 warrant officers, of which 402 were filled as of September 1991. Vacant chief warrant officer billets are filled by commissioned officers. Recent improvements in career management resulting from the High-Year Tenure Program are allowing more of the Naval Reserve's junior, technically-current petty officers to apply for appointment.

The Marine Corps Reserve has 25 warrant officer vacancies. Vacancies are relatively minor and some may disappear with fiscal year 1992 strength reductions.

The Air Force's Reserve components do not have warrant officer positions assigned to their programs.

The Coast Guard Reserve has a pool of qualified applicants that exceeds the available vacancies.

The recently-enacted Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) authorizes each Service secretary to implement WOMA provisions for the Reserve components. WOMA also provides for the establishment of the grade of Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5) beginning in February 1992, for both the Active and Reserve components.

*The Board recommends that the Army's Reserve component warrant officers be appointed following successful completion of the Warrant Officer Candidate Course.*

*The Board also recommends that continuing efforts be made to fill warrant officer positions with qualified individuals of the appropriate grade.*

### **Women in the Reserve Components**

Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT have demonstrated the important contributions women are making as members of the Armed Forces. In its interim report to Congress on the conduct of the Persian Gulf conflict, the Department of Defense reported that women were fully integrated into their assigned units, deployed successfully, and performed admirably in vital roles under stress, enduring all of the same hardships under the same harsh conditions as male counterparts.

Department of Defense policy requires that single parents and military couples have a valid child care plan in the event of mobilization. This policy was apparently successful, in that each of the Reserve components reported very few problems in mobilizing and deploying single parents and military couples for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Currently, statutes and Service combat exclusion policies define those combat-related career fields to which women cannot be assigned. By law, women are precluded from serving in certain types of positions in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Recent legislation repealed statutory limitations on assignment of women in the Armed Forces to combat aircraft. By policy, the Army has closed positions with the highest probability of direct combat. Except for the combat exclusion policies which reflect legislative intent, men and women possessing similar skills and qualifications are assigned on an equitable basis. Women are fully integrated into those career fields available to them. Department of Defense restrictions do not apply to the Coast Guard; women routinely carry out, without restrictions, a myriad of duties afloat, including law enforcement during drug interdiction duties.

During fiscal year 1991, the Army opened the position of diver to women. There are

approximately 29 diver positions in the Army National Guard and 8 diver positions in the Army Reserve. The Navy expanded sea duty opportunities, allowing women to serve in Full-Time Support positions (officer and enlisted) on-board NRF 1052-class frigates.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Congress established a commission on the assignment of women in the Armed Forces to "assess the laws and policies restricting the assignment of female service members and make findings on such matters." The commission's final report is to be transmitted to the President not later than November 15, 1992 and to the Congress by December 15, 1992.

*The Board supports the expansion and enhancement of appropriate career opportunities for women in the Reserve components.*

Table 4-21 provides data on women officer and enlisted personnel in the Reserve components for fiscal year 1991.

### **Additional Observations and Recommendations of the Board**

The Board conducted a number of regular and special meetings during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and made the following observations and recommendations on personnel-related topics. Many of these items have been adopted; others may have applicability to future call-ups.

*The Board recommended that:*

- *the adequacy of proficiency pay for Reserve component linguists should be reviewed. The Board is concerned that the current amount of proficiency pay (approximately \$13.00 per month) may not be adequate to have as positive an impact on recruiting and retention as needed for this critical skill.*
- *the filing deadline for Federal income tax be automatically extended beyond April 15, 1991, for all members of the Armed Forces in the Middle East in connection with Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Board also*

**Table 4-21**  
**WOMEN IN THE SELECTED RESERVE**

	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Percent of Selected Reserve</u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>		
Officer	3,839	8%
Enlisted	<u>27,984</u>	7%
Total	31,823	7%
<b>Army Reserve</b>		
Officer	12,451	21%
Enlisted	<u>50,289</u>	20%
Total	62,740	20%
<b>Naval Reserve</b>		
Officer	4,309	16%
Enlisted	<u>18,896</u>	15%
Total	23,205	15%
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>		
Officer	170	5%
Enlisted	<u>1,404</u>	3%
Total	1,574	4%
<b>Air National Guard</b>		
Officer	1,490	11%
Enlisted	<u>14,160</u>	14%
Total	15,650	13%
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>		
Officer	3,513	21%
Enlisted	<u>12,685</u>	19%
Total	16,198	19%
<b>DoD Total</b>		
Officer	25,772	15%
Enlisted	<u>125,418</u>	13%
Total	151,190	13%
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>		
Officer	116	7%
Enlisted	<u>1,261</u>	12%
Total	1377	12%
<b>Total</b>		
Officer	25,888	15%
Enlisted	<u>126,679</u>	13%
<b>Total Women</b>	152,567	13%

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the  
Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1991.



*supports legislation which would waive interest charges on taxes not paid as a result of an extension of the filing deadline.*

- the amendments and modifications recommended by the Board to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act be passed expeditiously.*
- Reservists accruing annual leave be given the option of receiving payment for such leave, taking pre-separation leave, or a combination of the two. Reservists desiring to take their accrued annual leave prior to release from active duty should be retained on active duty past their normal release date, up to the number of days equal to their accrued leave.*
- the maximum benefit under Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) be increased to \$100,000, retroactive to August 2, 1990.*
- the current Active component promotion policies not be changed to require Active component officers to serve a minimum of two years in support of a National Guard or Reserve unit as a condition of eligibility for consideration for promotion to the grade of colonel or, in the case of the Navy, captain. Integration of the Total Force is desirable, but, the Board believes that assigning Active component personnel to National Guard and Reserve units or positions is neither a feasible nor effective way to accomplish this objective. Alternative means exist: enhance existing programs that result in greater participation by the Active component in planning, conducting, and evaluating Reserve component training and mobilization exercises; formal education programs for Active component officers at all levels, from officer basic courses through senior Service colleges, should include expanded course content on Reserve component programs and activities; and career enhancing tours of duty for Active component officers that provide improved understanding of the role of the Reserve components and the Total Force Policy.*
- the Department of Defense request authority from the Department of the*

*Treasury for the Service Secretaries to evaluate requests for waiver of collection of overpayments on a case-by-case basis, to include authority to waive collection of overpayment in a case where collection would not be cost-effective. An affected Reserve component member could then submit a request for waiver of collection of overpayment for decision by the Service Secretary. The Board also recommends that no interest be charged as a result of an overpayment, that the schedule for collection of an overpayment not require the deduction of more than 25% of the amount received for a monthly inactive duty training period, and that appropriate consideration be given to the impact that collections of overpayment may have on morale and retention.*

- Military members be treated appropriately for their service to the Nation. There was concern that some Reserve component units which have been mobilized are scheduled for inactivation upon return from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Suggestions to address these circumstances include:*

*(a) providing extra temporary positions/mandays to returning members who are being separated or whose civilian job has been terminated. This offers support while these members seek other employment. It is especially critical since deployed members have not had an opportunity to prepare for their future unemployment while they were deployed.*

*(b) providing temporary positions to family assistance programs and the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve to provide services and support to returning members.*


*(c) providing temporary positions or mandays to the Services to allow repair of equipment and return to its appropriate organization. These mandays would include not only highly skilled personnel, but a number of managers, supervisors, clerical support, drivers, and unskilled laborers.*





# Training and Mobilization Readiness

# 5



*"As budgets decline, we must find innovative, efficient ways to continue performance-oriented training."*

*General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

## **General**

Training and readiness were keys to the successes of the Reserve components during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Maintaining and building upon the level of mobilization and combat readiness demonstrated by the Reserve components during fiscal year 1991 will require continuing emphasis on innovative, realistic, and challenging unit and individual level training opportunities and experiences. As the Active and Reserve components are restructured over the coming years, national security will require the maintenance of quality Reserve components, capable of meeting the demands of future contingencies.

## **Quality of Training**

The purpose of training in the Reserve components is to prepare Reserve component units and members to fight and win in combat. The Reserve components implemented a number of new training programs during fiscal year 1991 to improve mobilization and combat readiness.

The Army National Guard participated in the pilot test of the Combat Training Center Program's Battle Command Training Program-Reserve Component, which was designed to provide Army National Guard division commanders and their battle staffs with advanced combat training opportunities through the use of sophisticated, computerized battle simulations.

An important initiative undertaken by the Army Reserve was the Reserve Component-Structure Manning Decision Review program to consolidate and integrate management of all Reserve component school training. This initiative is intended to provide a more coherent structure and greater efficiency in management for Reserve component soldiers in military school training. Army Reserve soldiers also began regular participation in the Combat Training Center Program's combat training exercises at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

Naval Reserve F-14 squadrons began air-ground weapons delivery training, and the Reserve Helicopter Training School was established to train helicopter aircrews. The Naval Reserve's revised Surface Master Training Plan, designed to maximize accountability for readiness improvement through proper execution and administration of existing training requirements, was implemented.

Some of the scheduled Marine Corps Reserve's training initiatives were not implemented because of its participation in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. These initiatives will be implemented in the next fiscal year, utilizing the Reserve Counterpart Training program to provide members of the Individual Ready Reserve with combat arms refresher training, and expanding the exercise support program to include participation in major Active component exercises around the world.

The Air National Guard's Consolidated Training Office concept test program was expanded to include four additional sites. Full implementation of the Consolidated Training Office concept will eliminate the requirement for unit level training managers and provide supervisors and trainers with guidance and direction. The Air National Guard also reviewed all collateral training requirements normally completed during unit training assemblies to minimize the time members spend in completing recurring mandatory briefing requirements and maximizing the time available in mobility, specialty, or on-the-job training. As a result, eight collateral training requirements have been taken out of the classroom environment and will be satisfied through the use of other media.

The Air Force Reserve Training Development Center continued to work as the command focal point for training research, development, technology, and future training requirements. An Air Force Reserve Total Quality course, focusing on structured problem solving and process improvement, meeting dynamics, interactive skills (teamwork), and family group management, was implemented. In addition, the Air Force

Reserve First Sergeant Academy was established at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

In conjunction with the deployment of Reserve port security units to the Persian Gulf, the Coast Guard Reserve conducted an evaluation to analyze the training, reorganization, and equipment needs of Reserve port security units.

Lessons learned during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM reinforced the need for effective interface between Active and Reserve component management information systems. Reserve components should train and operate on the same systems that they will utilize during wartime. Incompatibility of personnel, logistics, and maintenance management systems made it necessary to retrain mobilized Reserve component personnel to operate Active component systems, and to develop manual "work arounds" to offset shortcomings in automated systems.

*The Board recommends that Reserve components train and operate during peacetime on management information systems that are compatible with the Active components' wartime systems.*

During the visit to the Department of State on March 5, 1991, the Board was advised that an interest was expressed in having members of the Reserve components perform duty at the Department of State. The Board believes that Reserve component general and flag officers would benefit from the opportunity to participate in appropriate Department of State executive-level orientation and training programs.

*The Board recommends that appropriate training opportunities be developed and coordinated with the Department of State to allow Reserve component members to participate in orientation and training programs, which support missions of the Department of Defense and enhance Reservists' professional development.*

#### **Inactive Duty Training and/or Annual Training Period Scheduling Innovations**

Traditionally, Reserve component units train, as a minimum, 2 days a month and participate in an annual training period of at least 14 days, 15 days for some members of National Guard units. In an effort to improve



training effectiveness, the Reserve components implemented or continued the use of scheduling initiatives in fiscal year 1991.

The Army National Guard scheduled three week annual training periods for overseas deployment training, Combat Training Center deployments, and joint exercise participation. The additional training days provided units extra time to complete deployment/redeployment requirements. Incremental annual training periods were used to permit platoons/sections to participate separately in military occupational specialty training when participation by the entire parent unit was not required.

Army Reserve forces' schools and training divisions conducted inactive duty training periods on weekday evenings. Additional inactive duty training periods were performed during the week by aviation, military intelligence, and other types of units which have special training needs.

The Reserve Flexibility Program permitted medical and nurse corps officers of structured Naval Reserve units to perform up to 50 percent of their inactive duty training through professional update training or mutual support activities. The Physician Reservists in Medical Universities and Schools (PRIMUS) program



allowed physicians, nurses, oral surgeons, and operating room technicians total flexibility in performing their inactive duty training period obligation at their medical university or school. Four- and six-day inactive duty training periods allowed Naval Reservists to achieve hands-on training at their mobilization sites, increasing their opportunity to become fully qualified in their mobilization billets.

Marine Corps Reserve units regularly used five inactive duty training periods when conducting field training away from their training centers. Some Marine Corps mobilization stations, manned by Individual Mobilization Augmentees, used split annual training periods of two 7-day increments, enabling the units to participate in joint and Marine Corps' mobilization exercises during one week, and to conduct collective training the second week.

Air National Guard units utilized all categories and variations of allocated workdays to include inactive duty, annual, special, proficiency training periods, and training period preparatory assemblies to complete training requirements and improve training effectiveness.

Air Force Reserve members had the option of performing the annual training in split tours throughout the year, rather than in one two-week period. Most Air Force Reserve flying units and Individual Mobilization Augmentees scheduled inactive duty training periods over multiple weekends during the month, allowing a degree of flexibility and providing the most realistic training while supporting Active component mission requirements on a year-round basis.

Coast Guard Reserve members performed inactive duty training periods with Active component commands on weekdays to meet operational requirements. Weekday inactive duty training periods often allows for a greater opportunity for training and practical use of skills.

*The Board recommends that drill and annual training scheduling initiatives be explored to take advantage of all available training resources.*

## Operating Tempo

One of the measures of the collective training opportunities available to Reserve component units is operating tempo: the number of ground vehicle miles per year, ship steaming days per quarter, and aircraft flying hours per crew per month, available for individual and collective training.

The Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve

reported that sufficient funds were available during fiscal year 1991, to meet programmed operating tempo.

Resource hours are not specifically assigned to the Coast Guard Reserve. Resources are shared between the Active and Reserve components. During fiscal year 1991, there was a \$4.2 million shortfall in funding for Coast Guard Reserve readiness exercises.

Table 5-1 compares Active and Reserve component operating tempos.

**Table 5-1**  
**OPERATING TEMPO**

<u>Flying Hours/Crew/Month</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992<sup>1</sup></u>
Army Tactical Forces	14.2	14.5	14.5
Army Reserve	8.1	6.1	8.1
Army National Guard	8.5	7.1	9.0
Navy/Marine Tactical Air/ASW	23.9	26.0	24.0
USNR/USMCR Tactical Air/ASW	13.6	13.0	13.0
Air Force Tactical Air	19.5	10.4	21.6
ANG Tactical Air	10.2	11.7	10.7
AFR Tactical Air	10.1	12.1	10.7
Air Force Airlift	33.2	30.5	27.8
ANG Airlift	13.2	32.1	14.7
AFR Airlift	11.4	32.4	11.6
Air Force Strategic	19.2	17.0	17.2
ANG Strategic	13.0	21.3	14.2
AFR Strategic	13.2	21.1	15.0
<u>Navy Steaming Days/Quarter</u>			
Deployed Fleets	54.2	56.8	50.5
Nondeployed Fleets	28.9	28.9	29.0
USNR Nondeployed Fleets	21.0	18.0	18.0
<u>Army Ground Miles/Year</u>			
Army Tactical Forces	800	800	800
Army Reserve	200	200	200
Army National Guard	259	288	288
Note 1 Budgeted			
Source The Reserve components			
Data as of September 30, 1991			

*The Board recommends that sufficient operating tempo resources be made available to the Reserve components to support individual and collective training requirements.*

### **Simulation Policy Study**

The use of advanced training technology has proven to be cost-effective as well as timesaving and proficiency enhancing. The Simulation Policy Study and subsequent Modeling and Simulation Management Plan, approved June 21, 1991, will have considerable impact on the Reserve components in two significant ways. It will mean increased efficiency of training time during the post-mobilization period prior to combat; and, it will build additional efficiency and effectiveness into the current Reserve component training year of 39 days.

The long range goal of this plan is to provide simulation devices which are inexpensive enough to be placed in each Reserve training center where the equipment they emulate is used. These devices will be designed to train more than one person and simulate the operation of the actual equipment so that Reservists train on the equipment with which they are expected to fight. These advanced technology training devices will be invaluable in meeting the unique training needs of the Reserve components who must find the best possible means of conducting effective training during a compressed inactive duty training period schedule.

### **Training Delivery Systems**

Training delivery systems, including computer-assisted instruction, interactive courseware, simulators and wargaming systems, are essential to Reserve component training effectiveness and efficiency. The Reserve components received various training delivery systems during fiscal year 1991, but there is still a funding shortfall.

In addition to currently fielded systems, 11 separate training aids, devices, simulators and simulations have been identified as

requirements as part of the Army National Guard's Integrated Training Strategy. Funds are not currently available for the majority of these requirements. Systems fielded included the precision gunnery training system, mobile conduct of fire trainers, video interactive gunnery systems, electronic information delivery systems, mobile simulation networks, and recoil amplifying barrel assemblies.

A requirement exists in the Army Reserve to provide battle simulations, configured for distributed training, that will support training of battalion and brigade staffs to Army Training and Evaluation Programs/Army Mission Training Plans standards. Simulation technology is needed to assist Army Reserve combat support and combat service support commanders and staffs in sustaining warfighting support skills. There is an ongoing initiative to enhance training for platoon and company-size units.

The Naval Air Reserve has identified a requirement for a number of weapons systems, operational flight, and acoustic trainers, for which no funding has been approved. To ensure adequate training for flight crews, funding in the amount of \$80.5 million is required. Funding has been budgeted for the procurement of all shipboard simulators and upgrades for electronic information delivery systems requirements. An estimated \$825,000 is needed in both fiscal years 1992 and 1993 to cover maintenance of in-place and newly-procured interactive courseware training systems.

During fiscal year 1991, the Naval Air Reserve received an operational flight trainer. The Naval Surface Reserve received electronic information delivery systems, a propulsion plant simulator, and cargo-handling trainers.

Sufficient funds existed during the fiscal year to cover most Marine Corps Reserve training needs. However, in light of projected budgetary constraints being imposed on all Services, continued Congressional support in the form of the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation is critical. The Marine Corps Reserve received indoor simulated marksmanship trainers during the year.

All Air National Guard training delivery systems must meet the training and readiness requirements as specified by the gaining major command. The conversion to commercial contract logistic support programs for Air National Guard systems and the activation of F-16 Air Defense programs have outpaced funding. Existing funding levels to execute commercial contract logistic support programs were not adequate.

The Air Force Reserve routinely delivers computer-based training and interactive videodisc courseware to units to enhance these on-the-job capabilities. As formal schools reprogram their curricula for exportability, the Air Force Reserve anticipates a greater demand for additional delivery systems, to include a telecommunications system.

The Coast Guard Reserve had sufficient access to simulators during the year. However, the Coast Guard Reserve does not own training devices or simulators and is dependent on Active component equipment and simulators. Naval Reserve shipboard simulators were used for fire fighting and damage control training, while aircraft simulators were used for pilot and aircrew training.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that advanced technology training devices be developed and sufficiently funded to meet the unique training needs of the Reserve components.*

### **Training with Gaining Commands**

A Reserve component unit's ability to mobilize, deploy, and perform its wartime missions is enhanced by frequent training with its wartime gaining command. The Reserve components' opportunities to train with their gaining commands in fiscal year 1991 were impacted by the war in the Persian Gulf.

Approximately 54 percent of Army National Guard soldiers performed annual training with their gaining commands in fiscal year 1991. In fiscal year 1990, the figure was 65.8 percent. The decrease is due, in large part, to

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Fiscal year 1992 training with gaining commands should be more representative of normal participation.

About 20 percent of Army Reserve troop program units scheduled inactive duty training periods with their gaining command; about 45 percent scheduled annual training periods with their gaining command. The Army's CAPSTONE program affiliates Army Reserve component units with their Active component wartime gaining commands. The CAPSTONE program permits Reserve units to focus training on wartime missions and encourages mutual training. When the gaining command is based in the continental United States, mutual training during inactive duty training and annual training periods can be conducted on a regular basis. Mutual training for Reserve units with an overseas gaining command is considerably more difficult. Every troop program unit with an overseas mission is expected to perform overseas deployment training at least once every five years. The restructuring of the Active and Reserve components will involve a change in the structure and alignment of CAPSTONE. The CAPSTONE program will remain important for Army Reserve planning and training.







Because of their geographic proximity, approximately 35 percent of the Naval Reserve Surface Force conducted monthly inactive duty training periods with their gaining commands. The remainder traveled to their gaining commands an average of 2-3 times per year for inactive duty training periods. Annual training periods at mobilization sites were conducted by approximately 86 percent of the Naval Reserve Surface units. Naval Reserve Air squadron augment units and master augment units conducted approximately 15 percent of their inactive duty training periods and approximately 40 percent of their annual training periods with their gaining commands. Surface augmentation units conducted approximately 20 percent of their inactive duty training periods with their gaining commands. Other augmentation units conducted approximately 60 percent of their annual training periods with their gaining commands.

Marine Corps Reserve units conducted 23 percent of their inactive duty training and 90 percent of their annual training periods with gaining commands during the fiscal year. This reflects an increase over the 10 percent reported for fiscal year 1990. Such training consisted primarily of operational training exercises and support of the drug interdiction and counterdrug program.

Approximately 60 percent of inactive duty training and 40 percent of annual training duty periods of Air National Guard units was conducted with gaining commands. Mobilization, readiness, wartime mission, and overseas familiarization training was conducted with gaining commands.

Air Force Reserve units aligned with the Military Airlift Command (flying, maintenance, and aerial port squadrons) conduct training with, and in support of, Military Airlift Command airlift requirements. Air Force Reserve units also participated in field training exercises in Europe and Latin America, the Ground Combat Readiness Center, and at Tactical Air Command bases.

Coast Guard Reservists usually train at the nearest Active component unit that can provide the environment for training in skills needed for their rating, mobilization billet, and/or advancement. Budget permitting, efforts have been made to have Reservists perform their annual training period at their mobilization site at least once every four years. Approximately 50 percent of Reserve training was conducted at or with Active component commands.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that the Reserve components be sufficiently*

*funded to permit Selected Reserve units and members to train on a regular basis with their wartime gaining command.*

### Overseas Training

The planning necessary for a Reserve component unit to prepare and execute an overseas training mission closely parallels the planning required in the event of mobilization and deployment. Overseas training provides effective training opportunities for Reserve component units and members by:

- exercising mobilization, deployment, operational, and redeployment plans.
- increasing wartime mission requirements awareness.
- tailoring peacetime training to wartime missions in actual wartime environment.
- strengthening actual wartime command relationships.

- providing deploying units with geographical orientation.
- increasing readiness by providing realistic exercise scenarios for Reserve component units and members.
- improving morale and potential of retention among unit members.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that the adequate overseas training opportunities for Reserve component units and members be supported.*

Not including those Ready Reserve units and members called up in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Table 5-2 reflects the number of Reserve component members and units, or cells, who participated in overseas training in fiscal year 1991.

Table 5-3 displays a listing of the countries worldwide where Reserve component members performed overseas training.

**Table 5-2**  
**OVERSEAS TRAINING**

Reserve Component	FY 1990		FY 1991	
	Cells/ Units	Personnel	Cells/ Units	Personnel
Army National Guard	724	21,475	678	21,200
Army Reserve	1,343	18,492	1,113	12,128
Naval Reserve	164	19,345	152	13,361
Marine Corps Reserve	12	2,486	18	1,090
Air National Guard	281	16,985	149	10,455
Air Force Reserve	462	15,369	175	4,905
Coast Guard Reserve	1	150	1	90
Total	2,987	94,302	2,286	63,229

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 5-3**  
**OVERSEAS TRAINING**  
**BY REGIONAL AREA AND COUNTRY**

<b>U.S. Territories and Special Locations</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>Oman</b>	<b>Chile</b>
Guam	<b>East Asia and Pacific</b>	Pakistan	Colombia
Marshall Islands	Australia	Saudi Arabia	Costa Rica
Northern Marianas Islands	Fiji	Tunisia	Cuba
Puerto Rico	Hong Kong	United Arab Emirates	(Guantanamo)
U.S. Virgin Islands	Kiribati	Yemen	Curacao
Wake Island	Japan	<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	Dominica
<b>Europe</b>	Okinawa	Cameroon	Dominican Republic
Armenia	Malaysia	Gabon	Ecuador
Azores	Papua New Guinea	Guinea	El Salvador
Belgium	Phillipines	Kenya	Grenada
Denmark	Republic of Korea	Liberia	Guatemala
France	Singapore	Madagascar	Guyana
Germany	Solomon Islands	Mali	Haiti
Greece	Thailand	Niger	Honduras
Greenland	Tonga	Senegal	Jamaica
Iceland	Vanuata	Somalia	Mexico
Italy	Western Samoa	Sudan	Nicaragua
Luxembourg	<b>North Africa, Near East, and South Asia</b>	Togo	Panama
Netherlands	Bahrain	Zimbabwe	Paraguay
Norway	Bangladesh	<b>Western Hemisphere</b>	Peru
Portugal	Diego Garcia	Antigua	St. Kitts
Scotland	Egypt	Argentina	St. Lucia
Sicily	India	Bahamas, The	St. Vincent
Spain	Israel	Barbados	Trinidad
Sweden	Jordan	Belize	Venezuela
Turkey	Maldives	Bermuda	<b>Antarctica</b>
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Morocco	Bolivia	
	Nepal	Brazil	
		Canada	

Source: The Reserve components  
Data as of September 30, 1991

## Joint Training Opportunities

Joint training offers the opportunity for elements of more than one Service to participate together in training activities and operations. During fiscal year 1991, the Reserve components participated in a variety of joint training activities and operations. Army National Guard special operations forces enhanced joint training and interoperability between Army and Air Force units through the conduct of required quarterly airborne operations, and participation in joint/combined exercises.

Army National Guard special operations forces have used various Army National Guard special training programs to assign members to joint assignments for short tours.


Over 12,000 Army Reserve soldiers participated in 20 joint exercises through the overseas deployment training program. This joint training represented a reduction of about 30 percent from the usual level, as a result of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Naval Reserve provided Selected Reserve augmentation to unified commanders to support a wide variety of Joint Chiefs' of

Staff-sponsored joint/combined exercises worldwide. Helicopter combat search and rescue squadrons participated in four joint exercises, as compared to only one during the previous year.

The majority of Marine Corps Reserve joint training was associated with Reserve officer professional military education. Over 200 Reserve officers attended courses conducted by other Services.

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve began breaking ground toward involving joint Service planners in NATO exercise communications system architecture developments. The goal was to develop an integrated United States' joint Service position, to be blended into the NATO exercise communications system network. The initiative started with Exercise DISPLAY DETERMINATION '91 and will continue with Exercises DRAGON HAMMER '92 and TEAMWORK '92. The Air Force's Reserve components participated not only in joint exercises, but also smaller unit-generated exercises with other Services and major command exercises. In support of counterdrug operations, Air Force Reserve civil engineering units provided emergency



repair and construction project assistance at Coast Guard Station, Borinquen, Puerto Rico.

Coast Guard Reserve forces participated regularly in joint military exercises with all Department of Defense Services. Coast Guard Reservists attended Department of Defense-sponsored training and war and staff colleges at various Department of Defense commands.

*The Board recommends increased participation by the Reserve components units and members in joint training activities, operations, and schools.*

### **Reserve Officer Professional Military Education**

The Reserve officer professional military education programs of the Reserve components encompass formal schools, structured self-study, selected professional reading, symposia, and lessons learned in duty assignments. Professional military education is a key element affecting the future of the Services, and the Reserve components recognize its importance. Opportunities available for officers in the Reserve components vary from Service to Service.



Army National Guard officers have the opportunity to participate in the same professional military education courses as their Active component counterparts. The typical progression in the professional military education of Army National Guard officers is the completion of an officer basic course, officer advanced course, Combined Arms and Service Staff School, Command and General Staff Officers Course, and a senior Service college. All newly-commissioned lieutenants in the Army National Guard attend the officer basic course of their branch in residence at Army installations. The remaining courses may be completed in residence, through a combination of resident/nonresident instruction conducted by the Army Reserve schools or by correspondence study. The preferred method for completion of professional military education is attendance at resident instruction, but the limited availability of course quotas, along with time requirements of civilian jobs, military unit training, and family demands, restrict resident attendance by Army National Guard officers. Professional military education requirements for promotion in the Army National Guard are similar to those of the Active component. Completion of professional military education requirements is required for promotion of Army National Guard officers.

The professional military education of Army Reserve officers spans their entire military careers. Similar to their Active component and Army National Guard counterparts, Army Reserve officers typically attend officer basic and advanced course, Combined Arms and Service Staff school, Command and General Staff Officers course, and a senior Service college. In addition to professional military education required for promotion, Army Reserve officers are encouraged to enroll in and complete functional courses designed to enhance their technical and tactical competence. Army Reserve officers are invited to apply for limited resident seats in the intermediate and senior Service college courses conducted by the Active component, its sister Services, and other Department of Defense schools.

Army Reserve officers may attend resident schools conducted by Active component Service schools. During the past three fiscal years, nearly 14,000 Army Reserve officers graduated from full-time resident professional education courses. Because of their civilian employment and family responsibilities, most Army Reserve officers must take advantage of the training opportunities offered by the U.S. Army Reserve Forces School system and the Active component's correspondence course programs to accomplish their professional military education training. The U.S. Army Reserve Forces School system enables Army Reserve officers to complete mandatory, professional military education requirements as part-time students while they continue to work full-time in their civilian careers and take care of their family responsibilities. In the past three fiscal years, more than 22,000 Army Reserve officers were enrolled in courses conducted by the U.S. Army Reserve Forces School system.

Naval Reservists currently have access to five resident course quotas to the Naval War College and 475 nonresident course (two-week) quotas allocated between the Naval War College, National Defense University, Air Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and a NATO Reserve Officer Course. During fiscal year 1991, Naval Reserve officers filled nearly 500 quotas at schools ranging in length from 5 days to 10 months. Neither the Active nor Reserve components use professional military education attendance as a criteria for promotion, but completion of the appropriate level of professional military education is a positive consideration.

The Marine Corps has established an integrated and progressive system of resident professional military education, nonresident professional education, and professional reading for all Marines, Active and Reserve. A major objective of the Marine Corps' professional military education program includes resident or nonresident education for every captain, major, and lieutenant colonel. The Marine Corps University at Quantico, Virginia, is the focal point for all professional military education, and includes the Basic

School, the Amphibious Warfare School, and the Command and Staff College. Officer professional military education consists of precommissioning, primary/career, intermediate, senior, and general. The Marine Corps Reserve has four quotas to resident courses; two are at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, one at the Naval Command Staff College, and the fourth at the Naval War College. The Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College can be attended in the current phased two weeks per summer, two-summer resident program or as nonresident professional military education courses. In addition to the courses taught through the Marine Corps University, the Marine Corps Reserve is allocated quotas to two-week Reserve career, intermediate, and senior-level courses. Some examples of two-week courses are Reserve Officer National Decision Making Course, Reserve Officer Strategy and Policy Course, Joint Warfare Course, Canadian Militia Command and Staff, and Staff Planning courses taught at Landing Force Training Commands - Atlantic and Pacific. In fiscal year 1991, a year dominated by Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, 825 Marine Corps Reserve officers attended professional military education courses. The Marine Corps Reserve Professional Military Education Board has selected 1,104 Reserve officers to attend professional military education in fiscal year 1992.

The first stage of the Air National Guard's professional military education is Squadron Officer School, a seven-week, resident course designed for captains at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Due to the relatively short length of the course, more Air National Guard officers are able to attend this course than the longer resident intermediate and senior Service schools. The Air National Guard sends 12 officers per year to the intermediate Service school at the Air Command and Staff College and one officer per year to the Naval Command and Staff College. The Air National Guard sends 18 officers annually to senior Service schools, including the Air War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, Army War College, and Harvard University Fellows Program. In addition to the

resident opportunity, Air National Guard officers may obtain their professional military education through either correspondence courses or by seminar.

Air Force Reserve officers have opportunities to attend a variety of resident and nonresident professional military education courses. The Air Force Reserve utilized quotas to joint Service schools, including the National War College, Industrial War College of the Armed Forces, Naval War College, and Reserve Component National Security Course. Additionally, the Air Force Reserve officers attended resident courses at the Air Command and Staff College. Nonresident courses of the Air Force and the other Services are open to all Air Force Reservists who meet basic course qualifications without quota limitations. In the Selected Reserve, 73 percent of all colonels have completed intermediate-level and 71 percent have completed senior-level professional military education. Over 65 percent of lieutenant colonels have graduated from intermediate-level courses, and 20 percent have already completed senior-level courses. Among majors, 76 percent have finished intermediate-level professional military education. The Air Force Reserve parallels Active component policy with regard to professional military education and promotion. There are no formal education requirements regarding eligibility or selection for promotion; however, an officer's participation in professional military education is considered as a positive factor towards promotion.

The National Security Management course is a nonresident course managed by the National Defense University. During the period 1990-91, enrollment in the course ranged from 1,000-1,500 students with 60 percent of the students being Reserve officers. Many of these students participated in locally conducted seminars. In 1991, the National Defense University proposed to replace the course with a new course, the National Defense University Strategic Studies Course, which would have required some periods of resident instruction at the National Defense University. This new course was not approved and the

National Security Management course was cancelled.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *professional military education programs be expanded and funded sufficiently to permit participation by an increased number of Reserve officers.*
- *the National Security Management course be maintained at the National Defense University to provide joint professional military training for both Active and Reserve component personnel.*

### **Training Ordnance and Ammunition Requirements**

Training ordnance and ammunition requirements and fiscal year authorizations are developed using training strategies, war reserve requirements, procurement programs, and Service priorities. Training strategies include determining the quantities and types of ordnance and ammunition required for individuals, crews, and units to attain and sustain weapon proficiency relative to readiness levels making maximum use of training delivery systems. The availability of sufficient levels of training ordnance and ammunition is essential to Reserve component mobilization and combat readiness. Availability of training ordnance and ammunition was a problem for some Reserve components during fiscal year 1991.

Although the Army National Guard was authorized only 55 percent of the minimum quantity of critical small arms ammunition needed to meet the Army's Standards in Training Commission (STRAC), historical data on expenditure rates validate the 55 percent authorization. Army National Guard units reported no degradation in weapon proficiency or readiness resulting from the less-than-required authorization. Only 64 percent of the 25mm ammunition required to achieve STRAC requirements for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle was authorized. Tank main gun ammunition was authorized at 76 percent of requirements, even though National Guard Bureau gunnery requirements are stated at 14

rounds less per gun than the STRAC specifies. Smoke, pyrotechnics, and demolition items were resourced at 57 percent of requirements. Missile and rocket items were reduced to support Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Only individual qualification, in lieu of crew qualification and sustainment training, using the 2.75 inch rocket was conducted during the year.

The only specific Army Reserve ammunition requirement that was not met involved the 2.75 inch rocket. The 2.75 inch rocket shortage was caused by a production shortfall which has existed since 1987, and was Army-wide rather than unique to the Army Reserve. As a result of the 2.75 inch rocket shortage, training of attack helicopter units was reduced to approximately 50 percent of the Standards in Training Commission recommended level.

A moratorium restricting all Naval Reserve Force units from expending live ammunition for training purposes was imposed by the Chief of Naval Operations. Quantities of ammunition allocated to the Reserve Naval Construction Force fell short of maintaining the required weapons qualification skill levels set by current Naval directives. Consequently, the Reserve Naval Construction Force was not permitted to maintain weapons qualification skill levels of those units not selected for call-up to support Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Ammunition shortages existed due to low stock levels and percentage assigned for training purposes. Shortages of air-related ordnance were not unique to the Naval Air Reserve, as fleet units were equally short in such aviation ordnance.

The Marine Corps Reserve experienced a number of shortages in aviation and ground ordnance and ammunition. The shortages, caused primarily by the ordnance moratorium invoked by the Chief of Naval Operations, had a substantial impact on training. Limited ammunition translated directly to limited hands-on training time for Reservists.

Only about 28 percent of the Air National Guard's 5.56mm blank ammunition requirement was allocated in fiscal year 1991, severely reducing the effectiveness of field



training exercises which rely on the use of Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment for realism. In the aircraft area, an Air Force-wide shortage of 30mm ammunition was experienced. The shortage of 5.56mm blank ammunition was a result of allocation problems, and the 30mm shortage existed due to a contractor manufacturing problem.

Air Force Reserve units experienced shortages of 30mm, 20mm, 5.56mm training ammunition, BDU-33 practice bombs, and AGM-65 Maverick and AIM-9M Sidewinder missile guidance and control units. The 30mm training ammunition shortage was due to material defects and production problems. The 20mm training ammunition and the practice bombs were available, but Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM requirements had priority for all available transportation; several units used internal transportation to acquire assets from nearby bases. The availability of missile guidance and control units was limited and the depot maintenance turnabout time was lengthy. As a result, when several guidance and control units failed over a period of time, sufficient quantities of training missiles were not always available to meet peak training requirements.

The Coast Guard Reserve did not experience any ordnance or ammunition shortages during the year.



*The Board recommends that adequate training ordnance and ammunition be provided to ensure that the Reserve component units and members achieve and maintain required levels of readiness.*

### **Training Areas and Ranges**

Ready access to Active component training areas and ranges is essential to the success of Reserve component inactive duty training and annual training periods in attaining and maintaining mobilization and combat readiness. Current and future base closures impose an increasing problem of eliminating local training sites that were previously available to the Reserve components.

Problems were encountered by some Army National Guard units when scheduling use of Active component training sites and with utilization of those training areas and ranges after the units arrived on site to train. Army National Guard units attempted to reschedule conflicting training dates many times during the year to accommodate Active component training site adjustments. Some Active component training sites only schedule Army National Guard units that have directed training associations with the training site. Training areas for aircrew proficiency training

continued to be a significant issue for Army National Guard aviation units. Competition for vertical and horizontal space in training areas can be intense. Environmental restrictions in the area of noise levels constrained the available times for aviation units to conduct meaningful training such as night gunnery and night vision device training.

Most of the difficulties experienced by Army Reserve units regarding the use of ranges were related to the special requirements of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Some difficulties with access to ammunition dumps were encountered at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Over the past five years, however, overall Active component support for training areas and ranges has been good. Sufficient aviation ranges and training areas are available, but many of these training areas need to be upgraded to support night training operations.

Some difficulties were encountered by Naval Air Reserve units in scheduling adequate range availability, particularly during periods of increased tempo of operations such as Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Support by Active component installations during inactive duty training and annual training periods was adequate. Occasionally,



rescheduling was necessary because of training requirements of early-deploying Active component units.

No difficulties were encountered by the Marine Corps Reserve in utilizing Active component training areas and ranges, mainly due to deployment of Active component units to Southwest Asia, which reduced base loading and facilitated access to training areas and ranges.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units generally have little difficulty in scheduling and using Active component training areas, however, congestion and scheduling conflicts have limited the training areas available to Reserve components. Active component support was normally adequate. The impact of training area nonavailability was minimal in fiscal year 1991 due to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM deployment of the Active component.

Coast Guard Reserve training units had access to adequate ranges to meet small arms training requirements. Active component installations supported Reserve units during inactive duty training and annual training periods.

*The Board recommends that the Reserve components and the managers of Active component training areas and ranges work closely to ensure that the limited training time available to Reserve units and members is effectively utilized, and that sufficient funding be provided to upgrade and maintain the capability for training areas and ranges to support night training operations.*

### **Aircrew Training and Combat Crew Qualification**

Sufficient aircrew training and combat crew qualification training opportunities are essential to attaining and maintaining Reserve component aircrew flying proficiency and to sustaining mobilization readiness.


Requirements for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM resulted in reduction in the

Army National Guard and Army Reserve flying hour program. Operating tempo for Active component aviators was approximately 14 hours per month, or about twice that programmed for Army Reserve aviators. Installation commanders at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, have proposed closing their flight simulator facilities due to lack of funding, which would reduce simulator usage rates by Reserve component aviators. A shortage of night vision goggles inhibited aviator proficiency in 24-hour operations.

Sufficient Naval Reserve flight hours were funded to fly about 87 percent of the established primary mission requirements. Naval Reserve F-14 aircraft experienced engine problems, but utilization of aircraft loaned from the Active component enabled completion of the fiscal year flight hour program. Some HH-60H aircraft shortages resulted from the loan of four aircraft to the Active component, as well as the deployment of four aircraft for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, limited transition training for the aircrew from both Naval Air Reserve HCS squadrons. The mobilization of 12 C-9 aircraft for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM reduced the number of C-9 aircraft supporting continental United States commitments by 44 percent. The shortage of unrestricted A-6E aircraft prevented the attack squadrons from achieving their training and readiness goals.

Sufficient flight hours were available to meet Marine Corps Reserve aircrew flying proficiency requirements, and sufficient aircraft were available to support flight hour requirements. The Marine Corps Reserve's major aircrew flying proficiency training problem was the weather in the Northeastern United States. The problem was not so severe that training was significantly degraded.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM did not adversely affect the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve's ability to meet aircrew flying hour requirements. Sufficient fighter and airlift aircraft were available to support flight hour requirements; however, during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, when KC-10s from Barksdale Air Force Base,



Louisiana, deployed to Southwest Asia, it became necessary to grant numerous "waivers" to associate crewmembers who remained at their home base and were unable to maintain proficiency due to lack of aircraft. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard KC-135 crews were able to maintain only minimum proficiency due to a shortage of aircraft remaining at home station to meet the Air Force's alert requirements.

Sufficient flight hours were not available to the Coast Guard Reserve during the fiscal year. At one Reserve training unit, three of five aircraft were down for programmed depot maintenance for a two-month period. Active component aircrews were given priority use of available aircraft, resulting in the failure of some Reserve personnel to meet semiannual minimum training requirements. The Coast Guard Reserve aviation program is to be restructured in fiscal year 1992, and will not include a Reserve flying component.

*The Board recommends that sufficient flying hours be budgeted and authorized to meet Reserve component aircrew training and combat crew qualification requirements, and that sufficient funding be provided to Active component installation commanders to ensure that training delivery systems are available for Reserve component use during Active component non-working hours.*

## **Civilian Contract Training**

Training of Reserve component members by civilians under contract can be a cost-effective alternative for training members of the Reserve components. The use of civilian contract training during fiscal year 1991 varied from Service to Service.

The Army National Guard used civilian contract training to train 143 Army Guard members in areas such as health care, construction trades, computer science, foreign languages, and mechanical maintenance.

The Army Reserve placed particular emphasis on the use of civilian contract training for hard-skill military occupational specialty and medical specialty training. Of the 797 Army Reservists participating in civilian contract training, over 490 were Reserve medical service personnel training as practical nurses, respiratory specialists, operating room specialists, dental lab specialists, x-ray specialists, and laboratory specialists.

The Naval Reserve reported that 10,165 Naval Reservists participated in civilian-augmented training. Both Naval Reserve Surface and Air units used such training extensively. Of particular significance was the contracting with civilian schools to modularize medical technician programs to fit inactive duty training period schedules, which provides the opportunity for enlisted personnel to qualify as medical technicians. A pilot program is being conducted for basic laboratory technicians, with expansion planned to operating room technicians.

The Marine Corps Reserve used civilian contract training to train 35 combat engineers in construction and engineering-related areas. Use of civilian contract training during the fiscal year was limited because of Marine Corps Reserve participation in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Air National Guard utilized the C-130H, KC-135, and Operational Support Airlift contracts to train over 1,000 aircrews. The Air National Guard funded F-16 and F-15 Contract

Logistic Support, as part of its civilian contract training program. The Air National Guard must utilize civilian contract training for certain aircraft systems due to lack of appropriate training available from the Active component. This training must be provided by contract, due to either the low number of similar aircraft in the Active component, or because civilian contract training is the only training available for a particular aircraft.

The Air Force Reserve utilized civilian contract training for aircrews of C-130Es, C-141s, C-5s, and KC-10s. Civilian contract training is necessary for C-130H simulator training because no H-model C-130 training is available from Reserve or Active component sources. Civilian contracts for flight simulator training, whether administered by the Active or Reserve components, are the preferred method for providing flight simulator training to aircrews in most multi-place systems.

The Coast Guard Reserve did not utilize civilian contract training.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that civilian contract training be utilized as an alternative means of providing individual and collective training to members of the Reserve components, when that training is cost-effective and capable of providing training equivalent to or better than that provided by the Active component.*

### **Medical Training Programs**

The continuing development of new training programs for Reserve component medical personnel greatly enhances the mobilization and combat readiness of the Total Force. Several new medical programs were implemented by the Reserve components during fiscal year 1991.

The Army National Guard reported that regional training sites - medical (RTS-M) offered new medical training programs for the medical field feeding system, Army Training and Evaluation Program testing, combat lifesaver course, medical equipment repairman sustainment training, Army medical

department unit training (all types), and Reserve component medical supply course.

Specialized Training for Army Readiness (STAR), a program developed for training Army Reserve soldiers in medical skills, has shown significant growth both in students and institutions participating in the program. The program permits qualified soldiers to attend civilian community colleges in lieu of advanced individual training while serving as Selected Reservists. Financial reimbursement to the institution for tuition, books, and fees are provided for students, and they incur a two-year Selected Reserve obligation for each year of training received. Originally this program was established for the nonprior service recruit and had 56 students in 9 locations. In fiscal year 1990, the program was expanded to include troop program unit members, and now trains 397 soldiers at 202 locations in 38 states.

Four of five planned Naval Reserve medical proficiency courses, focusing on sustainment/ refresher training for hospital corpsman basic skills, have been developed and were implemented at 40 regional training sites. Medical skills laboratories were established at these regional training sites to support the courses. Basic, intermediate, and advanced dental proficiency courses were being developed for an expected field implementation date in late fiscal year 1992.



Pre-deployment training programs, to include fire fighting, damage control, medical management of chemical casualties, burn lift support, refresher corpsman training, advanced trauma life support, and chemical, biological, and radiological defense, were initiated for Selected Reservists ordered to hospital ships and fleet hospitals during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

No new medical programs were implemented for Marine Corps Reserve medical and dental unit personnel. However, Naval Reserve medical and dental personnel assigned to Marine Corps Reserve units had access to Naval Reserve medical and dental training programs.

Air National Guard medical program initiatives during the fiscal year included the implementation of an emergency medical technician course, aircrew qualification training, and increased formal school quotas.

A centralized Air Force Reserve aeromedical evacuation crew member training program was developed by the Military Airlift Command to qualify nurses and medical technicians called up for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.



Medical officers assigned to the Coast Guard are uniformed members of the Public Health Service. The Coast Guard Reserve has medical administration and physician assistant warrant officers. Physician assistants come to the Coast Guard Reserve having already completed an accredited physician assistants' educational program either in the civilian community or in another Service. The Coast Guard, in conjunction with the Coast Guard's medical program manager, gathered information and validated currency of skills and training for the Reserve enlisted medical corps.

*The Board recommends that continuing development of new medical programs for Reserve component medical personnel be supported.*

### **Medical Readiness Exercises**

Participation in medical readiness exercises provides Reserve component medical, dental, and veterinary personnel valuable training in combat casualty care training, to include the experience of providing general medical, dental, and veterinary support to troops under field conditions. Unique opportunities also exist for medical, dental, and veterinary training in many parts of the world, benefiting not only the Reserve component personnel involved, but also providing assistance to other nations.

The Army National Guard deployed over 500 medical personnel during the fiscal year to conduct medical readiness training exercises. A total of 13 medical readiness training exercises were conducted in Panama, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Belize. Nine medical readiness training exercises were independent, self-sustaining deployments, while four were conducted as part of Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 91. These medical readiness training exercises treated over 50,000 host nation people, provided limited dental care to approximately 11,000 people, and provided veterinary care to over 30,000 livestock. Two medical readiness training exercises were conducted in the Caribbean basin, one in Dominica as part of the Joint Chiefs' of Staff-sponsored Exercise

TRADEWINDS, and the second, in response to a request for medical assistance to Haiti. Sixty Army National Guard medical units with 7,377 personnel were Federalized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Thirty-six units with 6,109 personnel deployed to Southwest Asia, 5 units with 551 personnel deployed to Europe, and 19 units with 717 personnel provided medical support in the continental United States.

The Army Reserve medical units deployed 1,299 soldiers in conjunction with overseas deployment training during the fiscal year. Participation included seven major Joint Chiefs' of Staff-sponsored exercises and several smaller medical readiness training exercises. The number of medical readiness exercises was smaller than usual due to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM precluded most regular exercise play by Naval Reserve medical units during the fiscal year, because of the call-up of 10,452 Naval Reserve medical and dental department personnel. However, Naval Reserve medical and dental personnel did participate in Exercises BATTLE GRIFFIN 91 and DESERT TRAINING 91.

Although no major exercises were conducted during the fiscal year, approximately 750 Naval Reserve medical personnel participated as full team members with Marine Corps Reserve units deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Thirteen Air National Guard medical units participated in medical readiness exercises at the Readiness Training Site in Alpena, Michigan. Seven exercises were conducted at home stations and the Air National Guard participated in one national level exercise. However, approximately 2,500 personnel received practical training in Air Force Active component medical treatment facilities in the United States, and European Command Casualty Receiving Hospitals, as well as, participating in deployable medical systems.

Medical unit readiness exercises were not conducted by the Air Force's Reserve

components during fiscal year 1991, due to the number of Reserve medical personnel called up in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

*The Board recommends that opportunities for Reserve component medical, dental, and veterinary personnel to participate in medical readiness exercises be increased and supported.*

## **Deployable Medical Systems Training**

Deployable medical systems consist of standardized equipment modules, such as operating rooms, laboratories, x-ray facilities, and patient wards, which are fully transportable by military means and can be used by the Reserve components to configure varying types and sizes of hospitals and clinics.

Two Army National Guard units received deployable medical systems new equipment training and eight Army National Guard units conducted sustainment training at regional training sites - medical. A total of 19 Army National Guard units had received deployable medical systems new equipment training by the end of fiscal year 1991. New equipment training was only conducted for Army National Guard units, which were scheduled to be equipped with deployable medical systems equipment during the year. Minimum essential equipment for training is fielded to each Army National Guard unit approximately three months after new equipment training.

Twenty-seven Army Reserve hospital units received training on deployable medical systems. Of these units, ten received new equipment training, eight conducted sustainment training, and nine received refresher training prior to deployment in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The first operational Army Reserve Regional Training Site - Medical at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, conducted its initial new equipment training cycle during the fiscal year. Thirty-three Army Reserve units have received their minimum essential equipment for training sets and are using the sets during inactive duty training periods. Army Reserve

hospital units that have not yet received their minimum essential equipment for training sets are continuing to train during inactive duty training periods with their medical unit self-contained transportable equipment or at local military, Veterans Administration, or civilian hospitals. Thirty-three of the Army Reserve's 88 hospitals have received deployable medical systems minimum essential equipment for training sets.

Personnel from all nine Naval Reserve Fleet Hospitals received training on deployable medical systems equipment during the fiscal year. No Naval Reserve medical units have, or are scheduled to have, any deployable medical systems equipment. Naval Reserve fleet hospital units require regular training on deployable medical systems equipment and utilize the equipment at the Fleet Hospital Operations and Training Command, Camp Pendleton, California, or one of the Army's regional training sites - medical.

Marine Corps Reserve medical units did not participate in deployable medical systems training during the fiscal year.

Fifty percent of the Air National Guard medical units have received deployable medical systems orientation and/or training. At least 30 to 35 percent of all Air National Guard medical units train annually during inactive duty training or annual training periods using deployable medical systems.

Air Force Reserve medical units did not train on deployable medical systems, since deployable medical systems are not an assigned mission.

*The Board recommends that Reserve component hospital units be encouraged to train on the deployable medical system on a regular basis during inactive duty and annual training duty periods.*

### **Combat Casualty Care Course**

The Combat Casualty Care Course, offered by the Military Medical Education Institute, Uniformed Services University of Health Services,

is a nine-day, tri-Services course designed to prepare military medical department officers to function successfully in a battlefield situation. Personnel acquire and practice specific wartime medical skills in their combat roles, thus improving medical readiness and the ability to support combat forces.

Thirty-five Army National Guard officers attended resident Combat Casualty Care Course training during the fiscal year. The National Guard Bureau is not responsible for managing nonresident combat care training and could not provide any statistics on other combat casualty care training by the Army National Guard.

Approximately 114 Army Reserve medical personnel attended the resident Combat Casualty Care Course, while approximately 822 medical personnel attended the nonresident course during fiscal year 1991. Combat casualty care training is the highest priority training for Army Reserve medical professionals.

During the fiscal year, 517 Naval Reserve medical department officers attended the Combat Casualty Care Course in either the resident or nonresident version. Fifty-three Naval Reserve enlisted members attended the resident Field Medical Service School which trains personnel as field medical or field dental technicians to support operational units. The modularized Field Medical Service School provided 389 enlisted Naval Reservists with similar training, conducted in a combination of inactive duty periods and an extended annual training period. A hospital corpsman proficiency course in emergency care was initiated and will provide sustainment training in trauma care to the Naval Reserve's 13,500 enlisted medical department personnel at the 40 Naval Reserve Readiness Centers.

Marine Corps Reserve medical and dental unit personnel did not participate in the Combat Casualty Care Course during the fiscal year.

The National Guard Bureau did not record the number of Air National Guard medical

personnel who participated in the Combat Casualty Care Course during the fiscal year. A considerable amount of training was cancelled due to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Air Force Reserve reported that 34 medical department officers attended the resident Combat Casualty Care Course, while 130 officers and 219 enlisted personnel participated in the nonresident version of the course. The Battlefield Nursing Course was attended by 79 Air Force Reserve nurses.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that the Reserve components continue to utilize the Combat Casualty Care Course to prepare Reserve medical department officers to function successfully in a battlefield situation.*

### **Training Detractors**

The Reserve component units must attain and maintain appropriate levels of mobilization and combat readiness in much less time than is available to Active component units. The Reserve components identified major detractors to unit training encountered by units during fiscal year 1991.

In the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, administrative burdens continued to be the major detractors to unit training. Other detractors were requirements to conduct training not supporting a unit's mission essential task list, and inadequate training areas and equipment.

Major detractors to Naval Reserve inactive duty training periods were mandatory administrative requirements, the inability of units to train with their gaining command, and limited availability of government airlift to move members to inactive duty training period sites.

For the Marine Corps Reserve, preparations for participation in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were the major detractors to unit training during inactive duty training and annual training/active duty training periods.

Major detractors to Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve unit training during inactive duty training periods included Active component mandatory ancillary training course requirements and shortages of required equipment items. Unit training during annual training/active duty training





periods suffered due to shortfalls in procurement and maintenance of required equipment items.

Insufficient numbers of Coast Guard Reserve Full-Time Support personnel in the administrative area at the unit and Reserve center-level have resulted in 29 percent of inactive training duty period time being spent to meet administrative demands.


*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that the Reserve components increase efforts to reduce and control the administrative requirements on Reserve units that interfere with accomplishing the training mission during inactive duty training period.*

### **Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Program Support**

During a period of historic change in the world strategic environment in which the Nation's Armed Forces were engaged in armed conflict in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Department of Defense nonetheless vigorously pursued a wide range of activities in performing its counterdrug mission.

The plans and programs of the Department of Defense constitute an important and integral part of the President's multi-national and multi-agency approach to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, and fulfills a key and essential role in our Nation's fight against illegal drugs. This mission includes the following responsibilities which have been directed by Congress: to act as the single lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; to integrate command control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the Federal government dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network; and to approve and fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard, when not in Federal service, in support of state drug interdiction and law enforcement operations authorized by the laws of the state concerned.

The Reserve components began their participation in support of these new counterdrug responsibilities in fiscal year 1989. In each succeeding fiscal year since fiscal year 1989, a larger portion of their training program has been devoted to this mission.



In fiscal year 1991, Reserve components played a major role in the counterdrug missions by taking over from Active component units that were deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Although the Reserve components played a major role in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM—mobilizing 245,000 personnel and deploying almost half that number to the Persian Gulf—their role in taking over the counterdrug mission of the Active duty units that were also deployed to the Persian Gulf was particularly important to the Department's counterdrug efforts. For example, the Air National Guard deployed F-16s and personnel to Panama a month earlier than originally planned, in order to assume the mission of an F-16 squadron deployed by Southern Command to Saudi Arabia. Similarly, in support of Forces Command, Marine Corps Reserve personnel of the V Marine Expeditionary Force completed a sensor operation in Arizona and two listening post and observation post operations in California which had been initiated by the Active component I Marine Expeditionary Force until it was deployed to Saudi Arabia.

The Army National Guard and the Air National Guard provided support to the drug interdiction and counterdrug program either incidental to scheduled training or in Congressionally funded, Title 32 active duty special work tours, over and above normal training requirements. Approximately 200 missions were performed incidental to training during the fiscal year. These missions were conducted so as not to detract from scheduled training, and were a by-product of that training. During fiscal year 1991, the Army and Air National Guard used 745,266 mandays, on a volunteer basis, funded by Congress for Title 32 counterdrug activities. Counterdrug missions and duties of volunteer members included: aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance; aerial and surface transportation of sworn officers and contraband, evidence, or suspects in their custody; ground radar support; cargo inspection at ground, water, and air points of entry; training of members and law enforcement officers in counterdrug specific subjects; aerial photo reconnaissance using

OV-1D and RF-4C aircraft, and film processing as appropriate; coordination and liaison with supported enforcement agencies; and administrative, information-handling, automatic data processing, logistical, maintenance and engineer support.

The Army Reserve supported 65 drug interdiction missions, varying in duration from one day to several months and in scope from one individual soldier to a 99-person unit. Army Reserve units devoted more than 365 flying hours in U-21 light aircraft and UH-1 utility helicopters to the drug interdiction and counterdrug program. During the fiscal year, the Army Reserve conducted the following types of missions: transporting law enforcement agents; providing intelligence analysis; manning listening posts and providing ground surveillance radar support along the southwestern United States border with Mexico; constructing listening and observation posts; repairing border fences; constructing roads and helopads in remote areas; training law enforcement agents on computer systems, first aid, and maintenance of military equipment; and providing linguistic support.

During fiscal year 1991, over 50 Naval Reserve surface units and aviation squadrons consisting of over 4,200 Naval Reservists participated in joint force operations in the drug interdiction and counterdrug program. This support consisted of aerial and surface patrols and watchstanding by intelligence personnel. The Naval Air Reserve increased their participation by over 1,400 flight hours compared to fiscal year 1990. In fiscal year 1991, over 4,100 hours were flown in support of the counterdrug mission which represented 13 percent of the Navy's total counterdrug flight hours. Naval Reserve Force ships steamed 207 days and provided 10,914 mandays.

The Marine Corps Reserve expended 6,399 mandays, 745 inactive duty training periods, and 341 flight hours in support of the drug interdiction and counterdrug program. Typical missions of Marine Corps Reservists were manning listening and observation posts, and employment of sensors.



The Air Force Reserve provided 7,730 mandays and over 1,000 flying hours to the war against illegal drugs. These resources represent the efforts of 689 aircrew members, civil engineers, security police, para-rescue, and mobile training team instructors involved in providing training to drug law enforcement agencies, operational support, and joint operations with civilian drug law enforcement agencies.

The Coast Guard Reserve provided 3,310 mandays of law enforcement program support in the drug interdiction and counterdrug program. Twenty-two Coast Guard Reservists participated in law enforcement activities while on temporary active duty, ten of whom participated in a 4-month Pan American Law Enforcement operation. Coast Guard Reserve members provided law enforcement support as a routine augmentation function throughout the year.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that participation by the Reserve components in the drug interdiction and counterdrug program be sufficiently funded so as not to interfere with the training and readiness requirements of the Reserve units and members involved.*

## **Training the Individual Ready Reserve**

Individual Ready Reserve training policy is a function of mobilization manpower requirements of the Active components and available resources. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force called upon their Individual Ready Reserves to provide manpower assets in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Most of the of training provided to Army Reserve members of the individual Ready Reserve was professional military education, to fulfill military education requirements. Other types of training included participation in exercises, counterpart training for specific military occupational specialties, language training, and technical training. Approximately 9,300 members of the Individual Ready Reserve received training during fiscal year 1991.

Use of active duty training periods continues to be the primary means of maintaining and upgrading Individual Ready Reserve skills in the Naval Reserve. Training is conducted at commands with sufficient resources to use the skills of the Individual Ready Reservist. Priority is given to enlisted Individual Ready Reservists receiving reenlistment bonuses or who are in bonus-eligible ratings and medical specialties. Correspondence courses and continuing medical education are secondary means of maintaining skills. During the fiscal year, 592 Individual Ready Reservists received training. The number receiving training represents approximately one percent of the Navy's Individual Ready Reserve.

Members of the Marine Corps Reserve's Individual Ready Reserve received skill training through the Reserve Counterpart Training program. Assigned Individual Ready Reservists performed at least two weeks of training in their military occupational specialty with the Active component. Because of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, only 727 Individual Ready Reservists participated in the program, which normally provides training for 1,300 to 1,500 Marines annually.

The Air Force Reserve did not conduct Individual Ready Reserve skill training during fiscal year 1991, nor are there any plans to conduct Individual Ready Reserve training in fiscal year 1992.

The Coast Guard Reserve was not funded to provide training to the Individual Ready Reserve.

*The Board recommends that the Active and Reserve components review policies regarding training of the Individual Ready Reserve in light of lessons learned during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and that the Reserve components increase opportunities to participate in skill retention training for those enlisted members of the Individual Ready Reserve, who possess military skills which are considered critical in the Active component or Selected Reserve.*

### **Individual Ready Reserve Training Units**

Reinforcement training units, voluntary training units, and mobilization training units provide opportunities for members of the Individual Ready Reserve and active status Standby Reserve to participate in Reserve component training. Most members of these units are senior officers and noncommissioned officers for whom positions in the Selected Reserve have become limited. These Reservists are attached to such units under competent orders, participate voluntarily in a nonpay status, and receive Reserve retirement credit points for their participation. The Army and Air National Guards do not have an Individual Ready Reserve.

About 300 reinforcement training units were active in the Army Reserve during the fiscal year. A new reinforcement training unit was activated on Kwajalein during the year. Over 3,000 Army Reserve soldiers were members of these reinforcement training units, which performed a broad range of Army functional missions to include language study, military intelligence, judge advocate general, logistics, marksmanship, research and development, and civil affairs.

The mission of Naval Reserve voluntary training units is to provide, in the event of war, national emergency and/or when otherwise authorized by law, qualified Individual Ready Reservists to meet the mobilization needs of the Navy in excess of those met by the Selected Reserve. During the fiscal year, 4,526 Individual Ready Reservists were affiliated with 347 voluntary training units whose functions correlated directly with specific program affiliations, including general support, supply systems, chaplain, research, security, intelligence, medical, construction force, law, support to Allies, and air systems.

The Marine Corps Reserve had 850 Individual Ready Reservists affiliated with 72 mobilization training units at the end of the fiscal year. Mobilization training units fulfilled a number of functions to include providing exercise control, historical research, wargaming support, training support for Selected Reserve ground units, legal assistance for Active and Reserve component personnel, public affairs support, and general support to Reserve Support Units, Active component bases and stations, and recruiting districts.

During the fiscal year, the Air Force Reserve had six reinforcement training units comprised of 1,545 Individual Ready Reservists who performed their training individually, but who were administratively managed under traditional unit configurations. Some Individual Ready Reservists participated in a joint Reserve training unit which supported training exercises of various joint commands. Missions performed by other reinforcement training units included ministry, medical, legal, personnel, officer programs liaison, and Civil Air Patrol assistance support.

There were 15 Coast Guard Reserve voluntary training units with 191 Individual Ready Reserve members during the fiscal year. Members of the voluntary training units were senior officers who provided the Area and District Commanders with research and analysis support, as well as serving as senior watch officers.

*The Board recommends that the Reserve components actively encourage participation*

*by Individual Ready Reserve officers and enlisted personnel in reinforcement, voluntary, and mobilization training units to take advantage of the vast amount of knowledge and experience resident in the Individual Ready Reserve.*

### **Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps**

The Secretary of each Military Department is authorized by 10 USC 2102 to establish and maintain a Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (SROTC) program, at any accredited civilian educational institution authorized to grant baccalaureate degrees, for the purpose of preparing selected students for commissioned service in the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps. Programs may also be established at any school essentially military that does not confer baccalaureate degrees, upon the request of the authorities at that institution.

The 75th anniversary of the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program, created when President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act of 1916, was celebrated during 1991. Currently, SROTC programs graduates comprise more than 60 percent of the Active component officers in the Army, 30 percent of the unrestricted line officers of the Navy, 41 percent in the Air Force, and 18 percent in the Marine Corps. The SROTC programs also provide officer leadership to the Reserve components. Significant numbers of graduates are assigned to Army Reserve and Army National Guard units directly after commissioning, while others affiliate with the Naval Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Marine Corps Reserve after completing their mandatory active duty obligations.

Participation in the various programs is reflected in Table 5-4.

**Table 5-4**  
**SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS PROGRAM**  
**Units and Members**

<b><u>Military Department</u></b>	<b><u>FY89</u></b>	<b><u>FY90</u></b>	<b><u>FY91</u></b>	<b><u>Projected FY92</u></b>
<b>Army</b>				
Units	416	413	413	350
Members	60,021	55,432	42,546	41,000
<b>Navy</b>				
Units	66	66	66	66
Navy Options Members	8,799	8,297	7,804	6,858
Marine Option Members	2,063	1,612	1,433	1,142
<b>Air Force</b>				
Units	151	148	149	147
Members	19,549	20,178	16,167	12,800
<b>Total</b>				
Units	633	627	628	563
Members	90,432	85,519	67,950	61,800

Source: The Services  
Data as of September 30, 1991

As shown in Table 5-5, the Secretary of the each Military Department supports the program by assigning Active and Reserve component members under his jurisdiction for instructional and administrative duties at educational institutions where units of the program are maintained.

Active component Operations and Maintenance funds support scholarships, training, summer camp operations, automation, and national/local advertising. Reserve component Personnel funds support all member entitlements, i.e., subsistence, travel, pay and allowances, and uniforms. Table 5-6 reflects funding for the programs.



**Table 5-5**  
**SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS PROGRAM**  
**Administrative/Instructional Personnel**

<b>Military Department</b>	<b><u>FY89</u></b>	<b><u>FY90</u></b>	<b><u>FY91</u></b>	<b>Projected <u>FY92</u></b>
<b>Army</b>				
Active	3,062	2,947	2,770	2,378
Reserve	575	553	490	311
<b>Navy</b>				
Navy Active	578	588	598	576
Reserve	2	2	2	2
Marine Active	132	132	129	131
Reserve	0	0	0	0
<b>Air Force</b>				
Active	1,038	982	916	852
Reserve	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>				
Active	4,810	4,649	4,413	3,937
Reserve	577	555	492	313

Source The Services  
Data as of September 30, 1991

**Table 5-6**  
**FUNDING FOR SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS PROGRAM**  
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Military Department Funding Accounts</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>	<u>Projected FY92</u>
<b>Army</b>				
Operations and Maintenance	84.0	113.0	117.0	100.0
Reserve Personnel	44.0	41.0	33.0	36.0
<b>Navy</b>				
Operations and Maintenance	53.4	55.7	54.8	55.2
Reserve Personnel	17.1	16.7	15.8	15.6
<b>Air Force</b>				
Operations and Maintenance	36.7	36.5	32.9	25.9
Reserve Personnel	16.1	15.3	11.7	13.8
<b>Total</b>				
Operations and Maintenance	174.1	205.2	204.7	181.1
Reserve Personnel	77.2	73.0	60.5	65.4

Source: The Services.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

*The Board recommends the continued funding and support of the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs which provide citizens of all backgrounds the opportunity, on a competitive scholarship basis, not only to obtain a college education, but to serve in the military.*

#### **Programs to Improve Mobilization and Combat Readiness**

New missions, new readiness criteria, and new force mix and force structure requirements present unique training challenges. These challenges demand increased efficiency and effectiveness throughout Reserve training programs to meet mobilization readiness goals.

The Army National Guard has a program designed to bring all units to the highest state of readiness consistent with resourcing. A key factor in overall improvements has been fixing

and managing units. While emphasis is placed on personnel, all resource areas are intensively managed. Gains were accomplished during a period in which 398 Army National Guard units were called up in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Overall resource and training levels for the Army National Guard continued to increase in fiscal year 1991, in spite of extensive personnel and equipment transfers to Army National Guard units in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM identified areas for improvement in the Army Reserve's mobilization readiness. Regulation and technical manual changes have been made to improve visibility of shortages. To reduce personnel status turbulence and loss of unit cohesion caused by cross-leveling, high priority units have been targeted for selective overstrength. Initiatives providing early access to the Individual Ready Reserve and changes

in the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program, to include legal authority for early call-up, have been proposed.

The Naval Reserve was an active participant in the Navy's effort to identify Active missions that could be placed in the Naval Reserve. The transfer of forty FF-1052 Knox-class frigates into the Naval Reserve as FFT-1052s, under the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept, has begun. Eight of these frigates will serve as training platforms and be ready to get under way within 24 to 48 hours. As training platforms during peacetime, the frigates will train their own crews and the crews for the remaining 32 frigates, which will be maintained in a reduced status able to get under way within 180 days.

The Marine Corps Reserve's 4th Marine Division planned and implemented programs in the areas of wargaming, staff functioning at the regimental and battalion levels, enhanced mobilization operational readiness deployment test and commanding general inspection events, and a program to reduce the administrative burden of processing of fiscal documents. The incorporation of aircraft armament equipment status into weekly aircraft material readiness reports enhanced the ability to mobilize Marine Corps Reserve aviation units during a period when insufficient quantities of aircraft armament equipment were available to meet full mobilization aircraft configuration requirements. New minimum training allowance stock levels for all Marine Corps Reserve aviation unit sites were also established, providing unit commanders more resources and flexibility in training.

The Air National Guard maintained a 99.7 percent combat-ready force by utilizing standards set by the gaining major commands.

The Air Force Reserve Ground Combat Readiness Center was established to provide ground combat skills training for security police personnel on an initial and continuing basis. Also, through a combined program of regular training and periodic exercise participation, Air Force Reserve units maintained a high state of combat readiness

and were ready to mobilize for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Coast Guard Reserve has mobilization responsibility in all Coast Guard missions. Augmentation of Active component commands was the primary mode of Reserve training and continued to be the most effective way to maintain mobilization and readiness levels.

### **Mobilization and Combat Readiness Exercise and Evaluation Programs**

Reserve component mobilization and combat readiness are exercised and evaluated through various Service-specific programs. The Reserve components conducted the following mobilization and combat readiness exercise and evaluation programs during fiscal year 1991.

All Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, with few exceptions, are required to receive a formal annual training evaluation, which is submitted at the end of the annual training period. A Force Assessment model is under development to provide objective, real-time, Reserve component unit training evaluations. During the fiscal year, about 3,000 Reserve component units received annual training evaluations, which was less than normal because units mobilized in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM were excused from evaluations.

Over 200 Army National Guard and Army Reserve component units, either units or cells, deployed on overseas training. There were two major exercises in which Reserve component units exercised mobilization procedures. About 50 Reserve component units normally participate in Exercise OPTIMAL FOCUS and a joint mobilization exercise, however, both were cancelled due to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

All Naval Reserve unit and Reserve center commanders are tasked with monitoring subordinate commands/units to ensure they have incorporated mobilization training into their consolidated training program. All augmentation and commissioned units





conducted at least an annual notification exercise to ensure members were thoroughly indoctrinated in mobilization procedures. All Naval Reserve unit and Reserve center commanders annually scheduled, conducted, monitored, and reported a complete mobilization exercise schedule. At a minimum, these exercises included a telephone recall, Reserve Training Support System reporting procedural test, simulated exercise of transportation, messing, and berthing, and the receiving and processing of personnel. Mobilization readiness of augmentation units is based on personnel and training readiness and reported to higher echelons as Individual Readiness Assessment Designators codes. Reserve air wing commanders conducted recall/mobilization exercises during annual squadron inspections/visits. All exercises were determined to be satisfactory in accordance with guidelines for mobilization/combat readiness.

All Marine Corps Reserve units are evaluated by Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Tests, battalion command operations center exercises, battalion field exercises, company field exercises, command post exercises, combined arms exercises, and Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System tests. Forty Reserve units were evaluated in the fiscal year, with 39 units being found to be mission-capable.

The Air National Guard relies upon major command standards for measuring and testing unit combat readiness and mobilization. Units participate in exercises to demonstrate

mobilization readiness. The only program in which standards are set by Air National Guard is for operational support airlift. These aircraft are small in number and assigned only to the Air National Guard. During the fiscal year, 119 major mobilization and combat readiness inspections of Air National Guard flying and mission support units were conducted with a 100 percent pass rate.

In the Air Force Reserve, each unit is required to have a mobilization plan, which is evaluated during exercises and operational readiness inspections, and includes a no-notice telephone alert/recall. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve, on occasion, are required to report to a specific military location as if actual mobilization had occurred, with physicals being administered and records reviewed. The Air Reserve Personnel Center also conducted quarterly tests of the personnel data system. Operational readiness, management-effectiveness inspections, and unit experience at exercises, competitions and deployments provide the Air Force Reserve a reliable gauge for evaluating units.

The Coast Guard Exercise Program is the principal means for evaluating the Coast Guard Reserve's mobilization and combat readiness. This program involves participation in command post exercises, field or fleet training exercises, and mobilization exercises. The program calls for post-exercise evaluation reports, data collection, critique items, and lessons learned. Twenty exercises were planned and executed in the fiscal year with 2,854 Reservists participating. These exercises revealed that a large number of unfilled mobilization billets exist in the Coast Guard's Mobilization System. Also, the Maintenance and Logistics Commands, relatively new organizations, had no assessment of their mobilization needs during a large scale mobilization.

*The Board recommends that the Active and Reserve components take advantage of the lessons learned in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM to enhance mobilization and combat readiness exercise and evaluation programs to improve mobilization and combat readiness.*

## Factors Limiting Mobilization Readiness

The Reserve components achieved an unprecedented level of readiness in fiscal year 1991. However, all Reserve components acknowledge that further improvement is needed.

The major factors limiting readiness for the Army National Guard were personnel and equipment. From the beginning of fiscal year through Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, personnel strength increased by one percent, while the number military occupational specialty-trained personnel remained constant. Challenges remain in sustaining military occupational specialty qualification in certain technical skills that require long training periods. Training in these specialties is difficult for Army National Guard members because of the length of Army courses, civilian job conflicts, and family responsibilities. Recruiting and retention of medical professionals continues to be a priority. Specialists, such as anesthesiologists, general surgeons, orthopedic, and thoracic surgeons, and nurse anesthetists are in short supply. Equipment on-hand increased by one percent in spite of cross-leveling actions during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. However, equipment shortages still persist. Receipt of equipment from programmed Army procurement and Congressionally-dedicated procurement appropriations improved the Army National Guard's posture. Despite these gains, there remains a shortfall in equipment with critical shortages in combat support equipment. These critical shortages include tactical vehicles, tactical radios, and test measuring and diagnostic equipment.

Primary factors limiting mobilization readiness of Army Reserve units were in the areas of personnel and equipment. Personnel shortages were offset by cross-leveling between units. In equipment, the Army Reserve was resourced to 62 percent of requirements at the end of fiscal year 1991. This lack of equipment necessitated cross-leveling among units, diversion of new production to called up units and/or pooled war stocks in the continental United States and Southwest Asia,

and lack of accurate reporting of certain categories of equipment. Restoring and improving equipment status was complicated by units returning from call-up without their equipment. Returned equipment being in less than serviceable condition, shortage of some class IX spares for repairs, and lengthy wait for repair dates all affect the equipment status of Army Reserve units.

Factors that limited Naval Reserve readiness included billet instability, unattainable or unrealistic training requirements imposed by the Active component gaining command, and skill/billet mismatches due to a geographically-mobile Selected Reserve. Lack of mobilization skill training was the major factor limiting mobilization readiness in the Individual Ready Reserve. Less than one percent of the Individual Ready Reserve population received refresher training in the fiscal year.

Mobilization readiness in the Marine Corps Reserve was limited by the following factors: invalid addresses and telephone numbers in the Reserve Manpower Management Pay System; incorrect information in records of emergency data; inadequate individual uniform fit, serviceability, and quantity; Marine Corps Reserve aviation UH-1 aircraft only partially mission-capable due to system problems with the GAU-17 mini-gun; pooling of aircraft armament equipment assets, controlled by the Naval Air Reserve Force at host Naval Air Stations; an equipment value deficit of over \$174 million in individual materiel readiness list equipment; Reserve sites holding table of allowance vice storing table of organization and equipment; inability to transfer equipment to receiving command without losing previous maintenance/supply history; and Naval Reserve hospital corpsmen assigned to mobilizing units not being mobilized simultaneously with the unit.

A factor limiting mobilization readiness in the Air National Guard was the compression of specialty and proficiency training time during unit training assemblies and inactive duty training periods, when Air National Guard members are required to satisfy recurrent ancillary training and associated administrative military requirements. Additionally, shortfalls



in procuring and maintaining required equipment items for training may also have been a factor limiting mobilization readiness within Reserve components.

Mobilization readiness in the Air Force Reserve was impacted by three factors: the unplanned use of volunteers, incomplete message distribution, and a mismatch between peacetime training and wartime utilization. The use of volunteers fragmented the source unit combat capabilities and created a snowball effect for further call-ups. In order to reestablish whole unit capability, further fragmentation of other units was required. Incomplete message distribution for policy guidance resulted in slow dissemination of policy and information. In some cases there were significant disparities between peacetime training and major command directed-wartime utilization. For example, civil engineers, trained for wartime deployment, were tasked for peacetime base facility management and utilized in continental United States backfill roles. Intelligence-trained Individual Mobilization Augmentees were employed in positions other than their assigned wartime position. The intelligence community found its personnel and equipment fragmented. These factors did not preclude timely mobilization, but did impact effectiveness and smooth flow.

The Coast Guard Reserve reported that unit administration remained a major drain on training and mobilization readiness. Twenty-

nine percent of all inactive duty training period time was devoted to unit administration. Lack of Full-Time Support resources constrained the Coast Guard Reserve's ability to support Reserve units.

*The Board recommends that the Active and Reserve components take appropriate action to correct those factors identified during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM as being limiters to Reserve component mobilization readiness.*

### **Physical Fitness**

The physical fitness of Reserve component members directly impacts on the combat and mobilization readiness of their Reserve component units. Some Reserve components experienced problems with members not being able to meet established physical fitness levels when called up for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The importance of physical fitness to mobilization readiness must continue to be stressed, especially in view of the increased reliance on the Reserve components to serve in operational missions. Physical fitness is essential to combat readiness.

*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that physical fitness of Reserve component members continue to receive strong leadership attention.*

### **10 USC 673b Call-Up (Selected Reserve Call-Up)**

Using the Presidential Selected Reserve call-up authority under 10 USC 673b, the President may activate not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve involuntarily, for not more than 90 days, without declaring a national emergency. The President may use this authority when he determines it necessary to augment Active component forces for an operational mission. The President may extend the original 90-day period for not more than an additional 90 days in the interest of national security. Whenever the President exercises this authority, the Congress must be notified within 24 hours and provided with

reasons for the action. The service of units so called up may be terminated by order of the President or law.

On August 22, 1990, the President, determined it was necessary to augment the Active components of the United States for the effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula, and authorized the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation to call up units and individual members of the Selected Reserve not assigned to units.

On November 5, 1990, Congress passed the 1991 Appropriations Act, which included authority for the President to call up Selected Reserve combat units for 180 days with a 180-day extension for Operation DESERT SHIELD, only.

On November 13, 1990, the President authorized the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation to extend the period of active duty, for the Selected Reserves, an additional 90 days, for a total of 180 days.

*The Board reaffirms its support of the decision to exercise the Presidential Selected Reserve call-up authority under 10 USC 673b in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD.*

Secretaries' of Defense and Transportation authorizations to the individual Services to call up Selected Reservists are summarized in Table 5-7.

Tables 5-8 through 5-10 reflect the progression of Selected Reserve units and individuals on active duty under the authority of 10 USC 673b.

**Table 5-7**  
**SELECTED RESERVE AUTHORIZATIONS**  
**Under 10 USC 673b**

<u>Service</u>	<u>SECDEF Memo Aug. 23, 1990</u>	<u>SECDEF Memo Aug. 24, 1990</u>	<u>DEP SECDEF Memo Nov. 9, 1990</u>	<u>SECDEF Memo Nov. 14, 1990</u>	<u>SECDEF Memo Dec 1, 1990</u>
Army	25,000 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	80,000	115,000
Navy	6,300	-	10,000	10,000	30,000
Marine Corps	3,000	-	-	15,000	23,000
Air Force	14,500	-	-	20,000	20,000
Coast Guard	-	1,250	-	-	-
Cumulative Total as of memo date	48,800	50,050	53,750	126,250	189,250

Note 1 The Army authorized call-up of Reserve component combat support and combat service support units only

Source: The Reserve components

Data as of September 30, 1991

**Table 5-8**  
**SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP UNDER 10 USC 673b**  
**(As of November 12, 1990)**

Reserve Component	Number Authorized	Units/ Personnel	Individual Members		Percentage of Authorized	
			Not Assigned to Units	Total Personnel	Used	
Army National Guard } Army Reserve	25,000	91/ 9,102	107	9,209	97	
		145/ 14,567	523	15,099		
Naval Reserve	10,000	7/ 340	4,272	4,612	46	
Marine Corps Reserve	3,000	3/ 192	29	221	7	
Air National Guard } Air Force Reserve	14,500	7/ 820	0	820	32	
		24/ 3,779	52	3,831		
Coast Guard Reserve	1,250	3/ 279	652	931	74	
Total	53,750	280/ 29,079	5,635	34,723	65	

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

In response to a letter from a member of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, which expressed concern over the decision not to initially authorize the call-up of Army Selected Reserve combat units, the Secretary of Defense stated: "To date, I have not authorized the call-up of Army combat units for Operation DESERT SHIELD for two reasons. First, my senior military advisers have not advised me that the call-up of such units is necessary at this time. Secondly, the statutory time limits on the use of Selected Reserve units imposes artificial constraints on their employment." Following the legislative authorization in the 1991 Appropriations Act to call Reserve component combat units for 180 days, the Army National Guard's three roundout brigades were activated, and following planned post-mobilization training, met the Army's deployability criteria. They were not deployed, however, because the war ended before deployment was accomplished.

*The following statement, which was adopted by the Board at its special meeting on August 27, 1990, is reaffirmed:*

*"The Board recognizes constraining factors such as logistics, transportation, and*

*operational requirements, but is pleased that consideration is being given to calling up roundout combat elements. Roundout elements train under plans to be part of their parent unit under the Total Force Policy, and consider themselves an integral part of the unit. Failure to call Reserve component roundout units, with appropriate readiness ratings, may create the impression of lack of confidence in the Reserve component units and the roundout policy. If the decision is made not to utilize certain roundout units, the reasons should be explained in order to minimize adverse impacts."*

The call-up of the Marine Corps Reserve affirmed the Commandant of the Marine Corps' Total Force concept. The ability to respond to several crises simultaneously, while maintaining a worldwide presence, requires a Marine Corps of three Active Marine Expeditionary Forces. While not required for initial crisis response, the Marine Corps Reserve is necessary to provide a sustainment and reinforcement base for extended operations beyond 60 days. Within eight days of the invasion of Kuwait, the first active duty Marine Corps elements deployed to Southwest Asia. The call-up of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve commenced 60 days later, on October 10, 1990.

**Table 5-9**  
**SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP UNDER 10 USC 673b**  
**(As of November 30, 1990)**

<u>Reserve Component</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>Units/ Personnel</u>	<u>Individual Members Not Assigned to Units</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Percentage of Authorized Used</u>
Army National Guard } Army Reserve }	80,000	231/ 36,689 306/ 30,474	109 523	36,798 30,997	85
Naval Reserve	10,000	11/ 2,266	4,535	6,801	68
Marine Corps Reserve	15,000	160/ 14,751	321	15,072	100
Air National Guard } Air Force Reserve }	20,000	10/ 997 31/ 4,480	0 318	997 4,798	29
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>1,250</u>	<u>3/ 279</u>	<u>934</u>	<u>1,223</u>	<u>98</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>126,250</b>	<b>752/ 89,936</b>	<b>6,740</b>	<b>96,686</b>	<b>77</b>

Source: The Reserve components.  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 5-10**  
**SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP UNDER 10 USC 673b**  
**(As of January 17, 1991)**

<u>Reserve Component</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>Units/ Personnel</u>	<u>Individual Members Not Assigned to Units</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Percentage of Authorized Used</u>
Army National Guard } Army Reserve }	115,000	341/ 55,664 525/ 56,362	218 660	55,882 57,022	98
Naval Reserve	30,000	20/ 5,482	6,888	12,370	41
Marine Corps Reserve	23,000	210/ 17,836	212	18,048	78
Air National Guard } Air Force Reserve }	20,000	108/ 5,960 90/ 9,978	0 499	5,960 10,477	82
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>1,250</u>	<u>3/ 279</u>	<u>1,409</u>	<u>1,688</u>	<u>135</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>189,250</b>	<b>1,297/151,561</b>	<b>9,886</b>	<b>161,447</b>	<b>85</b>

Source: The Reserve components.  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

## 10 USC 673 Call-Up

Partial mobilization under 10 USC 673 permits the President to expand Active component forces by mobilizing not more than one million Ready Reserve personnel and units and members of the Individual Ready Reserve for up to two years. Partial mobilization is initiated by a Presidential proclamation of a national emergency, and subsequent notification of the Congress.

On January 19, and January 24, 1991, respectively, pursuant to Title 10 USC 673, Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act, and the Executive Order of January 18, 1991, entitled "Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty," the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation authorized the call-up of Ready Reserve units, and individual members not assigned to units organized to serve as units, within the limitations shown in Table 5-11.

Table 5-12 reflects the number of Ready Reserve units and individual members of the Reserve components who were on active duty pursuant to 10 USC 673, as of March 31, 1991.

Members of the Ready Reserve, called up as of March 31, 1991, were utilized in the geographical locations shown in Table 5-13.

**Table 5-11**  
**READY RESERVE AUTHORIZATIONS**  
**Under 10 USC 673**

	SECDEF Memo Jan 19, 1991	SECDEF Memo Jan 24, 1991
Army	220,000	
Navy	44,000	
Marine Corps	44,000	
Air Force	52,000	
DoD Total		
Coast Guard		
On Active Duty		
Under 10 USC 673b		1,688
Additional		300
Total	360,000	1,988
Cumulative Total		361,988

Source: The Reserve components  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 5-12**  
**READY RESERVE CALL-UP UNDER 10 USC 673**  
**(As of March 31, 1991)**

Reserve Component	Number Authorized	SelRes Units/ Personnel	SelRes/IRR Indiv Mbr Not Assigned to Units	Total Personnel	Percent of Authority Used
Army National Guard } Army Reserve }	220,000	398/ 62,411 643/ 64,049	987/ NA 1,558/ 13,170	63,398 } 78,777 }	65
Naval Reserve	44,000	26/ 6,172	12,652/ 15	18,839	43
Marine Corps Reserve	44,000	250/ 23,334	798/ 3,538	27,670	63
Air National Guard } Air Force Reserve }	52,000	121/ 12,000 257/ 19,469	0/ NA 2,242/ 825	12,000 } 22,536 }	66
Coast Guard Reserve	1,988	3/ 279	1,409/ 0	1,688	85
<b>Total</b>	<b>361,988</b>	<b>1,698/ 187,714</b>	<b>19,646/ 17,548</b>	<b>224,908</b>	<b>62</b>

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 5-13**  
**UTILIZATION OF READY RESERVE PERSONNEL**  
**BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION**  
**(As of March 31, 1991)**

<u>Ready Reserve Personnel</u>	<u>Number Deployed to Southwest Asia</u>	<u>Number Deployed in CONUS</u>	<u>Number Deployed OCONUS (Not Southwest Asia)</u>
Army National Guard	37,447	22,520	3,431
Army Reserve	39,668	29,063	10,046
Naval Reserve	6,655	9,478	2,706
Marine Corps Reserve	11,815	13,835	2,020
Air National Guard	2,020	7,008	2,972
Air Force Reserve	6,886	12,158	3,492
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>279</u>	<u>1,409</u>	<u>0</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>104,770</b>	<b>95,471</b>	<b>24,667</b>

Source: The Reserve components.  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

More than 900 members of the Ready Reserve called up in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM also participated in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the humanitarian relief of the Iraqi Kurds. Eighty members of the Army National Guard provided medical, engineer, public affairs, and linguistic support. Public affairs, supply and services, and civil affairs support were provided by 655 Army Reserve soldiers. Twenty-one members of the Marine Corps Reserve provided civil affairs, public affairs, and linguistic support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The Air National Guard had 7 C-130 aircraft and 63 aircrew persons involved in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Air Force Reservists provided airlift and airdrop of supplies to refugees.

Eight hundred and eighty-two members of Marine Corps Reserve called up in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and under the operational control of the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade also participated in Operation SEA ANGEL, the humanitarian relief of the Bangladeshi cyclone survivors.

Table 5-14 reflects the numbers of Ready Reserve units and individual members of the Reserve components that were still on active duty pursuant to Title 10 USC 673, as of June 30, 1991.

Members of the Ready Reserve, who were still on active duty as of June 30, 1991, were employed in the geographical areas shown in Table 5-15.



**Table 5-14**  
**READY RESERVE CALL-UP UNDER 10 USC 673**  
**(As of June 30, 1991)**

<u>Reserve Component</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>SelRes Units/ Personnel</u>	<u>SelRes/IRR Indiv Mbr Not Assigned to Units</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Percent of Authority Used</u>
Army National Guard } Army Reserve }	220,000	71/ 11,154 98/ 11,298	662/ NA 0/ 1,468	11,816 } 12,766 }	11
Naval Reserve	44,000	5/ 781	1,520/ 0	2,301	5
Marine Corps Reserve	44,000	10/ 5,955	228/ 435	6,618	15
Air National Guard } Air Force Reserve }	52,000	56/ 2,178 209/ 8,012	0/ NA 414/ 44	2,178 } 8,470 }	20
Coast Guard Reserve	1,988	0/ 0	0/ 37	37	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>361,988</b>	<b>449/ 39,378</b>	<b>2,824/ 1,984</b>	<b>44,186</b>	<b>12</b>

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 5-15**  
**UTILIZATION OF READY RESERVE PERSONNEL**  
**BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION**  
**(As of June 30, 1991)**

<u>Ready Reserve Personnel</u>	<u>Number Deployed to Southwest Asia</u>	<u>Number Deployed in CONUS</u>	<u>Number Deployed OCONUS (Not Southwest Asia)</u>
Army National Guard	8,304	3,201	311
Army Reserve	5,305	7,461	0
Naval Reserve	127	1,760	414
Marine Corps Reserve	15	4,109	2,494
Air National Guard	43	2,009	126
Air Force Reserve	456	8,014	0
Coast Guard Reserve	0	37	0
	<b>14,250</b>	<b>26,591</b>	<b>3,345</b>

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

Members of the Ready Reserve, who were still on active duty as of June 30, 1991, were providing the following types of support:

Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers provided medical, transportation, finance, supply, maintenance, security, port operations, water supply, military history, legal, graves registration, civil affairs, movement control, engineer, ambulance, and ordnance support.

Naval Reserve personnel provided medical, military sealift, control of shipping, intelligence, logistics, cargo-handling, equipment retrograde, and staff support.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel provided strategic airlift, tactical airlift, aerial port, air refueling, civil

engineering, staging, medical, special operations, security police, services, and combat communications support.

The majority of Coast Guard Reserve support functions were performed in the areas of explosive loading/offloading supervision, personnel support, and supply.

Table 5-16 reflects the numbers of Ready Reserve units and individual members of the Reserve components that were still on active duty pursuant to Title 10 USC 673, as of September 30, 1991.

Members of the Ready Reserve, who were still on active duty as of September 30, 1991, were used in the geographical locations shown in Table 5-17.

**Table 5-16**  
**READY RESERVE CALL-UP UNDER 10 USC 673**  
**(As of September 30, 1991)**

<u>Reserve Component</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>SelRes Units/ Personnel</u>	<u>SelRes/IRR Indiv Mbr Not Assigned to Units</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Percent of Authority Used</u>
Army National Guard } Army Reserve }	220,000	0/ 0 8/ 534	0/ NA 0/ 591	0 } 1,125 }	1
Naval Reserve	44,000	0/ 0	302/ 0	302	1
Marine Corps Reserve	44,000	4/ 683	24/ 84	791	2
Air National Guard } Air Force Reserve }	52,000	49/ 150 0/ 152	0/ NA 0/ 0	150 } 152 }	1
Coast Guard Reserve	1,988	0/ 0	0/ 13	13	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>361,988</b>	<b>61/ 1,519</b>	<b>326/ 688</b>	<b>2,533</b>	<b>1</b>

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 5-17**  
**UTILIZATION OF READY RESERVE PERSONNEL**  
**BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION**  
**(As of September 30, 1991)**

<b>Ready Reserve Personnel</b>	<b>Number Deployed to Southwest Asia</b>	<b>Number Deployed in CONUS</b>	<b>Number Deployed OCONUS (Not Southwest Asia)</b>
Army National Guard	0	0	0
Army Reserve	411	714	0
Naval Reserve	37	253	12
Marine Corps Reserve	8	401	382
Air National Guard	0	150	0
Air Force Reserve	0	152	0
Coast Guard Reserve	0	13	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>1,683</b>	<b>394</b>

Source: The Reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1991.

The following types of support were being provided by the members of the Ready Reserve on active duty as of September 30, 1991:

All Army National Guard soldiers activated under 10 USC 673 had been released from active duty by September 30, 1991. 2,514 Army National Guard soldiers were voluntarily serving on active duty in locations in the continental U.S., Southwest Asia, and Europe to meet operational requirements. These volunteers provided aviation support, assistance in retrograde operations, redeployment of equipment, maintenance, and security.

Army Reserve soldiers provided transportation and port terminal operations support.

Naval Reserve personnel provided medical, military sealift, logistics, cargo-handling, and staff support.

Marine Corps Reserve members overseas were in the unit deployment program and in

Southwest Asia reconstituting Marine Corps equipment. Members in the continental United States were supporting the demobilization effort.

Air National Guard personnel were at home stations on either hardship extensions or medical holds.

Air Force Reserve members were on active duty for medical, hardship, or administrative reasons.

The 13 Coast Guard Reserve officers and enlisted personnel still on active duty were awaiting medical evaluation.

### **Call-up Authorities**

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM marked the first time that the Presidential Selected Reserve call-up authority under 10 USC 673b was utilized. The Reserve components commented on how well these authorities worked, what problems were encountered with their implementation, and recommendations for changes.


The implementation of policies and procedures under the Presidential call-up under 10 USC 673b was confusing for the Army National Guard. Army mobilization planning documents contained assumptions, plans, and procedures to be implemented upon mobilization, but not for a Presidential call-up.

Some personnel cross-leveling was required for Army Reserve units activated under 10 USC 673b. Ideally, the Individual Ready Reserve would have been used to fill unit personnel shortages. But 10 USC 673b did not authorize call-up of members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

Under the authority of 10 USC 673, the manpower requirements of the Navy were filled. Questions involving entitlements for Naval Reservists called up under this authority required both policy changes and revised legislation.

Both 10 USC 673b and 10 USC 673 worked well as basic authorities for the Marine Corps Reserve. The challenge was in the implementation of guidance and policy that previously had not been worked to the level of detail required for execution. This methodology diluted and delayed mobilization potential. As implemented, 10 USC 673b exempted personnel who had not completed initial entry level training. These exempted personnel remained at the home training center and were not available to be placed in the training pipeline until 10 USC 673 authority was granted. Implementation of 10 USC 673 authority initially would have allowed these exempted personnel to be involuntarily called up to complete entry level training and then be available for deployment with or without their unit or in replacement drafts.

The authorities under 10 USC 673b and 10 USC 673, as exercised during the course of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, were effective in calling up Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units and individuals. Despite the short time between the notification of Reservists and their reporting dates, all operational requirements were met.



If alerted sufficiently in advance of call-up, Reserve component units can increase readiness through various actions, without causing the 90-day initial time limit of 10 USC 673b to start running. Actions that could be considered between alert and call-up include:

- Available training days can be increased by scheduling additional inactive duty training periods, and, shifting resources to allow additional training periods and additional flying and flight training periods.
- Priority can be given to alerted units for school quotas for necessary skill training, and for use of other training facilities and resources.
- Personnel and equipment can be cross-leveled.
- Supply priority of alerted units can be increased to ensure adequate repair parts, and to bring materiel stocks up to required readiness levels.
- Resources can be shifted to support increased flight hours, steaming time, and vehicle operating mileage.
- Additional funding support can be provided for State Area Commands to assist in mobilization activities for called-up units.

To the maximum extent possible, the Board believes Reserve component units should be called up under 10 USC 673b as complete units to maintain unit integrity and readiness. There may be occasions when the entire unit may not be needed. However, the Board expressed concern that calling unit cells, rather than complete units, was a departure from a long-standing understanding that Reserve component units would be called up to serve only as units. Unit members have been recruited with that understanding.

The Department of Defense published guidance concerning the call-up of members of the Reserve components for Operations DESERT SHIELD /STORM under 10 USC 673b and 10 USC 673. The Services also had implementing policies and procedures. Service policies and procedures differed; some differences may have been soundly based in Service-unique requirements and needs. Service differences were noted in the following areas: single parents, pregnant members, HIV-positive members, and reporting times. At the time, the Board felt that since testing HIV-positive resulted in ineligibility for deployment, Reserve component members testing HIV-positive should be separated from the Service. While Service commanders were authorized to permit a delay in reporting up to 30 days, reporting times varied from 3 days to 30 days following notification. Policies and procedures regarding the call-up of Reserve component members is an area where greater uniformity between Services may be desirable.

The Board learned that some Reserve component units, which were organized and trained during peacetime to augment Active component forces upon mobilization, were not used as planned; and that Active component provisional organizations were formed after commencement of operations in-theater, and utilized to perform missions that Reserve component units had been trained for.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *whenever possible, Reserve component units with Active component affiliations be utilized as intended in support of operational missions.*

- *the Services share and review information about each other's call-up policies and procedures to develop as much uniformity as feasible.*
- *a review be conducted of existing mobilization authority legislation in order to identify amendments that should be enacted to ensure the effectiveness of future mobilizations of the Reserve components.*

*The Board reaffirms its recommendations that:*

- *Reserve component units be called up sufficiently in advance of deployment to provide for necessary training to ensure combat effectiveness and reduce casualties.*
- *that units to be called up under 10 USC 673b be alerted as far in advance of the call-up as practical so that preparations can commence.*



## **Volunteers**

Even before the President used the Presidential Selected Reserve call-up authority under 10 USC 673b, Reserve volunteers made major contributions to Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Table 5-18 reflects the number of Reserve component volunteers ordered to active duty in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM:

**Table 5-18**  
**VOLUNTEERS DURING OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM**

	<u>As of 21 Aug 1990</u>	<u>As of 12 Nov 1990</u>	<u>As of 30 Nov 1990</u>	<u>As of 17 Jan 1991</u>
Army National Guard	22	107	109	218
Army Reserve	606	3,692	3,836	3,927
Naval Reserve	0	300	348	357
Marine Corps Reserve	24	62	92	207
Air National Guard	3,000	1,950	2,359	1,289
Air Force Reserve	5,992	2,906	2,674	1,643
Coast Guard Reserve	65	652	934	1,150 (+/- 100)

	<u>As of 31 March 1991</u>	<u>As of 30 June 1991</u>	<u>As of 30 Sep 1991</u>	<u>Total Number of Volunteers</u>
Army National Guard	987	662	2,514	3,000+
Army Reserve	7,196	5,514	2,424	10,200+
Naval Reserve	360	158	16	809
Marine Corps Reserve	976	1,355	0	2,331
Air National Guard	948	340	230	10,000+
Air Force Reserve	1,078	357	0	6,000+
Coast Guard Reserve	1,150	37	13	1,200 (+/- 100)

Source: The Reserve components  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

The use of members of the Selected Reserve, unit members and Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and Individual Ready Reservists as volunteers provided needed manpower support during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The extensive use of Selected Reserve unit member volunteers caused the review of policies on the appropriateness of the use of Selected Reserve volunteers, which could have adversely impacted the readiness of later deploying Selected Reserve units from which the volunteers came.

The success of the initial deployment of troops and materiel in Operation DESERT SHIELD was due in no small part to the outstanding response of Reserve component volunteers who augmented the Active forces from the start of the operation.

Army National Guard volunteers provided medical, transportation, engineer, public affairs, signal support, security, and

equipment redeployment support. The National Guard Bureau managed cross-leveling with the states to ensure readiness of Army National Guard units was not adversely affected.

Army Reserve volunteers provided infantry, quartermaster, petroleum specialist, medical, transportation, and other types of support. The readiness of some Army Reserve units was reduced by the loss of members who volunteered from units which had not been alerted.

Before the Presidential call-up was announced, Naval Reserve volunteers provided support to a number of missions, including logistics aircraft squadrons provided to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific areas. Volunteers were involved in the breakout of Ready Reserve Fleet vessels, on-hire surveys, and out-loading of the hospital ship, USNS COMFORT. Applications for

volunteer service were not accepted from Selected Reservists assigned to commissioned units because of the possible adverse impact on those units' mobilization readiness.

Marine Corps Reserve volunteers provided support in the Marine Corps' Casualty Assistance Coordination Center; the Joint Mortuary Casualty Coordination Center, Dover Air Force Base, Delaware; casualty family assistance teams; hospital liaison teams in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France; mobilization processing centers; mobilization assistance at bases and stations; and for the Marine Corps' toll-free Family Response Line. There was very little impact on Selected Reserve unit readiness since the majority of the volunteers were limited to Individual Ready Reservists and Individual Mobilization Augmentees.

Air National Guard volunteers provided airlift, air refueling, tactical fighter, combat communications, fire fighting, security police, supply, maintenance, medical, and aeromedical support. Allowing members of Air National Guard units to volunteer did not adversely impact the Air National Guard's mission.



Within three weeks of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, almost 9,000 members of the Air Force's Reserve components were on active duty in a voluntary status. In August 1990, alone, Air Force Reserve component volunteers flew 42 percent of the Air Force's strategic airlift mission and 33 percent of the refueling mission requirements. In the initial weeks of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the Air Force could not have accomplished its strategic airlift and refueling mission requirements without relying on the availability of Reserve component volunteers. The Presidential call-up in August was the first increment of several activations of Air Force Reserve component forces. Volunteers were not necessarily activated until partial mobilization authorized larger numbers. The Military Airlift Command's portion of the Presidential call-up was insufficient to meet the airlift requirements, and therefore volunteers were still needed. Additional volunteers continued to be used from units that were not yet called up. Half of the Military Airlift Command's total airlift capability rests with the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. The force mix of missions and aircraft between the Military Airlift Command and the Air Reserve Forces have been carefully studied to provide for peacetime and contingency/wartime airlift requirements.

Coast Guard Reserve volunteers provided explosive loading supervisor, port security, and training support. None of the Coast Guard Reserve units were impacted adversely by allowing members of such units to volunteer since only the three port security units mobilize as units.

The Board was advised that Reserve component volunteers were available for tours of active duty for up to one year to support the Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM drawdown in such areas as maintenance and retrograde of deployed equipment. Qualified volunteers could be used in lieu of requiring additional involuntary call-up of Ready Reservists to provide the necessary manpower support.

*The Board reaffirms its recognition and commendation of the enormous contributions made by Reserve component volunteers in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.*

*The Board recommends that:*

- *the Services give appropriate consideration to the employment of Reserve component volunteers as an additional source of manpower during the drawdown from an operational contingency.*
- *the Active and Reserve components review their policies for the utilization of Selected Reserve unit members as volunteers when such use could adversely impact the readiness of later-deploying Selected Reserve units.*

### **Cross-leveling Impacts**

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM surfaced several issues regarding the cross-leveling of personnel between Reserve units. Cross-leveling is defined as the process of filling vacancies or replacing nondeployable members of one unit with members of another unit.

The Army National Guard cross-leveled 3,933 soldiers into other units prior to Federalization. The Army Reserve cross-leveled an even greater number. Cross-leveling was required to meet critical skill shortages in deploying units, and to fill units which were not fully manned with trained personnel. However, cross-leveling risks degradation in personnel readiness for the losing units in the event they later became candidates for mobilization. During the Presidential call-up phase of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, it became necessary to expand the involuntary cross-leveling radius for troop program unit members from 50 miles to 300 miles. In the case of medical vacancies, involuntary cross-leveling was extended nationwide. After the President declared partial mobilization, Individual Ready Reserve members became available for call-up,

relieving most unit cross-leveling requirements.

The Naval Reserve did some cross-leveling and noted that, among other issues, it was a very labor-intensive process, involving identifying nondeployables and reassigning replacements.

No cross-leveling was required in the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, or the Coast Guard Reserve.

### **Inactive Duty Training and Annual Training Period Support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM**

The Reserve component's support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM reached well beyond those Reserve units and members called up under 10 USC 673b, 10 USC 673, and those Reserve component members ordered to active duty in a voluntary status. Selected Reserve units and members provided support essential to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM during inactive duty training and annual training/active duty training periods.

Although the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve reported that they had no mechanism for capturing information on the number of inactive duty training periods expended in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, approximately 3,300 Reserve component unit members supported Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in annual training/active duty training period status performing combat support and combat service support functions.

The Naval Reserve reported that policy precluded use of Reserve Personnel Navy funds in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD after September 5, 1990. Prior to that policy decision, 196 Reservists in an annual training period status and 288 Reserve in an active duty training period status supported Operation DESERT SHIELD. After September 5, 1990, 53 Selected Reservists served in an active duty for special work status. Types of support included administrative, medical, cargo-handling, flight line support, and intelligence.



The Marine Corps Reserve reported that 728 Selected Marine Corps Reservists supported Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM performing in various support capacities in retrograde operations, base support, and in mobilization processing centers across the Nation, while in an inactive duty training or annual training/active duty training period status.

Approximately 86,000 Air National Guard members participated in direct support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in an inactive duty training and annual training/active duty training period status. Support provided during such training periods included command and control activities, mission planning, aircraft maintenance, transient aircraft maintenance, family support programs, mobility bag buildup, chemical gear inspection and buildup, equipment packing, military pay conversion, legal affairs review, mobility processing, mobilization processing, and communications systems processing.

During January 1991, a total of 1,244 Air Force Reserve unit members were supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM in an annual training or active duty training period status. While no specific data was collected on inactive duty training period participation, 46,832 Selected Reservists performed inactive duty training periods during this period, with a majority of the training supporting Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Primary areas supported were aerial port/mobile aerial port, medical, civil engineering, operations, maintenance, and security.

Exact numbers are not available, however, the Coast Guard Reserve estimates approximately 200 Reservists were involved in support to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in an inactive duty and annual training/active duty training period status. Support was primarily in the area of port safety and security.

### **Demobilization Programs**

As Reserve component participation in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM highlighted areas for attention in mobilization,

so, too, this first major demobilization in almost 40 years, identified matters for attention. Once demobilization was approved, efforts to minimize demobilization problems were quickly undertaken by the Reserve components. Each component developed special programs to facilitate the out-processing of demobilized Reservists and their transition to civilian life.

The National Guard Bureau sent a team to Southwest Asia to brief Army National Guard soldiers on benefits and procedures for redeployment and demobilization. A booklet was distributed to Family Support Centers to help families adjust and transition back to civilian life, and seminars were conducted to assist spouses in welcoming home soldiers. Information was provided to both soldiers and employers concerning re-employment rights. Guidance given to expedite outprocessing was taken literally, at demobilization stations with some soldiers receiving only cursory medical and dental exams. Some soldiers did not receive final pay and allowances until several months after release from active duty.

Authority to demobilize Naval Reservists was decentralized. Commands no longer requiring called-up Reservists were directed to request release authority from the fleet commander-in-chief or program sponsor. If no other requirement existed for the Reservist, the fleet commander-in-chief or program sponsor directed the command to release the Reservist and informed higher authorities. To facilitate demobilization, outprocessing procedures for Reservists were based on assignment and location of the Reservists' service/pay records. The release of Reservists was monitored and demobilization teams were sent to the major aerial ports of debarkation to greet returning Reservists and assist them with demobilization-related problems. These teams also provided outprocessing briefs to Reservists to inform them of their rights and benefits upon returning to civilian life.

The Reserve Transition and Recognition (RESTAR) program was established in March 1991 to provide a structure to ease the transition of Naval Reservists, who were called to active duty, back to inactive duty, and

ensure recognition for their efforts. Implementation of RESTAR involved senior-level Reservists ordered to active duty to manage the program at 31 Reserve activities throughout the Nation. These Reservists were assisted by coordinators who personally contacted and interviewed each returning Reservist and provided assistance for any problems encountered during mobilization and demobilization. A RESTAR-developed survey form was sent to every Reservist called up during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, along with a personal letter from the Commander, Naval Reserve Force, thanking each Reservist for his/her effort, and requesting input on the survey. Five thousand Reservists responded immediately to the survey, and their two most significant problems regarded pay and disruption of education for the Reservists and their families.

Reserve pay problems appear to have been a result of dissimilar Reserve and Active pay and personnel systems which required manual override of automated data processing systems and additional time to correct problems. The Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Acts of 1991 addressed the second problem by directing the Secretary of Education to encourage institutions to provide tuition refunds or credits for periods of instruction while Reserve members were on Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Marine Corps' II Marine Expeditionary Force sent an advance team to Southwest Asia to prepare Reserve members for outprocessing. Marine Corps Reserve demobilization and outprocessing was completed by centers established at major bases and stations on the East and West coasts. Members of called up Reserve units were outprocessed using the same procedures used when an Active component member is separated at the end of a contract. The processing included medical and dental evaluation, administrative records audit, and briefing on veterans benefits and reemployment rights. Personnel support for processing centers was comprised primarily of Reserve Support Unit personnel and activated unit elements. Family support programs implemented while Marine Corps Reserve

units were mobilized continued to function during the demobilization process. Welcome home planning provided for a review of the demobilization processing paperwork already in progress as well appropriate ceremonies. There were no unforeseen demobilization challenges for the Marine Corps Reserve. However, the tremendous influx of returning Marine Corps Reserve units dramatically increased demands on Military Traffic Management Command transportation services and outprocessing administration.

Once operational control of a unit was received from the Air Force, the Air National Guard ensured that all unit members received medical examinations prior to being demobilized. Also, depending upon personal or financial hardships, unit members were not demobilized until they could return to a civilian status comparable to that enjoyed prior to call-up. Each state-level Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve organization assisted those members who experienced difficulties in returning to their civilian jobs. Military lawyers and chaplains were utilized to provide advice as needed. The biggest problem experienced by Air National Guard members was that the Air National Guard called up its members for a one-year period, and Air National Guard members made arrangements with their employers accordingly. Since the mobilization was, in most cases, for only six months and in some cases less than six months, some employers did not want the Air National Guard members back immediately, because the employer made arrangements with new employees for a temporary job for that one-year period. Some of the Air National Guard members, who were self-employed, had entered into contract agreements with other people to handle their business, again, for a one-year period. The Air National Guard tried to resolve such problems, case-by-case, by considering requests for hardship extensions.

Timing for the demobilization of Air Force Reserve members and units was dependent upon the release of the Reservists by the gaining major command. Once the Reservists were released by the major command, Air Force Reserve policy required all

demobilization processing to be completed and the member released from active duty within 30 days. Exceptions to this policy were Reservists requesting hardship extensions of active duty tours, those on medical hold, and those who accrued leave and elected to take terminal leave rather than to sell leave back. Two Air Force Reserve programs were developed to aid the transition of returning Reservists. Project Homecoming Guidance Plan furnished units and operating agencies with a basic outline to insure minimum coverage of personnel requirements and local recognition ceremonies. The Demobilization Transition Counseling Program provided assistance to mobilized Air Force Reservists who lost their employment and/or employment opportunities as a result of service during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT generated ongoing requirements for Air Force Reserve forces which delayed demobilization. Active component units were substituted, wherever feasible, to allow Reservists to return home. Additionally, some stateside units retained Reservists on duty to allow Active component personnel returning from lengthy deployment to take leave. This was quickly corrected through major command direction to their units.

The demobilization of Coast Guard Reserve personnel was handled with the identical procedures used for routine release of a Reservist from active duty. Additional guidance and counseling was provided prior to release from active duty for returning port security units. Local Coast Guard district offices provided additional information, counseling, and family support services to members and family after release from active duty. No significant unexpected problems were encountered during demobilization.

Units and members of the Reserve components, called-up during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, served their Nation well. Efforts should be made to demobilize the units and members of the Reserve components expeditiously, consistent with existing operational requirements. Like-units of the Active components and Reserve volunteers should be utilized to the maximum possible to perform remaining tasks. Reserve

component units that continue to be required should be notified of projected release dates.

The Board was advised that a significant number of Reserve component members, after being called up as members of Selected Reserve units in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, were reassigned upon deployment in-theater to fill vacant positions in Active component units.

The Board believes that, subject to operational requirements, members of the Reserve components should be demobilized as soon as possible following the cessation of hostilities. The Board also believes that demobilization should be planned to the same degree of detail as mobilization, from the notification of a planned release date to the completion of outprocessing.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *development of policy guidance be made to direct combatant commands and the Active components to release mobilized Reserve component members and retirees from active duty as rapidly as possible following the end of hostilities in an operational contingency, subject to operational considerations.*
- *outprocessing procedures be institutionalized to out-process Reserve component members as quickly and efficiently as possible.*
- *to the maximum extent possible and consistent with operational requirements, Reserve component units, and the members of such units called up as units, should be reconstituted as units prior to their departure from theater.*
- *programs be established to assist the smooth transition of Reserve component members, including members of the Individual Ready Reserve and retirees, back to civilian life upon release from active duty following demobilization.*
- *all possible efforts be made to provide returning Reserve component personnel with Selected Reserve assignments after demobilization.*





# Equipment 6

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*"High quality, highly trained American troops deserve  
the very best equipment in the world."*

*General Maxwell R. Thurman, USA  
Commander-in-Chief,  
U.S. Southern Command*

## **General**

The Services have made significant progress in equipping their Reserve components in recent years. Providing modern equipment to the Reserve components has significantly increased their readiness levels and warfighting capabilities. However, shortages continue to exist which impair the ability of the Reserve components to accomplish their wartime missions.

## **Department of Defense Policy**

The Department of Defense's policy in the allocation of resources to the Total Force is governed by the "First to Fight, First to be Equipped" principle. This principle, originally recommended by the Reserve Forces Policy Board, gives manning, training, and equipping priority to early-deploying units over later-deploying units, even if the early-deploying units are Reserve forces. As a result of this policy, some Reserve units have a higher priority for manning, equipment, and training than do some Active units.

Excellent progress has been made equipping the Reserve components. However, significant equipment and spare shortages continue. Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM pointed out some problems with the "First to Fight, First to be Equipped" policy. First-to-fight units were oriented in some cases to another theater. Priorities changed and redistribution of equipment was required to equip previous low-priority units.

While the policy to prioritize equipment distribution for combat forces has worked reasonably well, priority for equipping support forces and mobilization forces has not received equal attention. This has led to equipment shortfalls in early-deploying Reserve component support forces.

The Army Equipping Policy establishes Army equipping goals. The "First to Fight, First to be Equipped" principle is only one part of this policy and is based on relative priorities. To the extent that priorities are valid, first-to-fight Army National Guard units are being equipped first. A system to measure compliance with

this principle is lacking. The Department of the Army's Master Priority List (DAMPL) and the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reports information to establish equipment requirements. In general, high DAMPL units report correspondingly high amounts of equipment on hand. Exceptions do, and will continue to exist. The Army methodology of equipping to maximize readiness status, by prioritized force packages, should eventually produce an optimally equipped Army.

During the last three years, the Army Reserve has also fielded equipment under DAMPL. Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM caused massive reprioritization of distribution of selected equipment at Army Reserve unit level. Due to operational requirements, many Army Reserve units listed high in the DAMPL priority were not mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Therefore, massive post mobilization equipment cross-leveling to low DAMPL deploying units was required.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and the "downsizing" of the Army has generated excess assets which will be redistributed using DAMPL. Presently, Army Reserve early-deploying/roundup units appear to be treated equally with Active component units with reference to equipment redistribution. New equipment procurement and deliveries in fiscal year 1991 have enhanced the Army Reserve unit capabilities and favorably impacted readiness.

Aggressive programs for equipping, upgrading, and replacing obsolete equipment are ongoing in both the ground/surface and aviation Marine and Naval Reserve communities. Elements of the Marine Reserve are fully capable of performing assigned missions with the assets they have on hand. During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, there was no degradation of operations due to Reserve support. Equipment allowances to all Naval Reserve units are assigned so that a detailed and accurate measurement of equipment status is known at all times. Naval Reserve units deployed to backfill Active component units in the Pacific and the Atlantic regions used equipment that was

already in the field. The Naval Reserve units that deployed to Southwest Asia had adequate equipment to be fully operational.

The Air Force priority system was developed to ensure that units with more critical missions were equipped first. In general, the priority assigned to Reserve component units is equivalent to the priority of their Active component counterparts. Care must be taken to insure that aircraft are not dispersed beyond the capability to support them. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are exercising caution in agreeing to accept additional transfers without the commensurate transfer of required support equipment. Program changes must include direction for equitable transfer of support equipment as well as funding for necessary new procurement. A major concern to both Reserve components is the lack of available spares and equipment to support aircraft procurement. No new Congressionally-added procurements of C-130Hs since 1986 have been supported by initial spares, equipment, and a concurrent provisioning effort.

Though Coast Guard Reserve port security units are stocked with boats, radios, and equipment necessary for their missions, the Coast Guard's general policy is to not stock equipment for mobilization requirements. Coast Guard Reserve units have very little equipment and are not scheduled to receive much additional equipment in the next few years. Mobilization equipment procurement and maintenance is the responsibility of the Active component gaining commands. In general, the Coast Guard's equipment planning philosophy tasks local and regional operational commanders with the identification and provision of the equipment necessary for augmenting Reserve component operating forces.

*The Board recommends that the "First to Fight, First to be Equipped" policy be continued and clarified to include that the first to be deployed be the first to be equipped.*

## Equipment Modernization

Equipment modernization during the past decade, including equipment redistribution and new equipment procurement, has resulted in improved Reserve component readiness and preparedness. Every effort was made during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM to ensure that all deployed units had the best equipment possible. In some cases, cross-leveling and the transfer of Reserve component equipment to Active components was necessary to ensure readiness.

Major equipment conversions in fiscal year 1991 had a positive effect on the Reserve components' ability to perform their peacetime operational missions and to prepare for their wartime missions. Continued equipment modernization of Reserve component units has increased the combat capability of the Total Force. Equipment modernization of the Reserve components enables Reserve units to be compatible with the Active component units.

Table 6-1 shows examples of Reserve component equipment conversions that occurred in fiscal year 1991.



**Table 6-1**  
**FISCAL YEAR 1991 MAJOR EQUIPMENT CONVERSIONS**

**Army National Guard**

- 2 Signal battalions received new Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE)
- 2 Units received SINCGARS communication equipment
- 2 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) units to military police units

**Army Reserve**

- 1 Helicopter company from CH-47C's to CH-47D's
- 1 Battalion from 155MM to M198 towed howitzers
- 2 Battalions from 155MM (3x6 design) to 155MM (3x8 design) self-propelled artillery
- 1 Landing Craft Utility (LCU 2000) boat transferred to Reserve
- 1 Heavy boat company from LCU 1400 class vessels to LCU 1600
- 5 Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) delivered
- 13 M1 tanks replaced M60A3's

**Naval Reserve**

- 1 Squadron from A-7E's to F/A-18's
- 1 Squadron from SH-3H's to SH-3H SLEP helicopters
- 1 Squadron completed transition to HH-60H's
- 1 Squadron commissioned with C-130T's
- 3 Squadrons from P-3B's to P-3C's
- 3 DC-9 aircraft completed conversion to C-9B configuration

**Marine Corps Reserve**

- 1 Squadron from A-4M's to F/A-18A's
- 1 Squadron from EA-6A's to EA-6B's
- 1 Squadron from OV-10A's to OV-10D's
- 1 Light anti-air missile battalion to Phase III, Block4, I-Hawks

**Air National Guard**

- 1 Squadron from A-7D's to F-16A/B's
- 1 Squadron from H-3's to MH-60G's
- 1 Squadron from C-130B's to C130H's
- 1 Squadron commissioned with eight KC-135E aircraft
- 1 Squadron commissioned with two HC-130 aircraft
- 1 Squadron commissioned with four MH-60G aircraft

**Air Force Reserve**

- 1 Squadron from F-4E's to F-16C/D's
- 1 Squadron from F-4E's to F-16A/B's
- 1 Squadron from HH/CH-3E's and HH-1H's to MH-60G's
- 3 Squadrons from F-16A/B's to F-16C/D's
- 1 Squadron from F-4D's to F16A/B's
- 5 Squadrons expanded from 8 KC-135E's to 10 KC-135E's

**Coast Guard Reserve**

- 3 Deployable Port Security units, upgraded with small equipment

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Recent Equipment Purchases and Transfers**

By having modern equipment to train on, Reserve component personnel can become familiar with the equipment they would use in combat.

Recent Reserve component major equipment purchases and transfers in fiscal year 1991 include those listed below. Some items were purchased directly from manufacturers, while other equipment was transferred directly from the Active components.

**Army National Guard**

- 63 AN/ASM-146 electronics shop shelters
- 200 AN/PVS-7B night vision goggles
- 10 Small unit support vehicles
- 41 M925A2 5-ton cargo trucks
- 24 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
- 1,025 AN/VCR-46 radios
- 134 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs)
- 16 M2/3 Infantry/Calvary Fighting vehicles
- 2 AH-64 Apache helicopters
- 109 M-1 tanks
- 1,574 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)

**Army Reserve**

- 9 M113A3 armored personnel carriers
- 8 Battery computer systems
- 4 100-ton locomotives
- 95 22 1/2-ton trailers
- 101 22 1/2-ton stake and platform trailers
- 281 34-ton trailers
- 96 34-ton stake and platform trailers
- 89 40-ton trailers
- 200 5K trailers
- 150 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs)
- 2,317 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
- 7 OH-58 helicopters
- 35 AH-1S helicopters
- 14 CH-47 helicopters
- 5 UH-60 helicopters
- 13 M-1 tanks
- 1 Landing craft
- 75 Heavy equipment transporters

**Naval Reserve (includes USMCR assigned aircraft)**

- 24 P-3C aircraft
- 11 A-6E aircraft
- 7 F/A-18 aircraft
- 5 OV-10D aircraft
- 9 HH-60H helicopters
- 5 EA-6B aircraft
- 2 C-130T aircraft
- 2 KC-130T aircraft
- 4 AQS-14 AMCM SONAR detecting sets
- 2 MK-105 AMCM sleds
- 60 ANVIS-6 night vision goggles

- 4 Global Positioning Systems sets
- 4 1 1/4-ton trucks
- 6 Pallet trailers
- 69 Fork lifts

**Marine Corps Reserve**

- 2 7 1/2-ton air mobile cranes
- 24 Laundry unit trailers
- 3 Fuel pump modules
- 5 Fuel tank assemblies
- 9 Full-tracked tractors (bulldozer)
- 100 Encryption devices
- 2 Nonexpandable maintenance shelters
- 3 Small emplacement evacuator tractors
- 5 Forklifts
- 14 Field dental sets (ADAL 662 & 664)

**Air National Guard**

- 40 R-11 refueler trucks
- 91 M 923/925 cargo trucks
- 100 Flightline tow tractors
- 29 Heaters

**Air Force Reserve**

- 18 F-16 A/B aircraft
- 24 F-16 C/D aircraft
- 4 WC-130E aircraft (BAI)
- 4 WC-130H aircraft
- 3 C-130H aircraft
- 6 MH-60G helicopters
- 2 Sets of heavy equipment rapid runway repairs (RRR)
- 92 Wheeled vehicles

**Coast Guard Reserve**

- 6 27 ft. Boston Whaler transportable port security boats

Much of the major equipment purchased or transferred to the Army Reserve occurred in the combat support and combat service support units. As a result, Army Reserve units required less time to mobilize for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and their overall readiness increased over 12 percent in fiscal year 1991.

In the Naval Reserve, the delivery of updated equipment significantly increased overall





combat capability and enhanced compatibility with Active component forces. Through horizontal integration, the Naval Reserve's ability to reinforce the fleet with front line equipment is being expanded. The introduction of additional P-3C aircraft at Reserve bases without sufficient support equipment caused operational problems regarding supportability. Receipt of other equipment in fiscal year 1991, while staying in step with horizontal integration, increased mobilization readiness. The recently-transferred HH-60H helicopters increased combat search and rescue capability.

In the Marine Corps Reserve, there was no known degradation of support provided during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Reserve units, in some cases, were limited in overall capability by flying older model aircraft, although two new KC-130T aircraft were used for inflight refueling. However, the new equipment purchases and transfers made in fiscal year 1991 increased the overall combat capability in the Marine Corps Reserve.

In the Air Forces' Reserve components, readiness and combat capability were also improved with the transfer of newer, more reliable combat aircraft. Installation of electronic defensive systems on C-130 aircraft

in fiscal year 1991 enhanced their survivability. Transfer of the rapid runway repair (RRR) equipment to the Reserve components significantly improved training of Reserve component personnel in the RRR process. The Air Force's Reserve components also received new wheeled vehicles during fiscal year 1991 which improved their capability to deploy during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

In the Coast Guard Reserve, equipment was purchased with Active component funds and transferred to the Reserve port security units (PSU's) when they deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Other equipment included PRC-77 radios and KY57 cryptographic encoders. All the new equipment purchased was in response to the deployment of three Coast Guard Reserve PSU's to the Southwest Asia theater of operations.

### **Equipment On-Hand**

Table 6-2 compares the fiscal year 1991 dollar value of equipment required with fiscal year 1990 values for major equipment required, spare parts, and other equipment items authorized during wartime, and on-hand for each Reserve component.

**Table 6-2**  
**VALUES OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS, SPARE PARTS, AND OTHER ITEMS**  
**FISCAL YEAR 1990-1991**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

<b>Major Equipment Items</b>		<b>Army National Guard<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Army Reserve</b>	<b>Naval Reserve<sup>2,3</sup></b>	<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>	<b>Air National Guard</b>	<b>Air Force Reserve</b>
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1991	34,563	11,645	8,473	4,195	23,610	10,051
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1990	30,122	10,173	6,754	3,920	22,384	9,950
Difference		4,441	1,472	1,719	275	1,226	101
Authorized	FY 1991	34,515	9,296	8,473	4,195	23,610	10,051
Authorized	FY 1990	29,902	9,147	6,754	3,920	22,384	9,950
Difference		4,613	149		275	1,226	101
On-Hand	FY 1991	25,578	7,916	1,719	3,874	23,610	10,051
On-Hand	FY 1990	21,932	6,319	8,453	3,594	22,384	9,950
Difference		3,646	1,597	6,746	280	1,226	101
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1991	74%	68%	100%	92%	100%	100%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1990	73%	62%	100%	92%	100%	100%
Percent Change		1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Dollar Shortfall							
OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1991	8,985	3,729	20	321	0	0
<b>Spare Parts</b>							
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1991	357	31	462	241	3,120	192
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1990	375	31	323	227	2,600	207
Difference		-18	0	139	14	520	-15
Authorized	FY 1991	357	31	462	241	2,940	192
Authorized	FY 1990	375	31	323	227	2,450	207
Difference		-18	0	139	14	490	-15
On-Hand	FY 1991	235	22	158	105	2,321	143
On-Hand	FY 1990	232	21	70	89	2,110	160
Difference		3	1	88	16	211	-17
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1991	66%	71%	34%	44%	74%	74%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1990	62%	68%	22%	39%	81%	77%
Percent Change		4%	3%	13%	4%	-7%	-3%
Dollar Shortfall							
OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1991	122	9	304	136	799	49
<b>Other Equipment Items</b>							
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1991	4,260	570	1,274	143	3,110	873
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1990	3,945	690	1,474	138	3,141	739
Difference		315	-120	-200	5	-31	134
Authorized	FY 1991	4,221	518	1,244	143	3,110	873
Authorized	FY 1990	3,807	627	1,120	138	3,141	739
Difference		414	-109	124	5	-31	134
On-Hand	FY 1991	2,970	462	738	137	2,322	621
On-Hand	FY 1990	2,596	490	691	136	2,397	471
Difference		374	-28	47	1	-75	150
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1991	70%	81%	58%	96%	75%	71%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1990	66%	71%	47%	99%	76%	64%
Percent Change		4%	10%	11%	-3%	-2%	7%
Dollar Shortfall							
OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1991	1,290	108	536	6	788	252

Notes. 1. FY 90 data differs from previously reported due to switch from TAEDEP to RUPS data FY91 based on July RUPS data

2. Major equipment item figures do not include value of ships (\$7.5 billion) Large increases reflect accelerated transition to front line aircraft

3. Spare parts figures reflect inclusion of construction force and cargo spares and higher costs associated with transition to new aircraft, i.e., A-6E, F/A-18A, P-3C.

Source: The Reserve components

Data as of September 30, 1991


The Naval Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard had 100 percent of required major equipment items on-hand. Of the Reserve components, the Army Reserve had the lowest percentage of equipment on-hand. As noted in Table 6-2, the Army Reserve is short \$3.73 billion and the Army National Guard is short \$8.99 billion in equipment on-hand compared with that authorized. The absence of some of this equipment would hinder the mobilization of many Army Reserve and National Guard units in a timely manner. No substantial improvement was expected for the Army's Reserve components, in fiscal year 1991, in the area of equipping without distribution from Active Army procurement resources.

Coast Guard Reserve units have very little equipment assigned and they were not scheduled to receive any new equipment in fiscal year 1991. Mobilization equipment procurement and maintenance is the responsibility of the Active component commands receiving Reservists. New equipment was provided for deployed port security units in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The Coast Guard's general policy is not to stock equipment for post-mobilization


requirements. The lack of equipment for the Coast Guard Reserve could have a significant effect on its ability to mobilize.

Spare parts requirements and authorized levels increased 4 percent for the Army National Guard, 3 percent for the Army Reserve, 13 percent for the Naval Reserve, 4 percent for the Marine Corps Reserve, and decreased 7 percent for the Air National Guard and 3 percent for the Air Force Reserve compared to fiscal year 1990. This was due to the large amounts of equipment used during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The failure to maintain sufficient equipment and spares to support Reserve component units could possibly prevent such units from being fully capable of performing their wartime missions.

Table 6-3 shows a comparison between the percent of total major equipment on-hand versus wartime requirements for each of the Reserve components as of the end of fiscal year 1991. Data for Table 6-3 is drawn from Table 6-4. The Coast Guard Reserve is not included on either table because equipment needed for mobilization is the responsibility of the gaining Active component command.



**Table 6-3**  
**MAJOR EQUIPMENT ON-HAND VS. WARTIME REQUIREMENT**



Note 1: Does not include value of ships.

Source: The Reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1991.

### Equipment Shortages

Each Reserve component has major equipment shortages, even though the Reserve components received large amounts of modern equipment during fiscal year 1991. Lack of some of this equipment could seriously impair the ability of the Reserve components to accomplish their mission effectively.

Tables 6-4 and 6-5 show the values of equipment shortages for each Reserve component at the end of fiscal year 1991. Although the wartime equipment requirements increased in every Reserve component service except the Marine Corps Reserve in fiscal year 1991, the Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve reduced their net equipment shortages by five percent, two percent, and four percent, respectively.



**Table 6-4**  
**EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES**  
**EQUIPMENT ON-HAND COMPARISONS**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>Wartime Requirement</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>On-Hand</u>	<u>\$ Shortage On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement</u>	<u>Percent On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement</u>	<u>Percent On-Hand vs Authorized</u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>						
FY 1991	38,823	38,736	28,548	10,275	74%	74%
FY 1990	34,449	34,084	24,760	9,689	72%	73%
Difference	4,374	4,652	3,788	586		
Percent Change	13%	14%	15%	6%		
<b>Army Reserve</b>						
FY 1991	12,246	9,845	8,400	3,846	69%	85%
FY 1990	10,894	9,805	6,830	4,064	63%	70%
Difference	1,352	40	1,570	-218		
Percent Change	12%	0%	23%	-5%		
<b>Naval Reserve<sup>1</sup></b>						
FY 1991	10,209	10,179	9,349	860	92%	92%
FY 1990	8,224	8,197	7,507	717	91%	92%
Difference	1,985	1,982	1,842	143		
Percent Change	24%	24%	25%	20%		
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>						
FY 1991	4,579	4,579	4,121	458	90%	90%
FY 1990	4,285	4,285	3,819	466	89%	89%
Difference	294	294	302	-8		
Percent Change	7%	7%	8%	-2%		
<b>Air National Guard</b>						
FY 1991	29,840	29,660	28,253	1,587	95%	95%
FY 1990	28,125	27,975	26,891	1,234	96%	96%
Difference	1,715	1,685	1,362	353		
Percent Change	6%	6%	5%	29%		
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>						
FY 1991	11,116	11,116	10,815	301	97%	97%
FY 1990	10,896	10,896	10,581	315	97%	97%
Difference	220	220	234	-14		
Percent Change	2%	2%	2%	-4%		
<b>DoD Total</b>						
FY 1991	106,813	104,115	89,486	17,327	84%	86%
FY 1990	96,873	95,242	80,388	16,485	83%	84%
Difference	9,940	8,873	9,098	842		
Percent Change	10%	9%	11%	5%		


Note: 1. Figures do not include value of ships.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1991.

**Table 6-5**  
**EQUIPMENT DOLLAR SHORTAGES**  
 (Dollars in Billions)

**Total Wartime Requirement = \$106.80 Billion**



Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Reserve components.  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

Equipment shortages continue to be identified as one of the most critical factors limiting readiness. Reserve components must be provided sufficient equipment for training and to meet their wartime requirement. Significant shortages of training equipment exist within some of the Reserve components. Shortages of equipment impact both the quality of training and the overall readiness of the unit. Equipment loans between the Reserve components and the gaining commands are the way a majority of the Reserve component units are being trained in a new weapon system.

Communications systems and equipment are common to all components. Major equipment

shortages, as identified by each Reserve component, for fiscal year 1991 are listed as follows.

#### **Army National Guard**

- Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT)
- 5-Ton trucks
- Heavy equipment transporters
- General purpose electronic test equipment
- Vehicular FM radios
- Chemical defensive equipment
- SINCGARS radios
- Medium tractors/trailers
- Generator sets

## **Army Reserve**

- Tactical wheeled vehicles
- Power generators
- Water purification systems
- Tool sets, Test sets and Measurement devices
- Materiel handling equipment
- Communication systems

## **Naval Reserve**

- Deployable Acoustic Readiness Training systems
- Flight trainers/simulators
- Tactical air electronic warfare equipment
- Support equipment for all types of aircraft
- Weapon system trainers
- Replacement equipment for Medical Proficiency Skills Laboratories
- Communication equipment
- Radar Sonar Surveillance Center vans

## **Marine Corps Reserve**

- Flight simulators
- Nuclear/Biological/Chemical field protective masks
- Parachutes and other special operations capable items
- Communication equipment

## **Air National Guard**

- Night vision goggles
- Communication equipment
- Global Positioning Systems
- Mobility containers
- Generators
- Training and support equipment for all assigned aircraft

## **Air Force Reserve**

- Night vision equipment
- Chemical defensive equipment
- Communication equipment
- Aircraft gunnery fire control components
- Automatic guns through 30 mm
- Aircraft support equipment

## **Coast Guard Reserve**

- Night vision equipment
- Utility boats
- 3/4 ton trucks
- 9 passenger vans
- Transportable containers
- Cryptographic encoders
- Transportable small boats
- Communication equipment

Shortages occur in both the Active and Reserve Coast Guard components.

Major training equipment shortages in the Reserve components directly affect opportunities for training and result in lower readiness levels and decreased mobilization capabilities. Training contributes directly to retention of mobilization skills, and in most cases ensures Reservists train on equipment which will be used upon mobilization. Forces deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM used assigned equipment, prepositioned war reserve mobilization stock, or used equipment allocated to mobilized Active component forces. Some equipment was reallocated from units not mobilized and distributed in support of deployed units. This redistribution caused a degradation in unit readiness for those units from which the equipment was pulled. Those Reserve component units which mobilized fully equipped were the units which were most capable of performing all assigned missions from the start.

As the Active components are drawn down and additional weapon systems are transferred to the Air Reserve components, it is imperative that adequate support equipment be included in the transfer to facilitate the conversion. Normally in the Active components large numbers of aircraft are assigned to a few locations. When aircraft are transferred to the Reserve components, they are transferred to several different locations. For example, an Active component fighter wing consisting of three squadrons at a single location has enough support equipment to

accomplish their assigned mission. When the Active component wing's aircraft are transferred to the Reserve forces, they are divided into three or four squadrons, each at a different location. Each of the new Reserve component's squadrons requires support equipment. Support equipment problems are even more pronounced when strategic airlift aircraft are transferred, because the existing Active component bases retain some aircraft, and consequently must retain some of their support equipment. The only source of supply for the Reserve components then becomes new procurement. Procurement of equipment to support 20 years old aircraft is very difficult because of the obsolete technology involved. Programs frequently call for transfer of aircraft well within acquisition lead time for support equipment, and sometimes do not provide funding for new equipment acquisition.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *the Army, Navy, and Air Force consider solving the major equipment shortages in their Reserve components by using excess stored equipment.*
- *the Army consider changes to the distribution of Army procurement resources to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to reduce equipment shortfalls.*
- *serviceable excess equipment resulting from inactivations should be made available to the Reserve components.*

### **National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations**

Each year the Services plan for the purchase of new or used equipment for their Reserve components. Congress generally has added funds to the President's budget request for the purchase of new additional Reserve component equipment to fill identified shortfalls. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA) are funds designated for the purchase of Reserve component equipment. The majority of the funds are designated by Congress for the



purchase of specific items of equipment. The remainder may be used by Reserve components for discretionary purchases of equipment to improve readiness. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations complement Service appropriations to improve training and readiness in the Reserve components. These funds have been used to reduce critical equipment shortages. The Reserve components are able to purchase equipment which could not be obtained in the normal budget process.

In fiscal year 1991, the Department of Defense's Reserve components acquired many items through NGREA, which were required for support, transportation, defensive systems, communications, improved detection systems, and test equipment. During fiscal years 1987-1992, Congress appropriated approximately \$7.95 billion in NGREA. Table 6-6 displays the National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriations from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 1992.



**Table 6-6**  
**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATIONS**  
**1987-92**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army National Guard	146	273	256	315	796	344	2,130
Army Reserve	90	85	30	89	71	99	464
Naval Reserve	61	66	145	118	659	383	1,432
Marine Corps Reserve	60	40	82	109	160	158	609
Air National Guard	50	341	400	239	623	535	2,188
Air Force Reserve	<u>150</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>227</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>358</u>	<u>1,131</u>
<b>DoD Total</b>	<b>557</b>	<b>1,007</b>	<b>1,140</b>	<b>909</b>	<b>2,464</b>	<b>1,877</b>	<b>7,954</b>

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of December 31, 1991.

In general, new equipment procurement accounts for approximately 30 percent of the planned annual deliveries to the Reserve components in fiscal years 1991 and 1992. The remaining 70 percent of equipment is expected through equipment redistribution from the Active components.

A listing of the types of equipment appropriated with NGREA dollars in fiscal year 1991 follows:

#### **Army National Guard**

- Multiple-launch rocket systems launchers
- M916 tractors
- M113 vehicles
- OH-58D helicopters
- UH-60 helicopters
- Night vision devices
- C-23 and C-26 aircraft

#### **Army Reserve**

- Cargo trucks (5-ton)
- Semi-trailers (heavy)
- Tractor trucks (heavy)
- Tugboats
- Communications and Electronics - AN/VRC-88A radio sets
- Night vision devices
- Test sets and shop equipment

#### **Navy Reserve**

- C-130T aircraft
- MH-53 helicopters
- C-20 aircraft
- IPADS for P-3 aircraft
- LAMPS MK-1 helicopter upgrades
- MIUW Radar Sonar Survey Center Equipment (RSSC)
- Advance Base Functional Component War Reserve equipment
- Civil Engineering equipment

#### **Marine Corps Reserve**

- KC-130T aircraft
- AH-1W helicopters
- Squad Engagement Training System
- AH-1W simulators
- Maintenance UHF radios
- Light Armored Vehicle turret trainers

#### **Air National Guard**

- C-130H aircraft
- F-15A aircraft upgrade
- C-26A aircraft
- MH-60G helicopters
- Joint Tactical Communication Program (TRI-TAC)
- Tactical air control system improvements
- C-130 equipment modifications

## Air Force Reserve

- C-130H aircraft
- F-16 (220E engine and computer upgrades)
- C-130 modifications
- F-16 multi-task trainers
- Scope shield radios
- Ring laser gyros

The Services' lack of support in purchasing of major end items for the Reserve components has been a problem which is being addressed. The shortage of support equipment has been a problem for both new purchases, as well as redistributed equipment from the Active components.

*The Board commends Congress for its strong support demonstrated in recent years in equipping and maintaining the Reserve components.*

## Equipment Obsolescence

Many Reserve component units still maintain numerous items of equipment which are at or near obsolescence. The Reserve component equipment modification program not only provides for the enhancements of in-service equipment, training devices, and support equipment, but it also extends the service life of older systems. The modification program also incorporates improvements after the equipment has entered service. Objective for Reserve component leadership is to maintain equipment in the most modern configuration.

The Army National Guard has numerous equipment items that are near or at obsolescence. These items require increased maintenance and repair parts. Significant items include: over 4,200 gasoline-powered trucks, AVLB's on M48 chassis, radios and encryption devices, M-101, WWII-era artillery howitzers, Vietnam era helicopters, and Medical Unit Self-contained Transportable (MUST) hospital equipment. Most of the obsolete equipment is not deployable for mobilization because it is not compatible with the Active component systems. Repair parts are extremely scarce or nonexistent, except through stripping other equipment. Since


items are no longer maintained in the Active component, Active Army schools do not offer maintenance training. Army depots no longer repair many of these items due to shortages of repair parts. The repair costs sometimes exceed the value of the equipment. These situations cause delays in repair, thus degrading readiness in the Army National Guard.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Army National Guard's gasoline-powered vehicles were deemed nondeployable. The older equipment experienced major failures on the trip from home station to the mobilization station, requiring additional cross-leveling to replace outdated items. New equipment training for personnel was required at the mobilization stations on the use of modern equipment issued to their units to replace nondeployable items.

The Army Reserve has obsolete and nondeployable communications equipment, watercraft units, special tools, and Test, Measurement Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE), which also make many Army Reserve units nondeployable for combat missions outside the United States. Lack of modern TMDE and special tools impact the ability of Army Reserve units to accomplish their wartime maintenance mission. The inability of units to communicate greatly impacts readiness. Many Army Reserve watercraft units are vintage 1950-60 and can not fully perform their assigned mobilization mission.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Army Reserve combat service support units had difficulty in providing support due to the lack of TMDE, special tools, and communications equipment. The Army Reserve watercraft units could not deploy to Southwest Asia because they were equipped with obsolete equipment.

The ability of the Naval Reserve to effectively reinforce the fleet upon mobilization will be limited without equipment compatibility/modernization. The UC-12B aircraft is approaching the end of its airframe service life. The Navy needs to procure a new light support aircraft. If the



service life of the C-12 aircraft is not extended or a suitable replacement is not procured, Naval fixed-wing light airlift support will not exist.

The Naval tactical F-14A aircraft needs new avionics, engines, and radar upgrades. Active component fleet counterparts are exploring these upgrades. To maintain compatibility, Reserve aircraft must be upgraded with the same equipment as the Active fleet. With the Active component fleet transitioning to the F/A-18C aircraft, Naval and Marine Corps Air Reserve units will be the only squadrons flying the F/A-18A. Reserve F/A-18A aircraft need to be replaced with the F/A-18C to maintain fleet compatibility. The limited supply of electronic warfare equipment in the Reserve carrier air wing squadrons is outdated and incompatible with fleet assets.

Many Naval Reserve helicopters are not compatible with Active fleet counterparts. The Reserve RH-53D equipped squadrons need to be replaced by MH-53E's and the Reserve SH-3H equipped squadrons need to be replaced by SH-60F aircraft to be compatible with fleet counterparts. Lack of compatibility between the SH-60F and the SH-3H, seriously limits the ability to logistically support Reserve SH-3H squadrons while being deployed. The Naval Reserve Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare (MIUW) program is only equipped with 84 percent of its wartime civil

engineering support equipment allowance. Over 60 percent of this equipment is outdated, no longer in production, or can not be supported logistically. Eight of the Reserve units are equipped with first generation surveillance vans outfitted with obsolete equipment. Second generation surveillance vans are required to make these units compatible with fleet requirements.

The Marine Corps Reserve continues to operate obsolete 30-ton cranes, MC-4000 rough terrain forklifts, dozers, tractors, 40-ton lowboys, M-49 refuelers, and obsolete .45-caliber pistols. There is a shortage of repair parts for most of this obsolete equipment. To maintain compatibility, Reserve component units must be upgraded with the same equipment as their Active component counterparts.

The Air National Guard has three aircraft weapons systems, which remain in its inventory that are thirty or more years old. The three aircraft weapons systems are the A-7 Corsair, which continues to have problems with wing cracks, and the C-130A and C-130B, which have 1950's vintage technology, have recurring wing problems, and less airlift capability due to weight restrictions than newer C-130E/H models. In each case, the weapon systems are difficult to support because they are no longer maintained in the Active inventory and spare parts are difficult to obtain. This has resulted in a lack of weapons system knowledge for wartime employment, and a lack of maintenance supportability for the aircraft while away from home station. Conversion of these aircraft to more compatible equipment is a must to assure interoperability when mobilized.

The Air Force Reserve continues to operate an aging fleet of AC-130A gunships in fiscal year 1991, which are approaching the end of their service life. Parts availability and logistics support for both airframe and mission equipment are expected to significantly decrease by 1993. Deployment of AC-130A gunships to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM accelerated the problem by increasing the use of spare equipment items already in short supply.

Air Force Reserve communications squadrons continue to operate antiquated, logistically non-supportable tactical switchboards. Replacement switchboards are on contract, but delivery dates have slipped until 1992. As logistics support decreases in these areas, mission capability will also decrease.

The equipment the Coast Guard Reserve does have is generally up-to-date; it's simply in very short supply. The equipment shortages the Coast Guard does have would have a significant effect on full mobilization and readiness. Without this equipment, the Coast Guard Reserve will be unable to fully carry out its wartime missions.

*The Board recommends that the Services be cautious in removing aging, yet capable, equipment from units scheduled for equipment modernization until the new equipment is actually on hand.*

### **Equipment Maintenance Backlogs**

Maintenance backlogs continue to exist in some Reserve component units. Efforts are underway to reduce these backlogs. Old equipment generally requires increased maintenance time.

The Army's National Guard maintenance backlog for fiscal year 1991 was \$55.7 million, an increase of four million dollars from fiscal year 1990. The plan to reduce the maintenance backlog includes initiatives to increase maintenance technician strengths, increase the training and productivity of soldiers, and to use commercial contractors. The Army National Guard's aggressive management maintenance program has helped to slow the growth rate of the maintenance backlogs. The fiscal year 1991 maintenance program funding allocations provided adequate resources to sustain current high levels of training readiness without degrading the Army's National Guard equipment readiness posture.

The maintenance backlog for the Army Reserve consists primarily of aircraft maintenance problems. The dollar value of

the depot maintenance backlog at the end of fiscal year 1991 was \$4.7 million. The Army Reserve depot maintenance backlog for fiscal year 1990 was \$1.7 million. Funds have been requested to finance the remaining valid backlog requirements. Large maintenance backlogs reduce aircraft availability for training, thereby reducing mobilization readiness.


The Naval Reserve had an aircraft maintenance backlog of \$11.5 million and a support services backlog of \$0.5 million in fiscal year 1991. There was no backlog in fiscal year 1990. Congress has been requested by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to transfer \$13 million from the Naval Reserve Personnel Account into the Operations and Maintenance account to eliminate the fiscal year 1991 backlogs and to fund a portion of the fiscal year 1992 backlog. The effect of grounded aircraft due to a lack of maintenance dollars, regardless of the aircraft type, model, or series, severely impacts a Naval Reserve unit's readiness and its ability to mobilize. The impact is greater on a Reserve squadron than on an Active fleet counterpart because the Reserve squadron, generally, does not have replacement equipment to utilize while the primary equipment undergoes depot-level repairs.

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve do not operate a depot level maintenance activity. They send their equipment to Active component depot facilities for needed repairs. The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve maintenance backlog is the same proportion as the Active Air Force backlog. The fiscal year 1991 backlogs for Air Force were not significantly different than those of fiscal year 1990. Much of the maintenance backlog was due to the funding requirements to support Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Large savings are projected in spares procurement and repair costs due to stock funding of depot level repairables for fiscal year 1992. Impacts on the backlogs are also expected to be incurred due to the shortage of support equipment to perform flight line and intermediate level maintenance for units converting to new weapon systems.

## Aircraft Defensive Systems

Current national defense posture dictates a greater role and commensurate responsibilities to the Reserve components. Electronic warfare systems are an essential component of modern combat operations. The effectiveness of these systems is dependent on the ability to rapidly change computer system software to accommodate new threats. The defensive system equipment purchases, provided through fiscal year 1991 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations, greatly improved the survivability of Reserve component aircraft operating in the high threat environment in Southwest Asia.

All Reserve component aircraft need to be provided with the most up-to-date aircraft electronic countermeasures equipment to allow aircrews to conduct effective training and enhance survival in a high threat electronic environment. Without modern electronic defensive systems installed on Reserve component aircraft, aircrews are unable to conduct effective training. Their ability to survive in a high threat electronic environment is questionable.



Shortages of various electronic defensive equipment needed on Reserve aircraft are shown below.

### Army National Guard/Army Reserve

- Radar jammer sets
- Radar detecting sets
- Radar signal detecting sets
- Radar warning systems
- General purpose dispenser
- Infrared countermeasure sets
- Missile approach detectors
- Laser detecting sets

### Naval Reserve

- Deceptive electronic countermeasure system
- Radar warning devices
- Laser designators
- Hellfire missiles
- Infrared countermeasure sets
- Defensive armament systems

### Marine Corps Reserve

- Radar homing and warning devices
- Infrared countermeasure sets
- Radar detecting sets
- Radar jammer sets

### Air National Guard

- Chaff and flare dispensers
- ECM equipment
- Radar warning receivers

### Air Force Reserve

- Radar warning receivers
- Chaff and flare dispensers

The only defensive system improvements made on Army Reserve aircraft were as a result of the aircraft being deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Seventy-four radar detecting sets and 26 infrared countermeasures sets were installed on Army Reserve aircraft which deployed to Southwest Asia. Although, Army Reserve aviation units are authorized radar

detector sets, infrared jammer sets, missile countermeasures sets, and chaff dispensers, there are never enough funds available in the Army budget to purchase all the equipment that is necessary. The Army Reserve aviation units that deployed to Southwest Asia experienced delays of up to three weeks while defensive systems were installed on their aircraft. As a result, Army Reserve aircrews were not as proficient in the use of this new equipment as were their Active component counterparts. An estimated \$4.1 million is required to upgrade the Army Reserve aviation units with the quantities of defensive equipment currently authorized. In order to provide adequate defensive systems to all Army Reserve aircraft expected to be in units in fiscal year 1993, an estimated \$21.8 million is required.

Due to shortages in defensive electronic countermeasures equipment, many of the Naval Air Reserve aircraft are operating with little, and in some cases, no defensive capabilities. Some equipment improvements have been realized in the Naval Reserve, but the lack of defensive electronic countermeasures and radar warning devices continues to limit mobilization readiness and survivability of aircraft and aircrews in combat conditions. The lack of certain defensive equipment (including defensive armament systems in the HH-60H) and proper training impacts mobilization capabilities and prevents commanders from deploying units to high-threat areas. Although the Naval Reserve units which operate the HH-60H helicopters were mobilized for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, they were limited in their mission effectiveness due to lack of defensive capabilities. Naval detachments had to rely on the armed Air Force HH-60Gs for defensive purposes on combat search and rescue missions.

The Marine Corps Reserve are to "mirror-image" their Active component counterparts in both makeup and capabilities, to include tactical electronic warfare capabilities. With the introduction of modern aircraft into the Marine Corps Reserve, it is vital to ensure that the aircrews have state of the art electronic warfare equipment to conduct "real world"

training. In the event of mobilization, maintenance and aircrew personnel would not have adequate experience and exposure to electronic warfare systems and employment techniques before engaging an adversary in a high-threat area. In order to maintain the readiness posture and mobilization requirements of the Marine Corps Reserve force, personnel must train with state-of-the-art equipment. The 4th Marine Corps Aircraft Wing achieved a 24 percent improvement in aircraft with adequate defensive systems in fiscal year 1991.

In fiscal year 1991, the Air National Guard embarked on two significant upgrades to aircraft defensive systems. In one area the Air National Guard started to test airlift aircraft with chaff and flare dispensers. The Air National Guard equipped six aircraft for the test period and the results were very successful. Although funds are in the President's budget for fiscal year 1992, the future of this much needed program is dependent on continued budget support. In another area, the Air National Guard has begun equipping its tactical airlift units with electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment of various types. This process will stretch over three years as the Air Force begins its force structure changes. The Air Force requires all combat gained tactical units to be equipped with electronic defensive equipment. All the Air National Guard combat gained units are now scheduled to have ECM equipment. Units without ECM equipment and units which are required to operate in a high-threat environment could suffer equipment and manpower losses. Extensive man-hours and manpower were expended moving electronic defensive equipment from several units to satisfy deploying Air National Guard units to Southwest Asia. In particular, the Air National Guard had to completely outfit one unit with ECM equipment and test stations to meet their combat requirement. The ECM equipment that was transferred from the other Reserve and Active units affected the transferring unit's ability to train for their own wartime mission.

The Air Force Reserve has procured sufficient missile warning receivers and flare/

chaff dispensers to equip all their assigned C-130 aircraft. Installation of the equipment is estimated to begin in January 1992. When equipped with missile warning receivers and flare/chaff dispensers, the Air Force Reserve C-130 aircraft will have an adequate defensive system. The Air Force Reserve has also required its tactical aircraft to be upgraded with radar warning receivers to enhance their survivability in a high-threat area.

The Coast Guard Reserve has no aircraft assigned. Training of Reserve aircrew members is conducted in Active component aircraft. There are no defensive systems installed in any Coast Guard aircraft. Therefore, the Coast Guard aircraft have extremely limited aircraft combat capabilities.


*The Board reaffirms its recommendation that Reserve component aircraft be equipped with appropriate defensive systems to enhance survival of aircraft and air crews in a high-threat electronic environment.*

#### **Reserve Equipment Transferred to Active Components during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM**

The majority of the equipment transferred from Reserve component units to Active component units during Operations DESERT

SHIELD/STORM has either been returned to the Reserve component units, remains deployed with Active component units, awaits transportation or was destroyed during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The current plan is to return all transferred Reserve component equipment as soon as possible. Some of the equipment is still mission-essential in the theater of operations and no date has been established for its return. If equipment is returned in a non-serviceable condition, appropriate action is taken to return or replace it prior to returning to the Reserve component units.

The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard have taken an active role, in the development of the Total Army plan for the redistribution and return of equipment from Southwest Asia. The Active Army has formed technical inspection teams to assist in equipment condition coding to expedite return of equipment to Army Reserve and National Guard units. The two goals of the Army teams are to ensure low-cost reparable equipment is returned, and that the returning equipment is shipped to specified government ports closest to the gaining or owning unit. Army maintenance units at ports of entry will return the equipment to normal usage condition before it is returned to the owning unit.



The plan for return of Army National Guard equipment also provides for Active component funding for replacement of parts and labor to return the equipment to transfer standards. The plan further provides that Reserve component units retain any new equipment, which has been fielded to them during their period of active service, provided the unit is authorized the items. There are no plans to replace equipment which was destroyed except through the normal Army supply system. The Army estimates that equipment returns to the Reserve components will begin in fiscal year 1992 and could extend into fiscal year 1993. Equipment which Army National Guard units took to war is being returned with the units. The Active Army withdrew heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs), heavy equipment transporters (HETs), UH60 helicopters, and computer disc drives from Army National Guard units. The Army National Guard also had miscellaneous equipment redistributed from units once they were Federalized. Six UH-60 helicopters that were withdrawn from the Army National Guard have been returned. Units may be degraded in equipment on-hand status while awaiting equipment return. Other units may have increased capability as a result of new equipment issued to them while on active duty. Because the majority of withdrawn equipment was in the fuel and heavy haul capability, the shortages of this equipment will degrade overall Army National Guard readiness. Equipment shortfall impacts greatly on Reserve unit readiness. As a result, many units do not have full sets of equipment to conduct mission-essential training and presently are not fully mission capable if mobilized.

During fiscal year 1991, several different classes of Army Reserve equipment were withdrawn from Army Reserve component units and transferred to deploying Active component units in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Primarily, this equipment included major end items, medical materials, and materiel for nonmilitary programs. The significant transfers were heavy equipment transporters, UH-60A aircraft, electronic equipment, communications equipment, and trucks. Less

than 10 percent of the withdrawn Army Reserve equipment has been returned by the end of fiscal year 1991. The Army Reserve has also requested additional funds and mandays for maintenance personnel to return equipment to pre-Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM readiness levels. The full impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM on future requirements for new or additional equipment in the Army Reserve can not be determined at this time.

Naval Active/Reserve loan agreements require equipment to be inspected and repaired/overhauled to "like new, ready for issue" status before returning to the War Reserve Management System and the Reserve component units. Other options include new procurement if the equipment is beyond economical repair or needs replacement. The vast majority of Naval Reserve equipment utilized in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was deployed with the Reserve units which maintained the equipment in the continental United States. Great effort has been invested to ensure documented accuracy and accountability of all equipment from the time of its deployment until its subsequent return or replacement to the Reserve component unit. All equipment is scheduled for return or replacement by the end of fiscal year 1992.

The majority of Naval Reserve equipment deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was civil engineering support equipment, civil engineering end items, and materiel-handling equipment. Major weapons systems deployed and used by Naval Reserve Forces, such as C-9B transport aircraft, HH-60H combat search and rescue helicopters, and MIUW surveillance/communications vans, have already been returned to their Reserve sites. Two mobile maintenance vans with ancillary equipment were loaned to Active component forces in support of P-3 aircraft operations are being returned. Thirty-six F/A-18A radar domes that were transferred from the Reserve components to support deployed F/A-18C aircraft are scheduled to be returned to their Reserve component units by August 1992. The Reserve F/A-18A aircraft cannot be used for weapons system training until the radar domes which were loaned are



returned. Radio and electronic defense systems equipment were also removed from Reserve helicopters squadrons to support Active Fleet Marine helicopter squadrons. Most of this equipment has been returned. The delay in return of Reserve component equipment directly affects the mobilization readiness of units concerned, and adversely impacts the ability to fully train during the interim period. The aircraft equipment shortages cause degraded readiness and mobilization capabilities, especially in the case of the electronic defense systems.

Some equipment was drawn from non-deploying Naval Reserve construction battalions and cargo handling units to fill the equipment requirements of deploying units. Over one-third of the total Reserve cargo handling, and one-half the materiel-handling equipment was deployed outside the continental U.S. Only one-third of the total deployed Reserve equipment has been returned to the Reserve component units. The equipment readiness of many units will be degraded, and effective training will be hampered while awaiting the return of this equipment. The full impact is still being determined and will be predicated on the outcome of equipment condition inspections. A determination that replacement of equipment is necessary could result in a delay of two years, if procurement of new equipment is required.

Marine Corps policy dictates that the Fleet Marine Force Commander may internally redistribute equipment and supplies to fill both the Table of Equipment and sustainment requirements of the deploying Active forces. The priority effort within the Marine Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was the reconstitution of the Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) program. The best equipment available from all Marine Corps assets (Active and Reserve) was used. Marine Corps Reserve units augmenting or reinforcing deploying Active component forces directly benefited from either prepositioned or remain behind equipment. Because of the overall readiness of the Active component forces, there were only isolated cases of Marine Corps Reserve equipment being used by other

deploying forces. The Marine Corps, in turn, received new weapons and replacements directly from the manufacturer.

The Marine Corps Reserve's capability, at the end of fiscal year 1991, was somewhat deteriorated by equipment shortages. Approximately four percent of the Reserve component reported equipment shortages were significant enough to cause mission degradation. This is based on the Training Allowances held by the Marine Corps Reserve units at their home training centers. All Reserve units which were deployed to Southwest Asia were assigned to an Active component unit, which acted as a host to represent them in the return of equipment to the home training center. Additionally, eight percent of the Reserve units are still reporting reduced equipment capability for maintenance-related problems. Efforts are continuing to return equipment to Marine Corps Reserve units. In cases where the actual equipment cannot be returned to the Reserve unit, the Reserve units will receive replacement equipment of like-type and model. Reserve units have been directed to submit fund requests to replace shortages of equipment incurred during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The Air Force's plan provides that the Air Reserve components get back as much of their loaned equipment as quickly as possible. Some Reserve equipment remained in the theater to facilitate the return of personnel. The loaned equipment is scheduled to be returned as soon as possible. The Air Reserve components have identified all shortages of equipment that were transferred during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As equipment is returned to different locations, it is reported and subsequently matched to an Air Reserve component unit which has a shortage.

The vast majority of items transferred from the Air Force Reserve units to deploying Active component Air Force units in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM during fiscal year 1991, consisted of non-combat essential support equipment. An assessment of the transferred equipment is continuing. All the Air Force Reserve aircraft maintenance

equipment loaned during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was returned in the same condition as it was when transferred. Six Air Force Reserve 10K adverse terrain forklifts, transferred to the Active components, have not been returned to their assigned Reserve units at this time. Initial reports indicate that Air Force Reserve equipment loaned to other Active units located at the same location as the Reserve unit has been returned. Much of the equipment loaned to other Active component units at different locations still remains in the possession of the Active component units. Not all of the loaned equipment has been returned in the same condition as it was when issued. Equipment returned in poor condition has been identified for replacement during the next Air Force budget submission. Equipment shortages in the Air Force Reserve notably reduce units' capability to deploy and train with their required type equipment.

The Air National Guard still has approximately \$7 million worth of combat communications equipment deployed. A high percentage of the equipment was awaiting transportation at the end of fiscal year 1991 for return to the United States. During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Air National Guard transferred over two thousand pieces of chemical warfare defense equipment (CWDE), communications-electronics equipment, and A-10 support equipment to Active component units. Air National Guard units that transferred CWDE are beginning to receive replacement equipment. Since CWDE is not a measure used to determine unit combat readiness, no quantitative impact is apparent. The current CWDE shortages in the Air National Guard do have an adverse impact on readiness, and degrade combat capability and the ability to mobilize to a chemical/biological environment. All A-10 support equipment items transferred to Active component units have been returned to their assigned Air National Guard units. Shortage of equipment items is either preventing Air National Guard personnel from receiving training or is impacting on the unit's ability to perform the full scope of its assigned mission. In some instances, the unit's combat rating is degraded as a result of all the equipment not being returned.


## Strategic Lift Concerns

The importance of maintaining the capability to rapidly project military power around the globe to protect the interests of the United States was apparent during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The lack of sufficient airlift and sealift capability continues to be a strategic vulnerability. While the strategic lift issue does not impact on Reserve component unit readiness, the ability of such units to arrive in-theater, at the times required by the gaining commanders, is significantly impacted by strategic lift shortages.

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM highlighted the importance of placing high priority on the maintenance and improvement of U.S. strategic mobility forces: airlift, sealift, and prepositioning.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, it became necessary to charter foreign-flag vessels to meet sealift requirements. A shortage of experienced merchant seamen to man existing Ready Reserve Force ships was also encountered. The airlift requirements further shortened the service life of aging C-141 cargo aircraft.





The Board continues to believe that strategic airlift and sealift are critical for the readiness, deployment, and resupply of the Total Force. There should be no distinction made between Active and Reserve component units when setting priorities for equipment and training.

*The Board reaffirmed its recommendation that increased attention be given to strategic mobility requirements in areas of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning.*

*The Board recommends that:*

- *as a result of the demands placed on strategic airlift and sealift assets, during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Department of Defense should examine overall lift requirements and programs.*
- *consideration should be given to applying the Maritime Prepositioning Ship concept to the requirements of other Services.*

### **Automated Management Systems**

A critical element of the Reserve components' command infrastructure is their automated data processing computer systems. Automated logistics management systems are critical to the Reserve component's

preparation and planning for mobilization and deployment. Development and fielding of supply, transportation, and logistics management systems must accurately reflect and support the Reserve's requirements and missions. A comprehensive modernization program continued to be one of the top priorities in fiscal year 1991.

Automated pay and personnel systems which interface between the Active and Reserve components are essential to avoid the pay and personnel record problems which surfaced during the call-up and deployment of Reserve personnel for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The Services are developing, and in some cases, refining personnel management data processing systems.

Equally important are the issues of interoperability and systems training opportunities for Active and Reserve component personnel.

The Army's Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) will automate all facets of unit administration, mobilization management, planning, and execution for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. RCAS sub-systems include financial management, operations and training, logistics, engineering, mobilization,

safety, and human resources. During mobilization, RCAS will track mobilization at home stations and movement to mobilization centers. The RCAS program will also provide electronic mail, a data base system, and word processing capability linking units, mobilization stations, and major Army commands. The RCAS program is Congressionally-directed and fully funded through 1997.

All Army National Guard and Army Reserve units will receive compatible computer hardware, software, and necessary telecommunication capabilities and equipment. Data will be shared, as required, throughout the system, eliminating the need for multiple data entry and reducing duplication of effort. The complete fielding of RCAS, in the Army's Reserve components, is scheduled for fiscal years 1992 through 1996. The Army National Guard continued to convert to new automated logistic management systems, the Standard Army National Guard Maintenance Reporting System and the Army National Guard Supply Accounting Management Information System. The conversions have greatly improved accuracy and timeliness of logistics/maintenance data especially in the Army National Guard Materiel Readiness Reporting. Completion of the program in fiscal year 1992 will enhance the decision making process in the Army National Guard. During peacetime, the Army Reserve components obtain parts and supplies through supply systems that are operated by the Reserve components and are different from the Active component system. Unit supply personnel requisition items from the Reserve component system rather than through the Active Army's Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS). In most cases, Reservists will not be proficient in operating Active component systems unless they are given peacetime training. Because of this, the Army provided the ULLS computers and software to the brigades after their mobilization.

Automated logistics system support for the Army Reserve continued to improve in fiscal year 1991. The Army Reserve units that deployed to Southwest Asia successfully used all the logistics automation systems that were

operating in the theater. Lack of unit-owned Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) equipment did not serve as a hindrance to the operations. Other initiatives included the incorporation of 23 system change proposals into the logistics module of U.S. Army Forces Command's Center Level Application System and the development of a personal computer version of the Standard Property Book System-Installation/Table of Distribution and Allowances that can be used by the Army Reserve activities for standardized property accountability.

The Naval Reserve's Standard Training Administration and Readiness Support (RSTARS) system is designed to provide automated support for numerous functions (manpower, personnel, training, medical, administration ) performed at Naval Reserve activities. Organized in functional modules, RSTARS is being developed in increments using rapid prototyping techniques. The manpower/personnel module was implemented in 1987, and is currently being refined. The first training module has been tested and will be implemented at all surface Naval Reserve activities in 1992.

The Fund Administration and Standardized Document Automation (FASTDATA) system was developed for the Naval Reserve to provide accounting data interface between the Naval Reserve Financial Information Processing Center, field activity comptrollers, and cost centers. Implementation of FASTDATA included placing the Fund Administrator (FA) module and the Cost Center (CC) module at Reserve field sites for production use. The FASTDATA system automates budget preparation, execution, and reporting requirements. The FASTDATA system has further automated the Naval Reserve field-level supply requisitioning process.

In the Marine Corps Reserve, system improvements in word-processing continue to enhance the automated management system. Due to the large volume of administrative requirements in preparing maintenance plans and equipment control listings, the new word-


processing system facilitates quick access to information. Where feasible, the Marine Corps Reserve uses the same automated management systems as the Active component.

In fiscal year 1991, logistics management systems in the Air National Guard were enhanced by implementing the Combat Supplies Management System, Phase II. The new system eliminated record duplication, enhanced management of War Reserve supplies, and provided the Air National Guard with an automated requisition schedule process. The new system also provided command and base level users with a faster and more timely reconciliation process thus improving combat assessments. The Combat Supply Management System was not fully implemented throughout the logistics world and, therefore, was not used during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. During fiscal year 1991, all 93 Air National Guard units fully implemented the Micap Asset Sourcing System. This system enhanced the lateral support capability of supply and improved the visibility of essential aircraft spares thus expediting movement of critical assets.

Four automated management systems used by the Air Force Reserve in fiscal year 1991 included stand-alone Logistics Module-B, part of the Contingency Operation Mobility Planning and Execution System, Squadron Mobility, and Recurring Training for improved

mobility operations. Two other systems, Core Automated Maintenance System and Mission Capability Asset Sourcing System (MASS) contributed significantly to mission capability rates. The Core Automated Maintenance System provided up to the minute maintenance data collection data and aircraft status. Mission Capability Asset Sourcing system gave the Air Force Reserve unprecedented visibility of the mission capability requirements during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Recurring training system software was not fielded in time for use in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, but its use will enhance similar future operations.

*The Board recommends that:*

- *the Services identify common automated information systems to use between Active and Reserve components.*
- *continued support and funding be provided for development and fielding of common automated data systems, and corresponding training requirements to ensure complete interoperability.*
- *action be taken to ensure effective interface between the Active Army's Unit Level Logistics System and the Reserve Component Automation System management information systems.* 





# Facilities

# 7



*"Policies developed to provide adequate and functional facilities and infrastructure must, at a minimum, maintain the existing inventory and invest in a logical and prudent revitalization construction program."*

*Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, USAF  
Chief, National Guard Bureau*

## General

Reserve component facilities range from individual Reserve centers and armories to regional equipment maintenance centers and support facilities to large installations. They are located in every state of the Union, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and Washington, DC. The installations and training sites are necessary to optimize training and, when necessary, prepare our Reserve forces for mobilization and deployment. These facilities are constant reminders throughout the country of the presence and vigilance of the citizen-soldier, Marine, sailor, and airman.

These facilities represent a substantial capital investment. The cost to replace these facilities would be \$29 billion. The annual operating budget to provide necessary utilities, real property maintenance, and services is approximately \$400 million.

For reasons of economy and efficiency of operations, joint use of facilities by more than one Reserve component has been emphasized by the Department of Defense in recent years. All new construction is evaluated for potential

joint use. Many new Armed Forces Reserve Centers efficiently house several units of two, three, or even four different Reserve components.

However, joint facility use is not an immediate panacea since most existing facilities are sized to accommodate only one unit. Construction of new joint-use facilities that would replace existing facilities with useful life remaining is an unlikely economic option. So progress will be slow, but there is an effective mechanism in place to monitor and direct that progress.

Environmental responsibilities are intertwined with facility management. The Reserve components have a responsibility to comply with existing Federal, state, and local environmental laws. Not only are they concerned with day-to-day compliance with regulations, but also they are involved in the engineering and budget activities to meet future requirements, as well as correction of past problems.

Table 7-1 provides additional details on Reserve component facilities.

**Table 7-1**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT FACILITIES**

	<u>Total Facility Locations</u>	<u>Separate Communities</u>	<u>Number Buildings/ Structures</u>	<u>Number Jointly Used</u>
Army National Guard	3,267	2,898	21,064	424
Army Reserve	1,457	1,313	2,184	176
Naval Reserve	259	244	1,824	156
Marine Corps Reserve	193	185	132 <sup>1</sup>	139
Air National Guard	184	184	5,400	46
Air Force Reserve	71	71	715	63
Coast Guard Reserve <sup>2</sup>	0	0	0	0

Notes: 1. Figures for Marine Corps Reserve are based on structures and buildings of Marine Corps owned, managed, and leased sites for 4th Marine Division sites only.

2. Reserve units share space with Active component commands and/or DoD Active and Reserve component training centers.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.



### Adequacy of Facilities

Modern, efficient facilities can improve unit readiness and reduce operating costs. When the Reserve components are surveyed to evaluate the adequacy of their existing facilities, the common threads which define inadequacy are:

- physical deterioration, structural limitations, or lack of capacity of the utility systems.
- functional obsolescence which impedes the current missions.
- lack of minimum essential space for the assigned people to work.
- lack of proper storage for individual and unit equipment.
- absence of a particular type of structure to accommodate new or expanded mission requirements.

Each Reserve component evaluates adequacy from a slightly different perspective.

- The Army's Reserve components have generally the oldest facilities and suffer from overcrowding and lack of storage and maintenance space. Larger units with more and larger equipment have outgrown existing facilities.

- The Naval and Marine Corps Reserves have used a strategy of consolidation to eliminate many of their most inadequate facilities. But many old, dysfunctional facilities remain.
- The Air Force's Reserve components often face major aircraft conversion milestones that necessitate major changes in aircraft test and repair requirements. The facilities which supported the previously-assigned aircraft, while not necessarily deteriorated, are ill-suited to properly support the newly assigned aircraft.

A summary of each Reserve component's assessment of facilities considered inadequate is shown, by percent, as follows:

Component	Percent Considered Inadequate
• Army National Guard	40
• Army Reserve	25
• Marine Corps Reserve	30
• Naval Reserve	29
• Air National Guard	70
• Air Force Reserve	39



The percent of inadequate facilities shown for the Army Reserve does not include many inadequate leased facilities. The section on leased facilities provides further details.

The Board believes that lack of adequate facilities in the Reserve components has a negative effect on training and readiness and hinders recruiting and retention efforts.

### **Military Construction**

Since January 1990, the Department of Defense has exercised special controls over the execution of military construction and land acquisition. The controls on military construction will continue until at least September 1992. However, in their current form, these controls serve as a final check on a project's necessity and do not artificially impede the initiation of a project. The land acquisition controls have been embodied in internal departmental operating procedures. The Department of Defense is being especially careful to acquire only that land which is absolutely essential to current and future operations. Most new Guard and Reserve facilities require acquisition of land well below the threshold of 1,000 acres or \$1,000,000.



Since those special controls did not affect projects for which construction contracts were awarded before January 20, 1990, there was a great deal of activity during fiscal year 1991. The Reserve components reported a total of 196 projects completed and accepted for their use during the fiscal year. The details are shown in table 7-2.

**Table 7-2**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT**  
**MAJOR CONTRUCTION**  
**PROJECTS COMPLETED**

	<b>FY 1990</b>	<b>FY 1991</b>
Army National Guard	74	104
Army Reserve	20	12
Naval Reserve	19	6
Marine Corps Reserve	8	2
Air National Guard	73	50
Air Force Reserve	<u>28</u>	<u>22</u>
DoD Total Number of Projects Completed	222	196

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

The Department of Defense recognizes the need for modern, efficient facilities for all of its activities. But it decided it needed to fund the Reserve component military construction program in fiscal years 1991 and 1992 at levels significantly less than the Congress had suggested in prior year committee reports. The Department of Defense's position is that its budget represents a balanced approach to military construction requirements for Active and Reserve components. Congress, however, made major additions to both the fiscal year's 1991 and 1992 Reserve component construction program budget requests.

In fiscal year 1991, as noted in Table 7-2, \$690 million was appropriated against a Department of Defense request of \$280 million. Most of those additional military construction appropriations did support the readiness and mobilization capability of the Reserve components.

For fiscal year 1992, Congress appropriated \$629 million, a substantial increase to the Department of Defense's \$282 million request.

For the six-year period including fiscal years 1987 through 1992, \$3.66 billion has been appropriated for Reserve component facilities. Some of this money has gone to construct facilities that support new missions, especially in the Air Force's Reserve components. The remainder has been used to improve the facilities of existing units and enhance maintenance and mobilization capabilities. While there still are many Reserve component facilities in need of renovation, expansion, or replacement, the Board notes the current high state of unit readiness brought about, in part, by these modern facilities.

*The Board recommends that:*


- *the Department of Defense provide adequate funding for Reserve component military construction.*
- *adequate facilities be constructed and upgraded, as necessary to support training, storage, and administrative requirements of the Reserve components.*
- *Department of Defense policies be reviewed to insure that Active and Reserve military facilities and equipment be made readily available to support drug demand reduction programs in the civilian community.*

**Table 7-3**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING**  
**Fiscal Year 1990 - 1992**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>			
Military Construction Request	114	66	50
Military Construction Appropriation	223	313	231
<b>Army Reserve</b>			
Military Construction Request	77	59	58
Military Construction Appropriation	96	77	110
<b>Naval and Marine Corps Reserves</b>			
Military Construction Request	51	50	21
Military Construction Appropriation	57	80	60
<b>Air National Guard</b>			
Military Construction Request	165	67	132
Military Construction Appropriation	236	181	218
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>			
Military Construction Request	46	38	21
Military Construction Appropriation	46	39	10
<b>DoD Total</b>			
Military Construction Request	453	280	282
Military Construction Appropriation	658	690	629

Note: Coast Guard Reserve does not have Military Construction funding.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Reserve components.  
Data as of November 25, 1991.



### **Reserve Component Facilities Investment Strategy**

The cost to renovate or replace all inadequate facilities and buildings is too large to expect a quick fix. And given the current uncertainties of Reserve component force levels and missions, a massive infusion of construction dollars into new facilities would probably not be wise at this time.

The Board recognizes there will be important Reserve component facilities implications associated with pending force structure, force mix, end strength, and base structure changes the Department of Defense will be implementing over the next few years. In some cases, missions transferred to the Reserve components from the Active components will require substantial new construction to support new force structure. In other cases, units leaving the force structure may present an opportunity to consolidate or move from leased into Service-owned facilities. Where Reserve component enclaves are established at Active component bases to be closed, maximum use will be made of existing facilities, but some new construction may be required for efficient consolidation and maximum return on disposal of excess acreage.

The Reserve components report a total construction backlog of \$8.87 billion as of the end of fiscal year 1991. The breakout by component is shown in the Table 7-4.

**Table 7-4**  
**CONSTRUCTION BACKLOG**  
**(Dollars in Billions)**

	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992<sup>1</sup></u>
Army National Guard	3.13	3.02
Army Reserve	2.48	2.33
Naval/Marine Corps Reserves	1.20	1.10
Air National Guard	1.50	1.54
Air Force Reserve	<u>0.56</u>	<u>0.47</u>
<b>Total DoD Backlog</b>	<b>8.87</b>	<b>8.46</b>

Note 1: Projected estimates based on  
FY 1992 Programs.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

For several years the Board has supported a facilities investment strategy that sought to reduce the backlog by four percent a year and put the physical plant on a 50-year renewal cycle. Table 7-5 shows the funding required in terms of an annual investment to achieve that goal. The Board continues to believe it is a sound investment strategy, but notes, in light of the uncertainties just discussed, that the Reserve components should review and validate their construction backlogs to ensure the funding strategy remains a credible measure of resource allocation adequacy.

**Table 7-5**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT FACILITIES INVESTMENT STRATEGY**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<b>Military Construction Backlog</b>	<b>Yearly Reduction</b>	<b>Plant Value</b>	<b>Yearly Renewal</b>	<b>Yearly Investment</b>
Army National Guard	3,133	125	10,600	212	337
Army Reserve	2,483	99	3,600	72	171
Naval Reserve	1,098	44	3,600	72	116
Marine Corps Reserve	94	4	100	2	6
Air National Guard	1,500	60	10,200	204	264
Air Force Reserve	561	22	2,000	40	62
<b>DoD Total</b>	<b>8,869</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>30,100</b>	<b>602</b>	<b>956</b>

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
 Data as of September 30, 1991.

*The Board recommends that additional Reserve component military construction funding be provided, as required, to reduce backlogs in construction and maintenance repair projects.*

### **Leased Facilities**

The use of leased facilities has proven to be a good short-term solution for the Reserve components faced with an immediate need for facilities. In fiscal year 1991, there were 705 Department of Defense-leased facilities for the Reserve components as shown as follows:

• Army National Guard	73
• Army Reserve	605
• Naval Reserve	14
• Marine Corps Reserve	6
• Air National Guard	0
• Air Force Reserve	7
<b>DoD Total</b>	<b>705</b>

The Army Reserve continues to require the largest number of leases to meet its facility needs. Some benefits may be derived from the availability of Active component facilities

vacated, as a result of force structure reductions, and from the opportunity to retain Reserve enclaves on Active component bases selected to be closed. In the meantime, this is an area of expenditure that should be closely monitored, for the cumulative expense of the Reserve components' leases is placing extraordinary demands on operations and maintenance funds, which could be used for maintenance of existing facilities or other programs.

### **Base Closures**

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 established the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Commission was established to consider base closure recommendations from the Secretary of Defense. Under the Act's provisions, only installations which employed more than 300 full-time civilians were eligible to be included on the Secretary's list.

Therefore, most Reserve component installations and facilities were not included in this exhaustive review. However, the Reserve components worked very closely with their parent Services during the entire process.

There was a very important issue that had to be carefully managed: retention of appropriate Reserve component enclaves at bases which were to be closed.

As a result of their work within the Department of Defense, and coordination with the Commission during its deliberations, the Reserve components have enabling language in the final report that will allow flexibility to consolidate existing activities at bases to be closed. This process will not circumvent the Department of Defense's, the Commission's, nor the Congress' intent to close and dispose of military assets. All agree that only in an exceptional circumstance would it make sense for the Reserve components to be forced to move from existing government-owned facilities and attempt to acquire new ones in the limited geographical region which provides members to a Reserve component unit.

The Board is concerned about the potential impact of base closures on Reserve component training and readiness. Some base closure decisions may have positive impact if facilities currently used by Active components become available for Reserve component use. However, a Reserve unit relocated to a military installation must be supported by the recruiting demographics of the area. Reserve units located in civilian communities adjacent to military installations marked for closure may be affected if that installation provides support services. There may be an adverse impact on individual units if adequate replacement facilities are not located and funded in timely manner. The Board anticipates that opportunities for consolidation and joint use will occur.

During fiscal year 1991, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission's base realignment decisions did not affect any existing Army Reserve properties. The Army Reserve is validating requirements, and reviewing opportunities presented by the Commission's decisions, to reduce the Army Reserve's facility shortages and reduce its construction backlog. The Army Reserve may be able to eliminate some high-cost leases and consolidate operations.

Army Reserve facilities at Fort Dix, New Jersey, for example, located in training, maneuver and range areas comprising over 27,000 acres, were exempted from closure by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's language. Plans are under development for extensive use of Fort Dix by the Army's Reserve components. The Reserve components of other Services have also expressed interest in the use of Fort Dix.

The Army Reserve is especially interested in those closed or realigned installations in or near urban centers where Metropolitan Consolidated Reserve complexes could be established. The Army Reserve is also interested in rural locations with a reasonable commuting distance of urban areas where Consolidated Regional Support Hubs could be created to service the metropolitan complexes and Reserve centers in the region. Other Services have been approached and the Army Reserve's requirements are being incorporated in their implementation plans.

The Naval Reserve is working with the Army to identify building space at Fort Dix to consolidate three Naval Reserve centers at a Readiness Command, as well as establish a training mobilization center for future recalls and training of large numbers of Reservists or hardware-intensive units such as fleet hospitals. The Army provided nine buildings for Naval Reserve use during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Additionally, Army facilities at Fort Dix were made available to two 500-bed Naval Reserve fleet hospital units preparing for deployment.

There was no impact on the Naval Reserve in fiscal year 1991 as a result of base closure actions. The bases to be closed, as a result of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report, will not provide significant impact on the Naval Reserve in the outyears. The Naval Reserve plans to relocate Reserve units from four Active component bases scheduled for closure in fiscal year 1991. Disruption created by physically relocating a unit may have short-term negative impact on the readiness of affected units.

Marine Corps Reserve units were not affected by base closures in fiscal year 1991.

For the Air Force Reserve, the closure announcement in April 1991, created initial uncertainty. The announcement indicated that the Air Force Reserve would operate cantonment areas at the following bases to be closed: Carswell and Bergstrom Air Force Bases, in Texas; and Grissom Air Force Base in Indiana. At Bergstrom Air Force Base, the Reserve operation would be contingent upon the City of Austin, Texas's operation of the airfield. At Carswell Air Force Base, it was assumed that "someone" other than the Air Force Reserve would operate the airfield, and at Grissom Air Force Base, the Reserve would operate the basic airfield operations and certain other functions would be "mothballed" for future contingencies. The Air Force Reserve will experience a temporary disruption during the consolidation and new construction required by the announced closures.

The Board continues to urge that serious consideration be given to the impact of base closure on the Reserve components.

*The Board recommends that the Reserve components use the current base closure*

*commission process as an opportunity to review Active component facilities from the standpoint of consolidation and closure.*

### **Environmental Issues and the Reserve Components**

This year's report includes several new sections on the effects of environmental issues on the Reserve components. The Board recognizes that the cost to comply with existing and anticipated future regulations will place major new demands on military construction as well as operations and maintenance budgets. The Board believes it can assist the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment to focus attention on the broad range of environmental issues facing the Reserve components. The Board is taking a proactive approach on environmental training in cooperation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment and the Active and Reserve components.

A summary of the Reserve components' major environmental requirements is shown in Table 7-6.



**Table 7-6**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS**  
(Dollars in millions)

<u>Component</u>	<u>Number of Sites Identified Cleanup</u>	<u>Est Cost of Cleanup</u>	<u>Dollars Obligated (FY 1991)</u>	<u>Dollars Planned (FY 1992)</u>	<u>Most Costly Remediation Required</u>	<u>Second Most Costly Remediation</u>
Army National Guard	83	\$ 59.4	\$ 2.4	\$ 16.7	Underground Storage Tanks	Hazardous Waste
Army Reserve	multiple	\$ 75.0	\$11.8	\$ 17.0	Underground Storage Tanks	Asbestos Removal
Naval Reserve	133	\$ 42.1	\$ 2.3	\$ 5.6	Asbestos Removal	Underground Storage Tanks
Marine Corps Reserve	41	\$ 8.2	\$ 0.1	\$ 3.2	Oil/Water Separators	Underground Storage Tanks
Air National Guard	275	\$302.2	\$ 0	\$ 34.4	Underground Storage Tanks	Environment Assessments
Air Force Reserve	22	\$ 17.0	\$ 0.3	\$ 1.4	Retaining Trained Professionals	IRP Site Closeout (for FY92)
Coast Guard Reserve	22	\$ unk	\$ 9.3	\$ 15.5	Environment Assessments	Underground Storage Tanks

Source: The Reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1991.

Removal of underground storage tanks is the most pressing and most expensive environmental compliance issue the various Reserve components are presently facing. Additional impact would occur in added funds and time needed to purchase fuel from the civilian sector. As more single-walled tanks are removed from service in preparation for the 1998 deadline for removal of all tanks from service, the problem is exacerbated.

### **Environmental Training**

The requirements placed on the various Reserve component and other Department of Defense environmental training programs are increasing. The major factors are an increased

number of positions requiring specially trained individuals, a high turnover rate as qualified people leave for higher paying environmental positions outside the Department of Defense, and the ever increasing complexity and scope of environmental regulations. Some of the highlights of the environmental training programs of each of the Reserve components follow.

Environmental training for the Army National Guard is coordinated by their Environmental Resources Management Office, which supports over 150 state environmental specialists working on 18 major environmental programs. More than 90 percent of the state environmental specialists received specialized training during fiscal year 1991.

Army Reserve soldiers and civilians attend environmental and occupational health and safety courses offered by the Logistics Management College and others.


Commanding officers and public works officers in the Naval Reserve may attend an environmental orientation course hosted by the Civil Engineer Corps Officer School, which is tailored to meet the specific needs of the individual and to focus on individual problem areas. Additionally, the Navy Energy and Environment Support Activity offers numerous environmental training courses that all Naval Air Reserve air installation environmental coordinators attend.

All Marine Corps Reserve personnel who fill environmental positions attend courses in hazardous materials and hazardous waste management offered by the Marine Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency.

The Air National Guard conducts nine different environmental training courses which are offered to environmental specialists and managers, including Adjutants General, field commanders, and National Guard Bureau division chiefs. The Environmental Communications Training course for environmental project managers has been especially successful. Cross training with other agencies has been implemented and additional programs are being developed.

The Air Force Reserve carefully manages assignment and retention of environmental professionals at their bases and major command levels. Environmental training for senior commanders and base-level environmental professionals is accomplished by the Air Force Institute of Technology and the use of various environmental training seminars. Technicians attend courses appropriate to their specialties.

The Coast Guard Reserve is developing in-house formal environmental training programs as part to their overall life-cycle hazardous material and waste minimization program. In the meantime, essential training is provided by the Active component's maintenance and logistics commands.



### **Hazardous Waste Minimization and Recycling**

The Reserve components are also actively pursuing programs to minimize hazardous waste material generation. For example, in February 1991, the Air Force Reserve completed a Hazardous Waste Minimization Study for all continental U. S. Air Force Reserve bases. This study identified several hazardous material substitutions which could reduce the quantity of waste generated, as well as, lessen health risks for operators.

Recyclable materials and procedures are being used to minimize bulk sent to landfills, reduce manufacturing costs, and save raw materials.



## **Department of Defense Environmental Goals**

In the three major environmental areas of compliance, hazardous waste minimization, and restoration or remediation of existing conditions, the Department of Defense has taken an aggressive and responsible stance. Previously established goals include that:

- additional funds be set aside to be spent for environmental compliance activities. The Department of Defense will spend approximately \$1.4 billion in fiscal year 1992.
- the reduction of annual hazardous waste disposal be increased by 50 percent by the end of 1992 compared to a 1987 baseline.
- the clean-up of hazardous waste sites be recognized as the Department of Defense's greatest environmental challenge. Surveys have already identified more than 17,480 sites on 1,855 of its installations, and current estimates of cleanup costs are in excess of \$14 billion.

The Department of Defense's goal is to commence all site restoration actions by the year 2000. This effort will reduce future cleanup, storage, and disposal actions. The Department of Defense has conceived an environmental vision that will make protection of the environment an integral part of its overall mission. To achieve this vision, the following six Defense environmental goals have been proposed:

- Achieve regulatory agreement on Department of Defense actions required for full and sustained compliance with Federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations.
- Commence all required installation restoration program remedial actions by the year 2000.
- Reduce the Department's solid waste disposals by 10 percent in each of the next five years.

- Reduce the Department's hazardous waste disposals 25 percent from the 1992 level by 1995
- Review all military specifications and standards that use hazardous materials and determine by December 1993, where alternative materials/processes would reduce environmental risks.
- Implement community outreach plans throughout the Department of Defense by December 1993.

In addition, the Department of Defense is addressing eight areas in which management improvements will allow it to conduct its environmental business more effectively and efficiently. Those areas include:

- integrating management of environmental programs through changes in the budgeting and accounting process.
- improving the Department's interface with regulators at all levels from individual installations to the national level.
- qualifying alternative materials that have less pollution potential for use throughout the Department of Defense, as well as, in specific unique applications.
- devising methods to promote contractor pollution prevention plans.
- coordinating environmental training and cross-component application of expertise in the Department of Defense technical centers.
- strengthening environmental career programs.
- emphasizing personal environmental accountability by members of the Department of Defense community.
- improving the identification of the Department's environmental research and development requirements.

## Department of Defense Environmental Initiatives

The Department of Defense wants to be seen as the leader in the national environmental effort. To this end, environmental initiatives abound within the Department of Defense. Many of these may prove to alleviate some of the concerns of the Reserve components previously discussed in this chapter. The Board supports and encourages these initiatives, and notes that:

- the Department of Defense is making a concerted effort to find suitable alternatives to the hazardous materials specified in many military and Federal standards and specifications.
- the Department of Defense is incorporating environmental training for weapon systems program managers.
- the Department of Defense is developing an integrated (strategic) environmental education and training plan to improve education and training programs for military and civilian personnel.
- the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment is studying ways to create more attractive environmental career field options.
- the Department of Defense is considering including environmental responsibilities in all appropriate civilian and military job descriptions.




*The Board commends the efforts of the Department of Defense to assist the Reserve components to comply with environmental requirements. However, the Board is concerned about adequate funding for the problems already identified and about protection from personal liability (civil and criminal) for Reserve component commanders and members. If additional legislation, which may be unique to the Reserve components, is necessary to protect these commanders and other members who are operating reasonably and responsibly, the Board will support it.*

*The Board recommends that the Department of Defense increase its efforts and assume the lead in a three tier national effort toward resolving environmental issues. Those three tiers are:*

- *investigate sites and organizations for environmental shortfalls, establish corrective measures, and begin remediation as soon as possible.*
- *continue research into training, material, and procedure alternatives which will avoid future environmental problems. Foster supplier contracts which offer alternative chemicals, metals, and fuel sources that provide environmentally sound substitutes.*
- *provide environmental training for all personnel, to include executive, manager, supervisor, and individual level.*

*The Board also recommends that:*

- *each of the Active and Reserve components establish an office specifically devoted to environmental issues, compliance, and training.*
- *the Services reevaluate attendance criteria for the numerous environmental training opportunities they offer, and allow up to 20 percent of each class to be filled by managers, supervisors, and executives from the civilian sector on a non-reimbursable basis.* (U)





# Board Activities in FY 1991 A

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## General

Numerous activities conducted during fiscal year 1991 enabled the Board to fulfill its mission as principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve components. Activities included quarterly board meetings and a special meeting following the Presidential Ready Reserve call-up upon the commencement of Operation DESERT STORM in January, 1991; alumni meeting; briefings; Congressional hearings; committee fact-finding trips; meetings with defense policy makers and Congressional leaders; visitations to selected government agencies; and information exchanges with appointed officials, various military associations, key staff members from executive departments and agencies. In addition, the Board contributed reports and articles for various defense-related conferences and publications.

## Board Meetings

The Board met during fiscal year 1991 on the following dates:

- December 3-5, 1990
- January 24, 1991 (Special Meeting)
- March 4-6, 1991
- June 3-5, 1991
- September 9-11, 1991



## Meetings with Military and Civilian Leaders

- Alton, Colonel Ronnie D., USA  
Acting Chief of Mobilization,  
Plans and Programs Branch (J4)  
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Atwood, Honorable Donald J., Jr.  
Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Baker, Honorable James A., III  
Secretary of State
- Baratto, Brigadier General D. J., USA  
Commanding General,  
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
- Barr, Major General John, British Army  
Deputy Chief of Staff,  
Allied Forces, Northern Europe
- Bartholomew, Ambassador Reginald  
Under Secretary of State for  
International Security Affairs
- Boorda, Vice Admiral J. M., USN  
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for  
Manpower, Personnel, and Training
- Brick, Mr. Samuel T., Jr.  
Director, Legislative Reference Service,  
Office of the General Counsel, DoD
- Brown, Brigadier General Gary E., USMC  
Director, Personnel Procurement Division  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Burdick, Major General Donald, USA  
Director, Army National Guard
- Burr, Brigadier General (P) Hiram H., Jr.,  
USA Deputy Director of Operations (J3)  
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Campbell, Brigadier General Donald F., USAR  
Commander, 353d Civil Affairs Command
- Carney, Major General Thomas P., USA  
Director, Program Analysis and  
Evaluation Directorate  
Department of the Army

- Cheney, Honorable Dick  
Secretary of Defense
- Clarke, Honorable Richard A.  
Assistant Secretary of State  
for Politico-Military Affairs
- Closner, Major General John J., III, USAF  
Chief of the Air Force Reserve
- Conaway Lieutenant General John B., USAF  
Chief, National Guard Bureau
- Cooper, Lieutenant General M.T., USMC  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower  
and Reserve Affairs,  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Davison, Major General Hollis E., USMC  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for  
Manpower and Reserve Affairs,  
for Reserve Affairs  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Duncan, Honorable Stephen M.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Reserve Affairs
- Ellerson, Brigadier General John, USA  
J-3, Southern Command
- Farrell, Brigadier General  
Lawrence P., Jr., USAF  
Deputy Director of Programs and Evaluation  
Department of the Air Force
- Fisher, Brigadier General  
George A., Jr., USA  
Commanding General, Joint Readiness  
Training Command
- Foley, Major General Thomas C., USA  
Commanding General  
U.S. Army Armor Center
- Gardner, Major General Donald R., USMC  
Deputy Chief of Staff for  
Requirements and Programs  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Green, Colonel Ronald, USA  
Executive Officer, 50th Anniversary of  
World War II Commemoration Committee



- Guthrie, Rear Admiral Wallace N., USNR  
Deputy Director of Naval Reserve
- Ham, Mr. Douglas B.  
Deputy Administrator, Research  
and Special Programs Administration  
Department of Transportation
- Hartzog, Brigadier General W. W., USA  
Commanding General, U.S. Army South
- Hurteau, Brigadier General Joseph C, USAR  
Deputy Commanding General (IMA)  
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
- Jehn, Honorable Christopher  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Force Management and Personnel
- Jeremiah, Admiral David E., USN  
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Joulwan, General George A., USA  
Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command
- Kamman, Mr. Curtis W.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
for European and Canadian Affairs

- Kelly, Ambassador John H.  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Killey, Major General Phillip G., USAF  
Director, Air National Guard
- Kilmartin, Brigadier General T. J., USAR  
Commanding General  
U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center
- Kime, Admiral J. William, USCG  
Commandant, United States Coast Guard
- Kimmitt, Honorable Robert M.  
Under Secretary of State  
for Political Affairs
- Lawrence, Mr. G. Andrew  
Executive Director, National Committee  
for Employer Support of the Guard  
and Reserve
- Leback, Mr. Warren G.  
Administrator of the Maritime  
Administration  
Department of Transportation
- Locher, Honorable James R., III  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Special Operations and  
Low Intensity Conflict
- McPeak, General Merrill A., USAF  
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
- Mendez, Honorable Enrique Jr., M.D.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Health Affairs
- Mooney, Brigadier General H. T., USAR  
Commander, 352d Civil Affairs Command
- Morency, Mr. Donald C.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Reserve Affairs)
- Mundy, General Carl E., Jr., USMC  
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
- Murtha, Honorable John P.  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense,  
House Committee on Appropriations
- Nelson, Major General Fred R., USAF  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air,  
Allied Forces, Northern Europe
- Oliver, Rear Admiral David R., Jr., USN  
Director, General Planning and  
Programming Division,  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Planty, Mr. Donald J.  
Charge d' Affairs,  
American Embassy, Norway
- Powell, General Colin L., USA  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Reardon, Mr. Michael P.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the  
Air Force (Reserve Affairs)
- Rees, Lieutenant General C. H., Jr., USAF  
Vice Commander-in-Chief,  
U.S. Air Force, Europe
- Rees, Major General Raymond F., USA  
Director, Army National Guard
- Rosamond, Mr. John B.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Material  
and Facilities  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for Reserve Affairs
- Rudshagen, Lieutenant General John  
Norway Defense Force  
Chief of Joint Staff, Defense Command  
Norway
- Sandler, Major General Roger W., USA  
Chief, Army Reserve
- Sansome, Mr. Wallace  
Deputy Commander, Military Sealift  
Command
- Shepperd, Brigadier General Donald W.,  
USAF  
Deputy Director, Air National Guard
- Shirley, Ms. Katherine H.  
Associate Coordinator for Counter-  
Terrorism  
Office of the Secretary of State

- Skinner, Honorable Samuel K.  
Secretary of Transportation
- Smith, Vice Admiral Leighton W., Jr., USN  
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans,  
Policy, and Operations, (OP-06)
- Smith, Lieutenant General Norman, H., USMC  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower  
and Reserve Affairs  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Stiner, General Carl W., USA  
Commander-In-Chief,  
U.S. Special Operations Command
- Studeman, Vice Admiral William O., USN  
Director, National Security Agency
- Sullivan, General Gordon R., USA  
Chief of Staff of the Army
- Taylor, Rear Admiral James E., USN  
Director of Naval Reserve
- Vincent, Colonel William, USA  
Chief of the Integration and  
Assessment Division (J-8)  
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Ward, Major General William F., Jr., USA  
Chief, Army Reserve
- Wilhelm, Brigadier General Charles E., USMC  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Missions  
and Applications  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for Special Operations and  
Low Intensity Conflict

#### **Briefings Received by the Board**

- Army Reserve Command and Control  
Structure
- Defense Intelligence Agency Middle East  
Update
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Update
- Department of Defense Environmental  
Issues Update



- Total Force Policy Study Status
- National Security Agency Orientation Visit
- Combat Brigade Training for Operation  
DESERT STORM
- Employer Support for Operations DESERT  
SHIELD/STORM
- Services' Perspectives of Reserve Call-up
- Secretary of Defense Perspectives on  
Reserve Component Issues and Concerns
- Partial Mobilization—Legal Aspects and  
Implications
- Status of Operations—Department of Army  
Perspective
- Status of Operations—Department of Navy  
Perspective
- Status of Operations—Department of Air  
Force Perspective
- Status of Operations—Coast Guard  
Perspective
- Special Remarks from the Vice Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Defense Intelligence Agency Updates on  
Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing on Operations  
DESERT SHIELD/STORM





- Visit to the National Military Command Center Complex
- Partial Mobilization Impacts on the Army's Reserve Components
- Partial Mobilization Impacts on the Naval Reserve
- Partial Mobilization Impacts on the Marine Corps Reserve
- Partial Mobilization Impacts on Air Force's Reserve Components
- Partial Mobilization Impacts on the Coast Guard Reserve
- Partial Mobilization Procedures, Law, and Statutes
- Legislative and Legal Issues Concerning Reserve Components
- Reserve Components Issues and Budget Implications
- Role of the Department of State and Relationships with Department of Defense
- Crisis Management of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM
- Near East and South Asian Affairs Briefing
- European Affairs Briefing
- International Security Briefing
- Counter-Terrorism Update
- Personnel Issues of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and Demobilization Planning
- Civil Affairs and Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM Briefing
- Service Perspectives on the Individual Ready Reserve
- Ready Reserve Fleet Update
- Reserve Component Demobilization from the Persian Gulf
- Update on Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SEA ANGEL
- Worldwide Intelligence Update
- Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM Reserve Components Emerging Lessons Learned
- Mobility Requirements Study Briefing
- Overseas Mission Study Briefing
- Merchant Marine Issues
- Special Remarks by the Secretary of Transportation
- Special Assessment of Army National Guard Brigade Mobilization
- Base Closings Update
- Department of Defense's 50th Anniversary Celebration of World War II
- Lessons Learned from the Persian Gulf-Services' Perspectives
- Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Impact of Reserve Components
- Special Operations Command Overview

- Service Chiefs' Perspectives-State of the Service
- Department of Defense Legislative Issues 91
- Special Remarks by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Update on Reserve Affairs
- Special Remarks from the Reserve Chiefs
- Manpower and Personnel Issues Update
- Update on Health Affairs Issues

### **Committees**

The Board has standing committees to study and formulate recommendations on issues relating to the following areas:


- Logistics Committee  
Chairman: Major General Donald L. Owens, ANGUS
- Personnel Committee  
Chairman: Rear Admiral Samuel E. McWilliams, USNR
- Training and Mobilization Committee  
Chairman: Major General Harvey J. McCarter, USAFR

### **Visits to Training and Field Activities**

Members and staff of the Logistics Committee visited the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation (USODC), Headquarters, Defense Command Norway (DEFCOMNOR), Allied Forces North (AFNORTH) Headquarters, in Oslo, Norway; the Marines Corps' land prepositioning site in Trondheim, Norway; and the Army's Equipment Maintenance Center-Europe, in Ramstein, Germany during the period October 29 to November 2, 1990. The purpose of the visit was to familiarize the committee members with the Norwegian civilian/Reserve support to the Marine Corps' land prepositioning program, and to observe Reserve components units undergoing training at the Army Equipment Maintenance Center-

Europe. The trip resulted in a number of committee recommendations to the Board regarding the maximum, efficient utilization of Reserve component personnel in the European theater.

On January 14-17, 1991, members of the Personnel Committee and staff traveled to Panama. The committee visited the following commands and units: Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Quarry Heights; Headquarters, U.S. Army South (USARSO), Fort Clayton; Headquarters, U.S. Navy South (USNAVSO), Fort Amador; 240th Reserve and Readiness Mobility Squadron, Howard Air Force Base; Jungle Operations and Training Battalion, Fort Sherman; Army National Guard Task Force 354 (TF 354), Nombre de Dios; Albrook Postal Detachment, Albrook Air Force Base; and the Army National Guard Field Medical Training site, Howard Air Force Base, Panama. Committee members were familiarized and updated on the missions and operations of USSOUTHCOM, lessons learned from Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, and observed the training of Reserve component units in theater.

Members and staff of the Training and Mobilization Committee visited the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky; and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during the period August 21-24, 1991. The trip provided the committee members with an excellent overview of the U.S. Army's Combat Training Center and Family of Simulations programs. 







# Reserve Forces Policy Board Staff **B**

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## Staff Directors



**Colonel Michael D. Brownell**  
U.S. Army Reserve



**Captain Mileva M. Hartman**  
U.S. Naval Reserve



**Colonel Robert M. Richards, Jr.**  
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

## Enlisted Advisor



**Colonel James C. Ward**  
U.S. Air Force Reserve



**Colonel Richard P. Morton**  
Army National Guard  
of the United States



**Master Sergeant  
Larry R. Adams**  
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

## Part-Time Consultant



**Major General Joseph D. Zink**  
Air National Guard of the  
United States (Ret)

## Executive Secretary



**Mrs. Brenda Dent**

## Staff Secretary



**Mrs. Deborah Joseph**

## Adjunct Staff

The Board is also supported by individuals from various offices and Reserve components who provide administrative support for Board meetings, assist in the preparation of the Annual Report and assist on special projects and activities. Those who have served during the past year, and their unit of assignment, are listed below:

- Senior Airman Shawn A. Akey, ANGUS  
103d Mission Support Squadron
- Sergeant Major M. Eugene Andruss, OKARNG  
HHC, 45th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
- Yeoman Third Class Marguerite Kendall, USNR  
Naval Reserve Op-04, Component 106
- Staff Sergeant Jerry McBride, USAR  
464th Transportation Company  
(Medium Boat)
- Lance Corporal Cecelia R. Medbery, USMCR  
Individual Ready Reserve
- Yeoman Second Class Muriel E. Oliver, USNR  
Naval Reserve PERSMOBTEAM 806
- Technical Sergeant Debra A. Ruf, USAFR  
913th Tactical Airlift Group
- Staff Sergeant Victor A Turner, ANGUS  
113th Tactical Fighter Wing
- Colonel Ernest R. Zuick, CAANG  
Headquarters, California Air National Guard



## Liaison Officers


The Board was assisted by the following liaison officers assigned by the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, and Military Departments.


- Captain Hugh Baumgardner, USNR  
Office of the Chief of Naval Reserve
- Colonel James T. Bridges, ANGUS  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans  
and Operations  
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
- Captain Kevin M. Burke, USMCR  
Reserve Affairs Division  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Lieutenant Colonel James A. Coar, USA  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Operations and Plans  
Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Colonel Jonathan B. Dodson, USA  
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Lieutenant Larry Fernandez, USCGR  
Office of the Chief, Reserve Programs  
Division  
Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard
- Lieutenant Colonel David S. Gauntlett, ANGUS  
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Colonel Thomas Jacobus, USA  
Office of the Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for Reserve Affairs
- Lieutenant Colonel Norman N. Johnson, USA  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Operations and Plans  
Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Colonel Gerald S. Kean, ANGUS  
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of the Air Force (Reserve Affairs)

- Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Kohner, USAR  
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Colonel Paul W. Lavender, USAF  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff,  
Plans and Operations  
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
- Colonel David J. MacKay, USAF  
Office of the Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for Force Management  
and Personnel
- Colonel James Moore, USAR  
Office of the Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for Special Operations  
and Low Intensity Conflict
- Mr. Ernest C. Milner  
Office of the Director of Naval Reserve
- Lieutenant Colonel Larry Ondovchik,  
USAR  
Office of the Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for Health Affairs
- Lieutenant Colonel Charles F.  
Pendergast, Jr., USAR  
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Lieutenant Commander Paul Redmond,  
USCGR  
Office of the Chief, Reserve Programs  
Division  
Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard
- Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Reynierse,  
USNR  
Office of the Chief of Naval Reserve
- Lieutenant Colonel Pat Schuback, USAR  
National Committee for Employer Support  
of the Guard and Reserve
- Major Stan Spillers, USAF  
National Guard Bureau
- Mr. Houghton Albaugh  
Office of the Comptroller  
Department of Defense

## Former Board Members and Staff

The following Reserve Forces Policy Board members and staff completed their service during this past year:

- Lieutenant General Dennis J. Reimer, USA  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations  
and Plans  
Department of the Army
- Rear Admiral John N. Faigle, USCG  
Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve  
Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard
- Major General Joseph G. Gray, USAR  
Assistant Deputy Chief for Operations  
and Plans (Mobilization)  
Department of the Army
- Major General John L. Matthews, ANGUS  
Adjutant General for the State of Utah
- Brigadier General Robert A. McIntosh,  
USAFR  
Commander, Tenth Air Force
- Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USCGR  
Senior Reserve Officer, Pacific Area
- Major General William J. Porter, USAF  
Director, Personnel Plans,  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
Department of the Air Force
- Rear Admiral P.D. Smith, USN  
Director, Strategy, Plans  
and Policy Division  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Major General Jack Strukel, Jr. USAR  
Commander,  
122d Army Reserve Command
- Major General Joseph D. Zink, ANGUS,  
(Ret)  
Part-time Consultant to the Board
- Master Sergeant Georgianna A.  
Hildebrandt, USMCR  
Senior Enlisted Advisor 




# RESERVE COMPONENT ITEMS IN DOD LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Title	Status
● To Amend Title 10 USC 673b (200,000 Call-Up Authority) for a Term of 180 Days to be Extended Another 180 Days and to Add IRR Members with Military Service Obligations Remaining	In Departmental Coordination
● Authorize Credit for Certain Service Performed Concurrently as a Senior ROTC Member and Member of the Selected Reserve (Would be retroactive for Persian Gulf veterans)	In Departmental Coordination
● Authorize Increasing the Selected Reserve Affiliation Bonus from \$2,000 to \$6,000	In Departmental Coordination
● Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act	Being Revised by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
● Modification of Physical Examination Requirements for Members of the Ready Reserve	To Congress June 19, 1991
● Clarification of Technical Provisions Relating to Promotion of Full-Time National Guard Officers	To OMB January 2, 1991
● Authorize Severance Pay for Certain Reservists Disabled while Traveling to and from Training	To OML July 2, 1991
● Authorize Increase in Age Limitation for Entry into ROTC of Nursing Degree Candidates	To OMB January 2, 1991
● To Amend Title 10, and Title 32, USC, to Improve the Efficiency of the National Guard (To eliminate unnecessary restrictions on personnel procedures and provide greater flexibility in the training, management, and mobilization of the National Guard)	To OMB April 17, 1991
● Tax-Treatment—Authority to Limit Combat Exclusion Withholding to Amount Withheld	To OMB August 9, 1991
● Increase in Combat Zone Exemption to \$2,000 for Officers	To OMB November 19, 1991
● To Modify Reenlistment Eligibility of Certain Former Reserve Officers	In Departmental Coordination



**Reserve Forces Policy Board  
40th Anniversary  
1952 - 1992**



**RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-7300**

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